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The	UK	 construction	 industry	 is	 notorious	 for	 the	 sheer	 amount	of	 disputes	which	
are	 likely	 to	 arise	 on	 each	 building	 and	 engineering	 project.	 	 Despite	 numerous	
creative	 attempts	 at	 “dispute	 avoidance”	 and	 “dispute	 resolution”,	 this	 industry	 is	
still	 plagued	 with	 these	 costly	 disputes.	 	 Whilst	 both	 academic	 literature	 and	
professional	practices	have	investigated	the	causes	of	disputes	and	the	mechanisms	
for	 avoidance/resolution	 of	 these	 disputes,	 neither	 has	 studied	 in	 any	 detail	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 construction	 disputes	 and	 why	 they	 develop	 as	 they	 do	 once	 a	
construction	lawyer	is	engaged.	 	Accordingly,	this	research	explores	the	question	of	
what	 influences	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 construction	 dispute	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 do	
construction	lawyers	control	or	direct	this	outcome?	




The	 basis	 of	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	 and	 indeed	 the	 research	method,	was	 the	
Actor‐Network	 Theory	 (ANT).	 	 As	 such,	 this	 research	 viewed	 a	 dispute	 as	 a	 set	 of	
associations	–	an	entity	which	takes	form	and	acquires	its	attributes	as	a	result	of	its	
relations	 with	 other	 entities.	 	 This	 viewpoint	 is	 aligned	 with	 relational	 contract	
theories,	which	 in	 turn	provides	a	unified	platform	for	exploring	the	disputes.	 	The	
research	 investigated	 the	 entities	 and	 events	 which	 appeared	 to	 influence	 the	
dispute’s	 identity,	 shape	 and	 outcome.	 	 With	 regard	 to	 a	 dispute’s	 trajectory,	 the	
research	 took	 as	 its	 starting	 point	 that	 a	 dispute	 follows	 the	 transformation	 of	
“naming,	blaming,	claiming…”,	as	identified	by	Felstiner,	Abel	and	Sarat	in	1980.	









The	 research	 concludes	 that	 construction	 disputes	 are	 rarely	 ever	 completely	
“resolved”	as	such.		Whilst	an	independent	third	party	may	hand	down	a	judgment,	or	
the	 parties	 may	 reach	 a	 settlement	 agreement,	 this	 state	 is	 only	 temporal.	 	 Some	
construction	disputes	dissipate	whist	others	reach	a	state	of	hibernation	for	a	period	
of	 time	only	 to	pick	up	momentum	and	energy	 some	years	 later.	 	Accordingly,	 this	
research	 suggests	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 “dispute	 resolution”	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 the	UK	
construction	industry.		The	ultimate	goal	should	be	for	parties	to	reach	this	ultimate	
and	 perpetual	 state	 of	 equilibrium	 as	 quickly	 and	 as	 cost	 effectively	 as	 possible:		
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the  risk  of  spending  any  more  money  on  this  dispute.    I  had 
hoped to carry on without the use of lawyers, but this is now out 
of  my  depth.    I  need  this  over  and  done  with  as  quickly  as 
possible.   








Structures  Ltd  had  engaged  Columns  &  Beams  Ltd  to  carry  out  specialist  design  and 
construction  services  on  a  number  of  projects  for  the  past  10  years.    The  Managing 
Directors of both companies had even become close friends.  Nevertheless, at some point 











The	 above	 exchange1	 took	 place	 between	 an	 English	 lawyer,	 who	 specialised	 in	












“It	would,	 I	 think,	be	 true	 to	 say	 that	all	 the	problems	of	excessive	
cost,	excessive	delay,	excessive	prolixity,	excessive	paper	and	 so	on	
are	seen	at	their	worst	in	this	particular	field.”						
Lord	 Bingham	 identified	 eight	 main	 reasons	 why	 this	 is	 so:	 	 the	 fluidity	 of	 the	





the	 claims	 culture	which	 he	 considers	 exists	 to	 an	 unusual	 extent	 in	 this	 industry	
(Bingham,	1998:	2‐4).	
In	addition	to	the	judiciary,	construction	lawyers	also	refer	to	the	complex	nature	of	
construction	disputes	and	construction	projects.	 	One	commonly	sees	 the	 following	
descriptions	on	law	firms’	websites,	blogs	and	articles:		“…large	disputes	are	complex	
and	 involve	 multiple	 contracting	 parties…”	 (Berwin	 Leighton	 Paisner,	 2014),	
“Construction	projects	and	the	disputes	that	arise	from	them	are	invariably	complex…”	
(SR	 Shackleton,	 2015),	 “…it	 is	 sadly	 common	 for	 disputes	 to	 arise	 in	 the	 course	 of	
                                                 









In	 1998,	 Phillip	 Capper,	 a	 leading	 construction	 lawyer	 at	White	 &	 Case	 and	 Nash	







The	 judiciary	 too	 recognises	 that	 construction	 contracts	 by	 their	 very	 nature	 have	
always	 generated	 disputes	 about	 payment	 (Coulson,	 2015:	 4).	 	 May	 LJ	 stated:	 	 In	
“Construction	contracts	do	by	their	nature	generate	disputes	about	payment.	 	If	there	
are	 delays,	 variations	 or	 other	 causes	 of	 additional	 expense,	 those	who	 do	 the	work	
often	 consider	 themselves	 entitled	 to	additional	payment.	 	Those	who	have	 the	work	




Structures	 Ltd	 introduced	 above,	 Mr	 Cahill	 had	 spent	 some	 10	 months	 chasing	




dispute	 resolution	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 an	 outcome	 for	 this	 dispute	 (negotiation,	
litigation	 and	 adjudication).	 	 Throughout	 this	 process,	 Mr	 Cahill	 often	 made	
comments	 to	his	 lawyer	such	as	“I	have	already	spent	more	 time	and	money	on	 this	
                                                 
2	Capper	noted	that	the	JCT	and	ICE	forms	of	contract	tend	to	postpone	matters	of	uncertainty	
under	the	contract	rather	than	seeking	to	determine	them	in,	or	prior	to,	the	execution	of	the	
contract.	 	 It	 is	 left	 to	 the	architect	or	engineer’s	discretion	or	 judgmental	evaluation	during	
the	 course	 of	 the	project	 (eg,	 how	much	work	has	 been	 carried	 out	 and	how	much	money	
should	be	paid	and	when)	(Capper,	1998:	343).	
















sub‐subcontractors	 and	 even	 suppliers.	 	 The	 disputes	 ranged	 in	 scope	 from	 the	
substantive	 merits	 of	 liability,	 to	 quantum,	 legal	 costs	 and	 even	 arguments	 over	
documents	 and	 procedural	 matters	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 litigation	 itself.	 	 By	 way	 of	
example,	 in	 a	 dispute	 between	 the	 main	 contractor,	 Multiplex	 Constructions	 (UK)	
Ltd,	and	the	steelwork	subcontractor,	Cleveland	Bridge	UK	Ltd,	 the	proceeding	was	
in	the	TCC	for	over	two	years,	the	trial	bundle	amounted	to	some	550	lever	arch	files,	
the	 costs	 of	 photocopying	 alone	 approached	 £1m	 and	 the	 parties’	 legal	 costs	
amounted	to	over	£22m	(Multiplex	Constructions	(UK)	Limited	v	Cleveland	Bridge	UK	
Limited,	2008).	
In	 addition	 to	being	 renowned	 for	 their	 complexity	 and	 cost,	 construction	projects	
are	recognised	as	being	“pregnant	with	disputes”	(Linden	Gardens	Trust	Ltd	v	Lenesta	
Sludge	 Disposals	 Ltd,	 1994).	 	 Since	 the	 early	 1990s	 there	 have	 been	 significant	
concerns	 as	 to	 the	 high	 proportion	 of	 disputes	 within	 the	 construction	 industry	
(Coulson,	 2015:4).	 	 The	 general	 consensus	 is	 that	 this	 industry	 endures	 more	
contractual	 disputes	 than	 any	 other	 industry	 (Fenn,	 2002;	 Latham,	 1994).	 	 As	 the	
construction	 lawyer	 Robert	 Peckar	 indicated	 (Peckar,	 2012:13),	 one	 view	 is	 that	
disputes	 on	 construction	 projects	 are	 integral	 or	 inherent	within	 the	 construction	
process:‐				











cutting	 costs.	 	 Sohoni	 (2012:1601)	 notes	 that	 arguments	 about	 hyperlexis	 can	 be	
divided	 into	 three	 categories:	 	 formal	 (arguments	 focusing	 on	 the	 numerosity	 and	
complexity	of	 law),	 institutional	(complaints	 that	 law	unduly	 intrude	on	state,	 local	
or	 individual	 prerogatives)	 and	 subjective	 (policy‐based	 arguments	 about	 costs).5		
Whilst	perhaps	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	say	how	many	construction	disputes	constitute	
too	many	disputes,	it	is	clear	that	the	complaints	are	in	respect	of	the	sheer	number	of	
these	disputes,	and	in	turn	the	cost	incurred	in	dealing	with	them	(from	the	point	of	
view	 of	 parties	 involved,	 not	 policy	 holders).	 	 As	 exemplified	 above,	 the	 general	
consensus	is	among	the	judiciary,	the	lawyers	and	their	clients.		Whether	or	not	these	
perceptions	are	founded	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	research.		However,	the	fact	that	
these	 perceptions	 remain	 consistent	 and	 have	 not	 subsided	 lends	 weight	 to	 the	
argument	 that	 the	 number	 and	 complexity	 of	 these	 disputes	 is	 inevitable.	 	 It	 is	
therefore	 imperative	 that	 studies	 continue	 to	 investigate	 these	 disputes	 and	 how	
they	are	dealt	with.		The	focus	of	this	research	is	just	that:		the	nature	of	the	dispute	






of	 a	dispute,	what	 role	does	 the	 construction	 lawyer	play	 in	 this	process	and	what	
happens	to	a	dispute	once	a	lawyer	is	involved.		For	the	avoidance	of	doubt,	the	aim	
here	 is	 not	 to	 examine	 how	 good	 English	 lawyers	 are	 at	 their	 jobs	 or	 critically	
appraise	the	system	within	which	they	work,	as	R.E.	Megarry	attempted	to	do	in	his	
1962	Hamlyn	Lecture	(Megarry,	1962:	1).	 	Nor	 is	 it	 to	analyse	the	suitability	of	 the	
various	types	of	resolution	procedures	used	for	these	disputes.	 	Rather,	it	examines	










these	 disputes	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 lawyers	 and	 in	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 procedure	
chosen	by	the	parties	and/or	their	lawyers	(or	not	as	the	case	may	be).							








the	TCC	 reported	 82	 judgments,	 in	 2013	 it	 reported	 88	 judgment	 and	 in	 2014,	 77	
judgments.7			
A	 recent	 survey	 conducted	between	1st	 June	2006	and	31st	May	2008	 showed	 that	
more	 than	 90%	 of	 cases	 started	 in	 the	 TCC	 settled	 before	 trial	 (Gould,	 King	 and	




that	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 cases	 were	 settled	 shortly,	 sometimes	 very	 shortly,	
before	trial	(Akenhead,	2013:7).			




policies	which	 promote	 alternative	 dispute	 resolution	 (‘ADR’)	 procedures	 (Resnik,	
2004)?	 	 Has	 the	 chronology	 of	 the	 litigation	 explosion	 of	 the	 mid‐20th	 century,	
resulting	in	a	 ‘jaundiced’	view	of	the	civil	 justice	system	owing	to	the	perception	of	
opportunistic	 claimants,	 greedy	 lawyers	 and	 activist	 judges,	 followed	 by	 a	 trend	
                                                 
6	 A	 further	 example	 is	 the	 dispute	 considered	 in	 City	 Inn	 Ltd	 v	 Shepherd	 Construction	 Ltd	
[2010]	 ScotCS	 CSIH_68.	 	 Here,	 the	 Architect	 issued	 a	 certificate	 of	 non‐completion	 of	 the	
works	in	1999	and	the	employer	started	court	proceedings	in	2000	regarding	the	contractor’s	
entitlement	 to	an	extension	of	 time	(after	having	referred	certain	disputes	to	adjudication).	
After	a	number	of	hearings,	 amendments	 to	pleadings	and	a	 lengthy	 trial,	Lord	Drummond	
Young	 handed	 down	 his	 decision	 in	 2007.	 	 The	 employer	 then	 pursued	 an	 appeal.		






therefore	 towards	 private	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures	 in	 the	 1970s	 minimised	
those	disputes	which	make	it	to	court	(Genn,	2010:	29‐38;	Galanter,	2006)?			
Since	the	late	1990s,	the	courts’	and	UK	government’s	approach	to	civil	litigation	of	
course	 plays	 an	 active	 part	 in	 encouraging	 parties	 to	 settle	 disputes	 rather	 than	
engaging	 in	 protracted	 litigation.	 	 The	 Civil	 Procedure	Rules	 (‘CPR’),	 introduced	 in	
1999	 following	 Lord	Woolf’s	 Final	 Report	 to	 the	 Lord	 Chancellor	 in	 1996	 (Woolf,	
1996),	and	its	overriding	objective	aim	to	ensure	that	costs	are	minimised	and	that	
cases	 are	 dealt	 with	 expeditiously,	 fairly	 and	 proportionately.	 	 The	 overriding	
objective	 of	 the	 CPR	 empowers	 the	 court	 to	 encourage	 parties	 to	 use	 alternative	
dispute	resolution	procedures	(‘ADR’)	if	appropriate.8	 	Furthermore,	as	parties	may	
face	 adverse	 cost	 consequences	 for	 failing	 to	 mediate9	 or	 follow	 the	 Pre‐Action	
Protocol10	 (where	 appropriate),	 the	 system	 is	 designed	 to	 avoid	 litigation	 if	 at	 all	
possible.			
Indeed	 the	 latest	 reforms	 to	 the	 CPR11,	 commonly	 known	 as	 the	 Jackson	 Reforms,	
have	already	deterred	protracted	litigation.	 	 In	the	recent	case	of	Venulum	Property	
Investments	 Ltd	 v	 Space	 Architecture	 Ltd	 &	 others	 (2013)	 the	 Judge	 dismissed	
Claimant’s	 application	 for	an	extension	of	 time	 in	which	 to	serve	 the	Particulars	of	
Claim	 after	 having	 referred	 to	 the	 amended	 CPR	which	 now	 requires	 the	 Court	 to	
enforce	 compliance	 with	 rules,	 practice	 directions	 and	 orders.12	 	 Looking	 at	 the	
circumstances	 as	 a	whole	 and	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 stricter	 approach	 the	 courts	 now	
take,	there	were	insufficient	grounds	to	 justify	the	court	exercising	its	discretion	to	





impact	 on	 deterring	 claimants	 from	 using	 litigation	 in	 the	 future.	 	 It	 clearly	 is	 too	
soon	to	understand	the	impact;	however	in	March	2015	civil	court	fees	significantly	
increased	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	money	 on	 claims	worth	 £10,000	 or	more	 (The	 Civil	




11	Civil	Procedure	(Amendment)	Rules	2013:	 	These	new	rules,	which	came	 into	 force	on	1	
April	 2013,	 are	 significant	 changes	 to	 civil	 procedure.	 	 They	 follow	 on	 from	 Lord	 Justice	
Jackson’s	Review	of	Civil	Litigation	Costs	 (Jackson,	 2010).	 	 The	 key	 objective	 of	 the	 Jackson	






Proceedings	 and	 Family	 Proceedings	 Fees	 (Amendment)	 Order	 2015).	 	 For	 these	
claims	the	new	fee	is	five	per	cent	of	the	value	of	the	claim	capped	at	a	maximum	fee	
of	 £10,000.	 	 So,	 for	 claims	worth	£200,000	and	over,	 the	maximum	 fee	 of	 £10,000	
applies	 (where	 previously	 it	 would	 have	 been	 £1,515)	 –	 an	 increase	 of	 nearly	
600%.13	
Perhaps	 most	 notably	 for	 the	 construction	 industry,	 in	 1996	 the	 government	
introduced	 the	 Arbitration	 Act	 and	 the	 Housing	 Grants,	 Construction	 and	
Regeneration	 Act	 (‘HGCRA’):	 	 two	 statutes	 regulating	 and	 providing	
rights/obligations	in	respect	of	arbitration	and	construction	adjudication.		Hereafter	
the	 industry	 certainly	 saw	a	dramatic	 increase	 in	 the	use	of	 statutory	 construction	
adjudication,	perhaps	deterring	claims	which	were	once	destined	for	litigation.14			
In	addition	to	the	judiciary’s	and	government’s	approach	in	managing	litigation	and	
promoting	 the	 early	 settlement	of	 disputes	 and	use	of	ADR,	 construction	 contracts	
themselves	 also	 encourage	 the	 use	 of	 alternatives	 to	 litigation.	 	 The	 construction	
industry	employs	 the	widest	range	of	dispute	resolution	procedures	 to	settle	 these	
disputes	out	of	court:		arbitration,	adjudication,	mediation	and	negotiation	‐	to	name	




mediation,	 new	 forms	 of	 ADR	 have	 been	 created	 and	 attempted	 over	 the	 past	 10	
years:	 	 the	 TCC	 now	 offers	 the	 Court	 Settlement	 Process	 as	 well	 as	 Early	 Neutral	
Evaluation	 (HM	Courts	&	Tribunals	 Service,	 2014).	 	 Furthermore,	 new	methods	 of	
dispute	 avoidance	 are	 also	 surfacing.	 	 For	 example,	 for	 the	London	Olympics	2012	
established	 two	dispute	 boards:	 	 an	 “Independent	Dispute	Avoidance	Panel”	 and	 a	
“Dispute	 Adjudication	 Panel”.	 	 This	 innovative	 approach,	 a	 new	 take	 on	 FIDIC’s	
traditional	dispute	board,	established	these	two	panels	at	the	outset	of	the	project.16			
                                                 
13	 Proposals	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 indicate	 that	 the	 government	 is	 looking	 to	 double	 this	





16	The	 intention	was	that	 these	 two	panels	would	 follow	the	construction	works	right	 from	
the	start,	thereby	enabling	them	to	become	familiar	both	with	the	parties	and	the	project.		If	
any	differences	 arose,	 the	aim	was	 that	 they	would	be	 referred	 to	one	of	 the	panels	which	





Notably,	 owing	 to	 the	 complexity	 and	 distinct	 nature	 of	 these	 disputes	 and	 the	
multitude	of	options	available,	parties	often	find	themselves	engaged	in	not	just	one	
of	 these	methods,	 but	 in	 fact	 several	when	 resolving	 their	 dispute.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Michael	John	Construction	Ltd	v	St	Peter’s	Rugby	Football	Club	(2007),	the	rugby	club	
was	 involved	 in	 two	 adjudications,	 enforcement	 proceedings	 in	 the	 TCC	 and	 also	
arbitration.	 	 This	 was	 all	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 resolve	 a	 payment	 dispute	 with	 its	
contractor,	valued	at	less	than	£100,000.		
These	 “new”	 forms	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 which	 have	 developed	 since	 the	 1990s	
clearly	 have	 become	 a	 stronghold	 in	 the	 construction	 industry	 and	 negotiation,	
mediation	and	adjudication	continue	to	be	the	mainstay	of	the	construction	industry.		
Indeed	 the	 use	 of	 construction	 adjudication	 rivals,	 if	 not	 surpasses	 the	 use	 of	
litigation.	 	 The	 Glasgow	 Caledonian	 University	 Adjudication	 Reporting	 Centre	
published	 the	 statistic	 that	 over	 1400	 adjudications	 had	 been	 referred	 by	
Adjudicator	 Nominating	 Bodies	 (ANBs)	 between	 May	 2007	 and	 April	 2008	
(Adjudication	Reporting	Centre,	2010).		This	figure	of	course	does	not	include	those	
adjudications	 in	 which	 the	 Adjudicator	 is	 appointed	 by	 agreement	 between	 the	
parties,	 without	 the	 assistance	 of	 an	 ANB.	 	 When	 comparing	 this	 data	 to	 the	 366	
claims	the	TCC	received	in	2008	(Ministry	of	Justice,	2010),	nearly	75%	more	claims	
were	referred	to	adjudication	over	litigation.	
Having	said	 the	above,	 it	 is	 important	 to	highlight	 that	generally	 the	TCC	 is	a	well‐
respected	 forum	 for	 resolving	 disputes.	 	 This	 court,	 particularly	 the	 High	 Court	 in	
London,	 is	 renowned	 for	 its	 proactive	 administration.	 	 Construction	 lawyers	
generally	no	 longer	 are	of	 the	view	 that	 litigation	 is	 a	 long	drawn‐out	 several	year	
process.	 	 It	 certainly	 can	 be	 in	 some	 cases;	 however,	 depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	
dispute,	the	availability	of	the	court	and	the	determination	of	the	parties,	the	TCC	is	
highly	 regarded,	 on	 the	whole,	 as	 efficient	 and	 proportionate.	 	 Of	 course	 some	 do	




In	 any	 event,	 in	 order	 to	 resolve	 these	 disputes	 effectively	 in	whatever	 forum	 and	
without	 the	 need	 for	 multiple	 forums,	 and	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 development	 of	 new	





Putting	 it	 another	way,	 you	 need	 to	 know	 your	 enemy	 (Sun	 Tzu,	 2010	 [1908]	 [6th	




This	 research	 investigates	 these	 disputes	 from	 the	 point	 at	 which	 the	 lawyer	 is	
engaged	and	provides	a	glimpse	into	the	life	of	these	lawyers	and	these	disputes.		To	
do	so,	this	study	is	ethnographic	and	is	situated	in	a	leading	construction	law	firm	in	








more	detail	which	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 “Matter	Database”,	 ultimately	 allowing	 an	
element	 of	 quantitative	 analysis.	 	When	 an	 event	 or	 description	within	 this	 paper	
concerns	one	of	these	matters,	the	reader	will	see	the	following	convention:				Matter	
No	XX	 [‘Brief	description’].	 	This	of	course	 is	documented	more	 fully	 in	Chapter	3	
below,	 though	 is	 introduced	 here	 for	 ease	 of	 reference	 and	 for	 use	 in	 this	
introductory	chapter.	
Understanding	the	composition	of	disputes	is	essential	 if	we	are	to	appreciate	their	
likely	 trajectories	 and	 how	 best	 to	 manipulate	 this	 courses	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	
disputing	parties,	as	well	as	society	as	a	whole,	and	this	research	aims	to	do	just	that.		
	
                                                 
17	“It	has	been	said	before	that	he	who	knows	both	sides	has	nothing	to	fear	in	a	hundred	fights;	
he	who	is	ignorant	of	the	enemy,	and	fixes	his	eyes	only	on	his	own	side,	conquers,	and	the	next	






As	introduced	above,	 the	construction	 industry	 is	essentially	a	breeding	ground	for	
disputes.		The	economic,	political,	commercial	and	contractual	conditions	within	the	
construction	 industry	 create	 an	 environment	 in	which	 disputes	 are	 inevitable	 and	
indeed	expected.			It	is	common	for	there	to	be	disagreements	about	defects,	delays,	
variations	 and	 extra	 expense	 on	 a	 construction	 project	 (Coulson,	 2015:4)	 and	 the	
industry	does	not	consider	that	construction	contracts	necessarily	help	matters.	
With	 regard	 to	 research	 exploring	 this	 malaise,	 generally	 there	 are	 two	 lines	 of	
investigation:	 	 those	 studies	which	 consider	why	 construction	 projects	 are	 fraught	
with	complexity	and	dispute	and	those	studies	which	analyse	the	effectiveness	of	the	
dispute	resolution	procedures	employed	and	the	body	of	law	which	forms	as	a	result.		
Both	 are	 well‐documented	 by	 practitioners	 and	 academia	 alike	 (Bingham,	 1998;	
Capper,	1997,	Chern,	2008;	Coulson,	2015;	Fenn,	1997:383;	Gould,	King	and	Britton,	
2010;	Love	et	al,	2010;	and	Roberts	and	Palmer,	2005).			
However,	 these	 studies	 look	at	why	 construction	projects	 are	 so	prone	 to	disputes	
(ie,	what	are	the	conditions	which	cause	so	many	disputes)	or	whether	the	resolution	
procedures	 are	 effective	once	 there	 is	 a	 dispute	 and	what	 can	be	done	 to	 improve	
this	 (ie,	 how	 successful	 are	 the	 conditions/rules	 of	 the	 procedure	 in	 settling	 a	
dispute).	 	 Little	 research18	 focuses	 on	 the	 construction	 dispute	 itself,	 particularly	
from	 the	 point	 at	 which	 the	 lawyer	 is	 engaged,	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 do	 lawyers	
influence	 the	 direction	 of	 these	 disputes	 or	 how	 the	 client‐lawyer	 relationship	
moulds	and	steers	these	disputes.			In	other	words,	from	the	point	the	lawyer	gets	his	
or	 her	 grubby	 little	 hands	 on	 the	 dispute,	 what	 happens?	 	 What	 factors	 which	
influence	the	dispute’s	identity,	shape	and	outcome.			
The	emphasis	to	date	has	been	on	why	construction	disputes	emerge	and	how	best	to	
resolve	 these	 disputes.	 	 The	 industry	 now	 needs	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	what	
comprises	 these	 disputes	 and	 how	 do	 they	 behave	 and	 develop,	 particularly	 once	
lawyers	are	involved.		Without	this,	it	is	arguable	whether	a	dispute	can	ever	be	fully	
resolved	or	settled.		In	any	event,	without	recognition	or	knowledge	of	the	nature	of	
                                                 
18	Chapter	4	of	Dispute	Processes	 (Roberts	and	Palmer,	2005)	does	profess	 to	 consider	“the	









these	disputes,	a	party	 to	a	dispute	certainly	will	not	 “know	 its	enemy”	(at	 least	 in	
totality)	 and	 therefore	may	 face	 the	 risk	of	 repeated	 conflict/disputes	or	 failure	 to	
achieve	settlement.					





what	 influences	 their	 result	 (namely,	one	or	more	of	 the	 three	outcomes	 identified	































Accordingly,	 the	 objectives	 of	 this	 research	 are	 to	 gather	 empirical	 data	 on	 the	
outcome	of	disputes	in	the	construction	industry	and,	more	specifically:	 	to	provide	
both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data	 on	 the	 nature	 and	 outcome	 of	 construction	
disputes;	 to	 explore	 how	 these	 disputes	 are	 handled	 by	 construction	 lawyers;	 to	
investigate	 the	 lawyer‐client	 relationship	 with	 regard	 to	 construction	 disputes;	 to	
describe	 the	 environment	 of	 the	 resolution	 of	 disputes	 and	 the	 process	 by	 which	




                                                 
21	Owing	to	the	data	source,	the	research	focuses	on	the	lawyer’s	perspective.		It	is	recognised	











In	 line	with	 the	above	sentiment	on	possessions,	 it	 is	essential	 that	we	understand	
the	 composition	 of	 construction	 disputes	 and	 how	 they	 function	 in	 order	 to	 adapt	
and	disassemble	 them.	 	 Considering	 the	 construction	 industry’s	 importance	within	
the	 UK	 economy,	 its	 propensity	 for	 disputes	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 and	 money	
society	 invests	 in	 dealing	with	 them24,	 both	 in	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 it	 is	




on	 the	socio‐legal	 aspects	of	 these	disputes	 from	 the	point	at	which	a	construction	
lawyer	 is	 engaged	 –	 an	 area	 not	 considered	 in	 any	 detail	 in	 previous	 studies.		
Certainly	 other	 social‐legal	 studies	 have	 explored	 disputes	 or	 the	 lawyer’s	 role	 in	
disputes	in	other	industries	such	as	medicine,	divorce,	white	collar	crime	and	family	
law25,	 and	 indeed	 this	 research	 draws	 from	 and	 builds	 upon	 those	 findings.		
However,	this	research	aims	to	advance	and	contribute	to	the	knowledge	and	studies	
of	 lawyers	 and	 lawyering	 particularly	 in	 the	 construction	 industry:	 	 how	 does	 the	
agency	of	construction	lawyers	impact	the	dispute	trajectory	and	to	what	extent	do	
they	 shape	 and	 transform	 these	 disputes?	 	What	 happens	when	 the	 lawyer’s	 gaze	
falls	upon	the	dispute?			
In	 order	 to	 develop	 new	 approaches	 or	 methods	 for	 dealing	 with	 these	 disputes,	
which	are	more	effective	than	the	current	mainstream	ones,	a	new	perspective	and	
understanding	must	 be	 achieved.	 	 The	 collection	 of	 such	 knowledge	 in	 this	 thesis	
aims	to	increase	the	awareness	of	both	construction	and	legal	professionals	as	to	the	
nature	 of	 disputes,	 particularly	 from	 the	 point	 in	 which	 a	 lawyer	 is	 involved,	 and	
provide	information	to	assist	in	the	development	of	more	effective	dispute	resolution	
techniques.	 	 Indeed,	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 ‘vanishing	 trial’	 and	 the	 increased	 use	 of	
                                                 









ADR,	society	has	 less	of	an	opportunity	 to	see	and	 learn	 from	these	disputes.	 	This	
research	offers	an	‘up	close	and	personal’	glimpse	into	the	life	of	these	disputes	and	
the	lawyers	that	deal	with	them	–	a	standpoint	rarely	seen.			
In	 addition,	 this	 research	and	scrutiny	 into	 the	 life	of	 these	disputes	offers	 context	
and	perspective	for	use	in	the	development	of	contract	law.		The	disputes	researched	
here	 concern	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 commercial	 and	 contractual	 issues	 arising	 out	 of	
contracts	 (or	not	as	 the	case	may	be).	 	Even	with	 the	prominent	use	of	ADR	 in	 the	
construction	industry	today,	these	disputes	of	course	still	find	their	way	to	the	court	
in	 some	 shape	 or	 form26	 and	 the	 shear	 amount	 of	 disputes	 in	 the	 construction	
industry	increases	the	likelihood	that	some	of	these	disputes	will	reach	the	court.		As	
the	 “general	 principles	 of	 contract	 law	 are	 still,	 for	 the	most	 part,	 of	 a	 judge‐made	
character”	 (Mulcahy,	2008:5),	 these	contracts,	 the	parties’	attitudes	and	behaviours	
in	 the	 use	 of	 them	 and	 ultimately	 the	 disputes	 which	 arise	 from	 them	 are	 most	
relevant	to	and	indeed	have	the	potential	to	influence	the	broader	and	over‐arching	
framework	 and	 legal	doctrine	of	 contract	 law.	 	They	are	particularly	 important	 for	












the	 small,	 but	 hopefully	 growing,	 body	 of	 research	 which	 has	 managed	 to	 do	 so	
previously	(Flood,	2013;	Latour,	2010	[2002];	Sarat	and	Felstiner,	1995;	Mann,	1985;	
Flood,	1983;	Katz,	1982).	
                                                 
26	By	way	of	example,	see	the	recent	Court	of	Appeal	cases	of	Brown	&	Anr	v	Complete	Building	
Solutions	 Ltd	 (2016),	Wilson	 and	 Sharp	 Investments	 Ltd	 v	Harbour	 View	Developments	 Ltd	
(2015)	and	MT	Højgaard	A/S	v	E.ON	Climate	and	Renewables	UK	Robin	Rigg	East	Ltd	and	Anr	









Similarly,	 trying	 to	 resolve	 a	 dispute	with	 a	method	which	 is	 simply	 incompatible	
with	 its	 disposition	 is	 futile.	 	 This	 research	 therefore	 seeks	 to	 discover	 the	
composition	 of	 construction	 disputes,	 what	 makes	 them	 tick	 and	 what	 influences	
their	 development	 after	 a	 lawyer	 is	 engaged,	 so	 that	 appropriate	 and	 aligned	
procedures	 can	 be	 developed	 (or	 existing	 ones	 used	 more	 effectively)	 to	 assist	
parties	in	conflict.			
Whilst	this	research	is	specific	to	construction	disputes	and	may	only	have	validity	in	









Before	 turning	 to	 the	 disputes	 themselves,	 by	 way	 of	 background,	 this	 section	
provides	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 construction	 industry,	 the	 projects	 and	 contracts	
therein,	 the	 type	of	disputes	which	arise	 from	these	projects	and	how	the	 industry	
generally	deals	with	these	disputes.		I	begin	first	with	a	general	description	of	what	is	
meant	 by	 “construction	 projects”,	 “construction	 contracts”	 and	 “construction	
disputes”,	 followed	 by	 an	 account	 of	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures	 commonly	
used	 to	 address	 the	 disputes	 arising	 out	 of	 these	 projects	 and	 contracts.	 	 It	 is	
particularly	noticeable	the	extent	to	which	the	construction	industry	utilises	dispute	
resolution	 procedures	 other	 than	 traditional	 litigation.	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	
construction	 industry	 accords	 with	 the	 ‘vanishing	 trial’	 phenomena,	 though	 not	
necessarily	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 confidence	 in	 courts	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 dispute	
resoltuion		
The	construction	sector	 is	a	key	sector	for	the	UK	economy.	 	It	 is	one	of	the	largest	
sectors	in	the	UK	and	indeed	the	UK	construction	industry	remains	one	of	the	largest	
in	 Europe	 (BIS,	 2013:	 v;	 UKCES,	 2012)28.	 	 To	 understand	 the	 sheer	 scale	 of	 the	
construction	 industry	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	 Office	 for	 National	 Statistics	 (‘ONS’)	 recently	
reported	 that	 construction	 currently	 accounts	 for	 6.3%	 of	 the	 Gross	 Domestic	
Product.	 	 In	 monetary	 terms,	 the	 estimated	 construction	 industry	 annual	 volume	
output	was	£112.6	billion	 in	2013	 (ONS,	2014:	1‐2)	 and	 in	 employment	 terms,	 the	
construction	industry	accounts	for	10%	of	the	total	UK	employment	(BIS,	2013:	v).			
The	 construction	 industry’s	 components	 can	 be	 categorised	 as:	 (i)	 construction	
contracting	industry;	(ii)	provision	of	construction	related	professional	services	and	
(iii)	manufacture	of	construction	related	products	and	materials	(BIS,	2013:	1).		This	






                                                 
28	The	measurement	 in	these	statistics	 is	based	on	employment,	number	of	enterprises	and	
gross	value	added.	




















projects	 which	 concern	 building	 works	 or	 civil	 engineering	 works,	 or	 both30.		




Construction	 projects	 may	 be	 “large”	 or	 “small”	 and	 may	 involve	 a	 range	 of	
stakeholders/parties.	 	 	 A	 small	 building	 project	 could,	 for	 example,	 involve	 one	
contractor	designing	and	refurbishing	an	existing	kitchen	 in	a	 residential	 flat.	 	 In	a	
‘typical’	 large	 building	 project	 –	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 £20‐£25	 million	 range	 –	 the	 main	
contractor	may	directly	manage	around	70	subcontracts	of	which	a	large	proportion	
are	 small	 (ie,	 £50k	 or	 less)	 (EC	 Harris,	 2013).	 	 This	 example	 of	 a	 large	 building	







project	 could	 involve	 numerous	 designers,	 consultants,	 subcontractors,	 suppliers,	
funders,	and	interest	groups.	
“Construction	 contracts”	 are	 essentially	 those	 contracts	 which	 are	 put	 in	 place	 in	
order	 to	 complete	 or	 manage	 these	 construction	 projects.	 	 Practitioners	 define	 a	
“construction	 contract”	 as	 a	 contract	 for	 the	 carrying	 out	 of	works	 of	 construction	
(Fenwick	 Elliott	 LLP,	 2012)	 and	 as	 including	 any	 contract	 where	 one	 person	
(including	a	corporation)	agrees	for	valuable	consideration	to	carry	out	construction	
works,	 which	 may	 include	 building	 or	 engineering	 works,	 for	 another	 (Furst	 and	
Ramsey,	2012:	1‐002).		In	terms	of	a	statutory	definition,	for	the	purposes	of	Part	II	








The	 above	 HGCRA	 definition	 includes	 contracts	 for	 architectural	 services,	 design	
services,	 surveying,	 and	 providing	 advice	 on	 building,	 engineering,	 interior	 or	
exterior	 decoration	 or	 on	 the	 laying‐out	 of	 landscape	 in	 relation	 to	 construction	
operations	(Section	104(2))32.			
                                                 
31	The	HGCRA	is	a	significant	piece	of	legislation	in	the	construction	industry.	 	It	introduced	
various	 amendments	 and	 additions	 to	 those	 contracts	 which	 are	 defined	 as	 “construction	
contracts”	under	the	HGCRA.		The	HGCRA	gives	the	parties	the	right	to	resolve	their	disputes	
on	a	temporary	basis	by	way	of	adjudication	and	also	imposes	a	stage	payment	regime	–	in	
the	 event	 that	 a	 construction	 contract	 does	 not	 expressly	 do	 so.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 HGCRA	
regulates	 the	right	of	set‐off	 in	 the	absence	of	written	notice	which	must	be	given	not	 later	
than	 the	 prescribed	 period	 before	 the	 final	 date	 for	 payment.	 	 The	 HGCRA	 has	 now	 been	
amended	 by	 the	 Local	 Democracy,	 Economic	 Development	 and	 Construction	 Act	 2009	
(‘LDEDCA’).		The	LDEDCA	affects	those	contracts	entered	into	after	1	October	2011.	
32	 Some	 contracts/operations	 are	 specifically	 excluded	by	 the	HGCRA.	 	 By	way	of	 example,	
these	include	contracts	of	employment	(Section	104(3)),	contracts	with	residential	occupiers	






by	 “construction	 operations”	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 Section	 104(1)	 and	 the	 HGCRA,	
which	ultimately	widens	the	definition	of	“construction	contract”	even	further.33			
The	 definition	 of	 “construction	 contract”	 and	 “construction	 operations”	 for	 the	
purposes	 of	 the	 HGCRA,	 as	 amended,	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 both	 how	
disputes	 are	 dealt	 with,	 or	 “resolved”34,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	 disputes.		
Contracts	 which	 fall	 within	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 legislation	 are	 entitled	 to	 have	
disputes,	 which	 arise	 under	 or	 out	 of	 the	 contract,	 resolved	 by	 way	 of	
“adjudication”35	regardless	of	whether	the	contract	expressly	calls	for	adjudication	or	
not.	 	 If	 the	 contract	 fails	 to	 provide	 adequate	 adjudication	 provisions,	 or	 any	
provisions	whatsoever,	 the	 terms	of	 the	 legislation	 are	 implied.36	 	Accordingly,	 the	
legislation	 influences	 the	process	 for	 the	resolution	of	disputes	–	by	 including	such	
provisions,	 it	 encourages	 disputes	 to	 be	 handled	 outside	 of	 the	 court	 in	 what	 is	
perceived	 and	 intended	 to	be	 a	quicker	 and	 cheaper	process.	 	The	 legislation	does	
not	 force	 parties	 to	 refer	 their	 disputes	 to	 adjudication,	 nevertheless	 by	 including	
this	method	with	construction	contracts	the	option	is	available	without	the	need	to	
negotiate	or	agree	the	process.			
In	 addition,	 by	providing	 a	definition	of	 “construction	 contract”	 (and	 “construction	
operations”)	within	 the	HGCRA,	 this,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	can	also	 influence	the	
emergence	of	disputes	as	interpretation	of	the	legislation	is	inevitable.		On	the	face	of	






Cleveland	Bridge	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	Whessoe‐Volker	 Stevin	 Joint	Venture	 (2010),	Parkwood	
Leisure	Ltd	v	Laing	O’Rourke	Wales	and	West	Ltd	(2013)).	
                                                 
33	 Again,	 some	 operations,	 such	 as	 the	 drilling	 for	 or	 extraction	 of	 oil	 or	 natural	 gas,	 are	
excluded	from	the	meaning	of	“construction	operations”	(Section	105(2)).	
34	I	employ	the	commonly	used	word	“resolve”	in	the	beginning	of	this	thesis	for	convenience;	
however,	 see	Chapters	4	&	5	 for	my	analysis	of	 this	 term	and	conclusion	 that	 construction	
disputes	are	often	never	“resolved”	as	such.	










as	 “construction	 contract”,	 which	 in	 turn	 allowed	 Parkwood	 to	 refer	 any	 dispute	
under	 the	 collateral	 warranty	 to	 adjudication	 (see	 below	 for	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	
construction	 adjudication).	 	 Prior	 to	 this,	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 a	 collateral	
warranty	could	be	a	construction	contract	as	the	HGCRA	is	silent	on	this	particular	
type	of	contract.		This	illustrates	that	the	definition	of	“construction	contract”	may	be	
wider	 than	 one	might	 otherwise,	 thereby	 compelling	 interpretation	 which	 in	 turn	
may	give	rise	to	potential	disputes.37			
Accordingly,	 a	 construction	 contract	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 contract	 between	a	 contractor	
and	 the	 person	who	 instructs	 the	 building	 or	 engineering	work	 to	 be	 carried	 out.		
Construction	 contracts	 are	 formed	 between	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 construction	
professionals,	 contractors	 and	 subcontractors,	 suppliers	 and	 building	
owner/employers38.	 	Examples	of	construction	contracts	which	might	concern,	 say,	
                                                 
37	In	Parkwood	v	Laing	O’Rourke,	Laing	O’Rourke	had	entered	into	a	standard	JCT	Design	and	
Build	contract	(“the	Contract”)	with	Orion	Land	and	Leisure	(Cardiff)	Limited	to	design	and	
build	a	 swimming	and	 leisure	 facility	 in	Cardiff.	 	Under	 the	Contract	 they	were	 required	 to	
(and	did)	enter	into	a	“deed	of	warranty”	with	Parkwood,	the	tenant	which	was	to	operate	the	
facility.	 	 Once	 the	 facility	was	 complete,	 a	 number	 of	 defects	 arose.	 	 As	 Parkwood	 did	 not	
directly	 engage	Laing	O’Rourke,	 their	 only	 course	of	 action	was	 to	bring	 a	 claim	under	 the	




The	 wording	 of	 the	 warranty	 was	 such	 that	 Laing	 O’Rourke	 “warrants,	 acknowledges	 and	
undertakes”	that	“it	has	carried	out	and	shall	carry	out	and	complete	the	Works	in	accordance	
with	 the	 Contract”.	 	 The	 Judge	 focused	 on	 the	 three	 opening	 words	 and	 found	 that	 the	
warranty	 was	 not	 merely	 warranting	 or	 guaranteeing	 a	 past	 state	 of	 affairs,	 it	 was	 also	
undertaking	that	 future	works	would	be	carried	out	and	completed	to	the	standard,	quality	
and	state	of	 completeness	called	 for	by	 the	Contract.	 	The	 Judge	recognised	 that	 the	works	
under	the	Contract	remained	to	be	completed,	albeit	that	Laing	O’Rourke	had	already	carried	
out	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 the	 works	 and	 the	 design.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 collateral	 warranty	 did	
therefore	constitute	a	continuing	and	future	obligation	to	carry	out	construction	obligations	
within	the	meaning	of	the	HGCRA.	
The	 judgment	 is	 certainly	 not	 to	 be	 taken	 as	meaning	 that	 it	will	 apply	 to	 every	 collateral	
warranty.	 	For	warranties	that	relate	to	works	which	are	still	 to	be	carried	out,	 the	current	
position	 is	 that	 they	 are	 “construction	 contracts”	 to	 which	 the	 HGCRA,	 and	 therefore	












the	 refurbishment	 of	 an	 office	 building,	 would	 include:	 	 a	 contract	 between	 the	
building	 owner	 and	 the	 contractor	 for	 the	 refurbishment	 works	 to	 the	 existing	
building,	 which	 may	 include	 works	 to	 the	 cladding,	 structure	 and	 internal	 fit‐out	
(generally	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 industry	as	 a	 “building	 contract”);	 a	 contract	between	
the	building	owner	and	an	architect	 for	architectural/design	services	(and	possible	
contract	 administration	 services	 of	 the	 building	 contract)	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 new	
design	 for	 the	 existing	 office	 building	 (generally	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 industry	 as	 a	
“consultant	 appointment”	 or	 “appointment”);	 a	 contract	 between	 the	 main	
contractor	 and	 its	 subcontractor	 for	 specific	works	 (eg	 demolition)	 to	 the	 existing	
office	 building	 (generally	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 industry	 as	 a	 “subcontract”);	 and	 a	
collateral	warranty	between	a	 subcontractor	and	 the	building	owner,	 guaranteeing	
the	past	state	or	future	state	of	the	subcontract	works.		
In	terms	of	the	physical	contract	document	itself,	it	is	common	practice	in	the	UK	to	
use	 one	 of	 the	 various	 standard	 form	 contracts	 available	 for	 construction	 and	
engineering	 projects.	 	 In	 general,	 the	 standard	 forms	 have	 been	 developed	 by	
professional	 institutions	and	trade	bodies.	 	Perhaps	the	most	widely	used	standard	
forms	 are	 the	 JCT	 suite	 of	 building	 contracts,	 published	 by	 the	 Joint	 Contracts	
Tribunal	 (Malleson,	 2013:8‐21).	 	 The	 JCT	 range	 of	 contracts	 caters	 for	 traditional,	
design	and	build	and	management	procurement	routes.39	
Other	 common	 standard	 form	 contracts	 include:	 the	 New	 Engineering	 Contracts	
(commonly	known	as	the	NEC3,	as	 it	 is	 in	 its	 third	edition);	 ICE	or	ICC	engineering	




engineering	 projects);	 IMechE/IET	 model	 forms	 of	 contract	 (published	 by	 the	
Institution	 of	 Mechanical	 Engineers	 and	 the	 Institution	 of	 Engineering	 and	
                                                 
39	This	paper	does	not	provide	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	various	procurement	routes	available	
as	 it	 is	 not	 the	 focus	 of	 study.	 	 Nevertheless,	 by	 way	 of	 background,	 the	 “traditional”	
procurement	route	requires	the	employer	(or	rather,	the	employer’s	design	team)	to	prepare	
the	design	and	construction	 information	and	 the	contractor	 to	build	 to	 these	drawings	and	
specifications.		The	“design	and	build”	procurement	route	shifts	more	risk	onto	the	contractor	
as	he	is	responsible	for	both	the	design	and	construction	of	the	project.	 	 It	 is	often	the	case	




40	 On	 1	 August	 2011	 the	 ICE	 Conditions	 of	 Contract	 were	 withdrawn	 from	 sale	 and	 re‐





Technology	 for	 use	 on	 electrical	 and	 mechanical	 works);	 and	 PPC2000	 contracts	
(published	 by	 the	 Association	 of	 Consulting	 Architects	 and	 described	 as	 the	 first	
standard	form	partnering	contract).	
The	 National	 Construction	 Contracts	 and	 Law	 Survey	 2013	 (Malleson,	 2013:8‐21)	
revealed	 that	 the	 JCT	 contracts	were	most	 often	 used	 (48%),	 followed	 by	 the	NEC	
contracts	(22%),	bespoke	contracts	(9%)	and	FIDIC	Contracts	(4%).	
Standard	forms	for	the	appointment	of	professional	consultants	are	also	commonly	
used.	 Some	 examples	 include:	 the	 Royal	 Institute	 of	 British	 Architects	 Agreements	
2010	(‘RIBA’),	 the	Royal	Institution	of	Chartered	Surveyors	Forms	of	Appointments	
(‘RICS’),	 the	 NEC	 Professional	 Services	 Contract	 (‘PSC’)	 and	 the	 Association	 for	
Consultancy	and	Engineering	Agreements	2009	(‘ACE’).	
The	 choice	 of	 contract	 or	 appointment	 is	 largely	 determined	 by	 the	 employer’s	
preference	for	procurement,	the	nature	of	the	works	and	the	previous	experience	of	
parties	 involved.	 	 	 Parties	 also	 amend	 these	 standard	 forms,	 or	 alternatively	 use	 a	
standard	form	as	a	starting	point	or	basis	upon	which	to	develop	their	own	bespoke	
contract.	
The	 fundamental	 characteristic	 which	 distinguishes	 construction	 contracts	 from	
other	major	commercial	contracts	is	that	as	the	work	proceeds,	it	becomes	fixed	or	
attached	 to	 the	 owner’s	 land	 and	 therefore	 becomes	 his	 property,	 whatever	 the	
financial	 rights	 or	 obligations	 of	 the	 parties	 may	 be	 at	 that	 point	 in	 time	 (Atkin	
Chambers,	 2010:	 1‐001).	 	 This	 of	 course	 impacts	 on	 the	 ownership	 of	 goods	 and	
materials.	 	 In	 addition,	 construction	 contracts	must	 address	matters	 of	 time,	 price,	
scope	of	works,	contract	administration,	what	happens	in	the	event	of	defects	in	the	
works,	variations	to	the	original	scope	of	works	and	damages	in	the	event	of	delay	to	




Looking	 holistically	 at	 the	 factors	 discussed	 above	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 contracts	 and	
















parties	 and	 their	 relationship,	 the	 project	 and	 the	 specific	 issues	 in	 dispute.		
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	a	broad	statement	which	generally	holds	true	to	many	studies	of	
construction	disputes.	 	 Indeed,	 the	detailed	cases	studied	 in	this	research	generally	
did	fall	within	these	two	categories:		payment	and	defects.		
Of	 the	 50	 matters	 observed	 and	 analysed	 in	 this	 research,	 92%	 of	 the	 matters	
concerned	 payment	 or	 payment	 &	 defects.	 	 The	 “other”	 matters	 (8%)	 concerned	
























owing	 to	 a	 perceived	 liability.	 	 Money	 tends	 to	 be	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 construction	
disputes	 –	 though	 this	 perhaps	 comes	 as	 no	 surprise	 considering	 the	 commercial	
nature	of	construction	projects.		Having	said	that,	there	were	several	cases	in	which	
at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 motives	 or	 objectives	 of	 the	 client	 for	 pursuing	 the	 dispute	
appeared	to	be	revenge	and	infliction	of	pain/heartache.		To	what	extent	alternative	
motives	 or	 factors	 other	 than	 money	 influence	 a	 client’s	 decision	 making	 or	





unforeseen	 obstacles;	 delays	 in	 payments,	 and	 problems	 over	 the	
technical	 aspects	 of	 construction.	 	 Ultimately,	 they	 all	 concern	
money	and	which	party	will	be	responsible…”	
A	study	regarding	the	use	of	mediation	in	construction	disputes,	carried	out	between	
2006	 –	 2010	 by	 the	 TCC	 and	 King’s	 College	 London	 (the	 “TCC	 Research”),	 also	
demonstrates	 that	 construction	 disputes	 principally	 concern	 payment	 and/or	
defects.		Of	the	cases	under	study,	28%	concerned	defects	or	payment	issues	–	by	far	
the	 largest	 proportion	 in	 terms	 of	 nature	 of	 the	 case	 /	 most	 common	 type	 of	
dispute.42							
Whilst	 the	 type	 of	 disputes	 which	 arise	 arguably	 can	 be	 boiled	 down	 to	 two	




                                                 








is	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 modes	 by	 which	 disputes	 are	 handled	 and	
resolution	sought.	 	In	general	terms,	the	range	of	these	procedures	









disputes	 generally	 holds	 true	 today	 for	 the	 methods	 employed	 for	 construction	
disputes	in	the	UK.			
Of	 course	 the	 use	 of	 “the	duel”	 to	which	Gulliver	 refers	 is	 not	 relevant	 for	 today’s	
construction	 industry	 (at	 least	 in	 the	UK),	 though	unfortunately	 “violent	self‐help”	














“Avoidance”	 of	 construction	 disputes	 is	 also	 an	 option	which	 certain	 construction	
companies/individuals	do	choose:		deliberate	curtailing	of	further	relations	with	the	






seeking	 no	 specific	 decision	 on	 the	 dispute	 and	 preventing	 the	 escalation	 of	 it	





in	 time	or	 just	missed	the	boat.	 	 In	one	extreme	case,	Matter	No	39	[‘Limitation’],	
the	client	(one	of	the	Firm’s	regular,	repeat	clients)	approached	the	Firm	with	their	
dispute	 some	 10	 years	 after	 the	 project	 had	 finished.	 	 The	 client	 (a	 contractor)	




done	 so	 before	 is	 unknown.	 	 During	 the	 discussions	 with	 the	 lawyer,	 the	 client	
appeared	to	have	already	resigned	to	the	view	that	they	were	unlikely	to	recover	the	
outstanding	money	as	 they	had	 left	 it	 so	 long;	however,	 since	 their	 claim	was	over	
£2m	(of	which	£300,000	was	interest),	they	“might	as	well	give	it	a	punt	–	nothing	to	
lose”.	 	This	punt	 proved	 to	be	quite	 lucrative	as	 the	adjudicator	awarded	 the	 client	
approximately	£1m.	
In	other	cases,	disputes	were	not	escalated	owing	to	perceived	difficulties.		In	Matter	
No	46	 [‘Roof	Defects’]	 the	 client	 (the	building	owner)	only	wanted	 to	 advance	 the	
dispute	 and	 serve	 a	 formal	 claim	 against	 the	 Main	 Contractor	 and	 their	
Subcontractor	 for	 defects/workmanship	 in	 the	 building	 –	 but	 not	 against	 the	
Architect	for	negligent	design,	as	they	were	still	at	that	point	employing	the	Architect	
on	 other	 projects.	 	 It	 appeared	 that	 for	 political	 reasons	 and	 for	 perceived	 future	
difficulties	in	respect	of	the	other	projects,	the	client	was	only	willing	to	investigate	
the	 dispute	 and	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 claim	 against	 the	 Architect	 and	 wanted	 to	
decide	later	whether	to	escalate	the	dispute.	
A	 further	 type	of	 avoidance	was	observed	where	a	dispute	 arose	 though	 the	 client	
ultimately	 avoided	 proceeding	 any	 further	 with	 it.	 	 In	Matter	 No	 26	 [‘Defective	
Glue’],	 the	 client	 (a	 Subcontractor)	 was	 defending	 a	 claim	 against	 the	 Main	
Contractor.	 	 The	 client	 was	 a	 joinery	 company	 and	 custom‐made	 a	 number	 of	
cabinets,	 desks	 and	other	 joinery	 for	 the	 project.	 	 Some	of	 the	 joinery	 required	 an	













that	he	wanted	 to	 recover	 from	 the	glue	manufacturer	 the	money	he	had	spent	on	
remaking	the	joinery.		The	assistant	solicitor’s	attendance	note	recorded:					
I  telephoned  [the  client]  today.  He  said  that  he  spoke  to  [the  Main 
Contractor]  and  that  the  £5,245  they  are  looking  for  is  probably  about 
right. He said that the £1000  included for management costs  is probably 
over the top, but on the whole, the £5,245 is fine (provided the adhesive 
supplier/adhesive  manufacturer  will  be  picking  this  up).  However,  [the 
Main  Contractor]  owes  him  quite  a  bit  of  money  from  various  other 
projects  ‐ he does not have an exact figure though  it  is probably at  least 
£30k. So, he does not think that [the Main Contractor] will be chasing him 
for this £5,245 anytime soon. 






did	 call	 again	 four	 months	 later	 apologising	 that	 he	 had	 been	 too	 busy	 with	 his	
business	 to	 put	 the	 information	 together	 and	 promised	 to	 send	 the	 documents	




With	 regard	 to	 Gulliver’s	 category	 of	 “Transformation	 into	 symbolic	 and/or	
supernatural	 terms”,	 again,	 this	 perhaps	 is	 not	 immediately	 relevant	 to	 the	 UK	
construction	industry.	 	Gulliver	refers	to	witchcraft	accusations,	performance	in	the	
ancestral	cult	or	some	other	religious	system	and/or	sporting	contests.		None	of	the	
cases	 observed	 utilised	 these	 particular	 measures	 to	 transform	 the	 dispute	 into	
something	 else;	 however,	 there	 was	 evidence	 of	 an	 alternative	 type	 of	




lawyers	 and	 their	 clients	 concerned	 the	 situation	where	 a	 dispute	 arose	 regarding	
non‐payment	(ie	the	client	was	not	paid	the	full	outstanding	amount)	yet	the	client	
had	been	persuaded	to	“look	the	other	way”	or	convert	his	disappointment	into	hope	
or	delight.	 	 In	other	words,	 the	client	had	been	asked	and	was	willing	 to	 transform	
the	dispute	 over	 failure	 to	 pay,	 into	 a	 promise	 for	 future	work.	 	 The	debtor	 either	
awarded	the	client	the	next	project	(and	therefore	the	promise	of	further	income)	or	
enticed	 them	 in	 some	 other	way	 to	move	 on	 from	 the	 dispute	 over	 non‐payment.		
Gulliver	noted	that,	as	with	avoidance,	transformation	of	the	dispute	is	not	so	much	
resolving	the	dispute,	but	deflecting	it	(Gulliver,	1979,	1‐3).		Deflection	of	the	dispute	
may	 well	 be	 effective	 in	 terms	 of	 allowing	 the	 parties	 to	 carry	 on	 in	 a	 successful	
commercial	relationship.					
I	 turn	now	to	the	most	common	forms	of	dispute	resolution	 in	the	UK	construction	
industry:	 	 “negotiation	 and	 adjudication”.	 	 Specifically	 for	 construction	 disputes,	
this	comprises:		litigation,	arbitration,	adjudication	and	mediation/negotiation.	
Whilst	 these	 four	 are	 most	 common,	 there	 is	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 dispute	 resolution	
methods	available	in	the	UK	which	the	construction	industry	does	draw	from.		These	





























the	courts	before	a	 judge	 (Bailey,	2011:	1735))	 is	of	 course	an	option	available	 for	
construction	disputes	and	is	regularly	used.			
Construction	 disputes	 are	 generally	 commenced	 in	 the	 specialist	 Technology	 and	
Construction	 Court	 (TCC)	 if	 they	 fall	 with	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 “TCC	 Claim”45:	 	 a	
construction,	 engineering	 or	 technology	 claim	 which	 involves	 issues	 or	 questions	
that	are	technically	complex,	or	it	is	otherwise	desirable	for	a	TCC	judge	to	hear	and	




claims	were	commenced	 in	2013	as	compared	 to	2006	(Ministry	of	 Justice,	2010	–	






                                                 
45	CPR	r60.1.		Also,	Practice	Direction	60,	at	paragraph	2.1,	identifies	examples	of	TCC	claims:		
building,	 construction	 or	 engineering	 disputes,	 claims	 against	 engineers	 and	 architects,	
landlord	and	 tenant	disputes,	 environmental	disputes,	 claims	 relating	 to	 the	design,	 supply	
and	installation	of	computers	and	computer	software,	etc.	
46	 For	 example,	 in	 CFH	Total	Document	Management	 Ltd	 v	OCE	 (UK)	 Ltd	 (2010)	 Edwards‐
Stuart	J	held	that	it	may	be	desirable	for	a	TCC	Judge	to	determine	a	claim	where	it	involves	a	







Court	 (Akenhead,	 2013).	 	 Previously,	 the	 general	 rule	 was	 that	 TCC	 claims	 for	 more	 than	
£50,000	are	brought	in	the	High	Court,	while	those	below	£50,000	are	brought	in	the	county	





  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
# Claims 
Received 
390  409  366  528  493  528  452  475 
# Claims 
Disposed of 






process.	 	This	was	observed	time	and	time	again	during	the	 fieldwork.	 	Lawyers	at	
the	Firm	advised	their	clients	to	avoid	litigation,	 if	at	all	possible,	owing	to	the	cost	
and	 time	 involved.	 	 This	 was	 often	 the	 case	 when	 clients	 were	 “one‐shotters”	
(Galanter,	1974)	and	very	concerned	with	legal	costs49.		Of	course	in	other	situations	
the	 lawyers	 would	 recommend	 litigation,	 particularly	 if	 other	 methods	 were	 not	
available	 or	 viable,	 or	 the	 client	 was	 a	 “repeat	 player”	 and	 already	 familiar	 with	
and/or	 comfortable	 with	 the	 litigation	 process.50	 	 Of	 the	 50	 matters	
observed/researched,	17	(32%)	of	them	involved	litigation	at	some	point	during	the	
trajectory	of	the	dispute.51	









This	view	of	“time	and	expense”	appear	to	continue	despite	 the	 introduction	of	 the	
Civil	Procedure	Rules	 (CPR)	 in	1999	which	aimed	 to	 improve	access	 to	 justice	and	
reduce	 the	cost	and	complexity	of	 litigation.	 	Even	 the	 introduction	of	 the	 “Jackson	
Reforms”	 in	 2010	 (see	 further	 below)	 has	 not	 changed	 this	 view:	 	 	 on	 the	 whole,	
lawyers	continue	to	view	litigation	as	a	costly	exercise	for	their	clients	and	in	some	
situations	 the	 new	 requirements	 imposed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Jackson	 Reforms	 only	
intensify	that	view	(see	further	below).			




a	 proportionate	 cost’	 (Jackson,	 2010:2).	 	 Following	 on	 from	 the	 Review,	 the	 Civil	
Procedure	(Amendment)	Rules	2013	came	into	force	on	1	April	2013.		The	changes	
to	 the	 CPR	 included	 new	 rules	 in	 respect	 of	 conditional	 fee	 agreements	 (CFAs),	
disclosure,	 cost	management,	 witness	 statements	 and	 Part	 36	 offers	 (“the	 Jackson	
Reforms”).			
By	way	 of	 example,	 in	 respect	 of	 cost	management,	 if	 the	 sum	 in	 dispute	 is	 under	
£2million,	under	the	new	rules,	parties	must	file	and	exchange	detailed	cost	budgets	





it.	 	 Most	 lawyers	 are	 familiar	 with	 and	 accustom	 to	 providing	 clients	 with	 costs	
estimates	 and	 budgets.	 	 However,	 as	 the	 amended	 CPR	 has	 potentially	 serious	
consequences	 if	 the	 estimates	 are	 exceeded,	 more	 onerous	 obligations	 are	 now	
placed	on	lawyers	to	manage	and	accurately	estimate	costs.		
As	a	result,	 this	particular	amendment	 to	 the	CPR	and	 the	recent	case	of	Mitchell	v	
News	Group	Newspapers	(2013)54	has	compelled	 lawyers	at	 the	Firm	to	adjust	how	
they	conduct	 their	 litigation	practices	–	particularly	 for	 smaller	cases.	 	The	general	
view	appears	to	be	that	the	cost	budget	requirement	creates	additional	work	and	in	
turn	 increases	 clients’	 legal	 fees.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 Matter	 No	 47	 [‘Final	 Two	













contacted	 without	 prejudice	 to	 investigate	 whether	 they	 were	 willing	 to	 consider	
mediation.	 	 If	so,	 this	would	avoid,	at	 least	 in	the	 interim,	the	need	to	complete	the	
costs	budget	and	disclosure	report.	 	Ultimately	the	dispute	was	settled	out	of	court,	
after	 several	 other	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures	 employed	 ‐	 the	 cost	 budget	 and	
disclosure	report	were	avoided.			
In	 addition	 to	 complying	 with	 the	 CPR,	 when	 advising	 on	 the	
advantages/disadvantages	of	 litigation,	 lawyers	are	required	 to	consider	with	 their	
clients	 and	 comply	with	 the	 Pre‐Action	 Protocol	 for	 Construction	 and	 Engineering	
Disputes	 (PAP)	prior	 to	 filing	a	claim.	 	The	aim	of	 the	PAP	 is	 to	ensure	 that	before	
court	 proceedings	 commence,	 the	 Claimant	 and	 the	 Defendant	 have	 provided	
sufficient	 information	 for	each	party	 to	know	 the	nature	of	 each	other’s	 case,	have	
had	an	opportunity	to	consider	the	other’s	case	and	are	in	a	position	where	they	may	
be	 able	 to	 settle	 the	 case	 early	 without	 recourse	 to	 litigation,	 failing	 which	 the	
proceedings	will	 be	 conducted	 efficiently	 owing	 to	 this	 pre‐action	 investigation	 by	
the	 parties	 (Pre‐Action	 Protocol,	 paragraph	 2).	 	 The	 PAP	 requires	 the	 service	 of	
detailed	correspondence	between	the	intended	parties	(the	“Letter	of	Claim”	and	the	
“Defendant’s	Response”57)	and	a	pre‐action	meeting,	non‐attendance	of	which	can	be	




the	 course	of	 the	 fieldwork,	both	 in	 the	detailed	 investigations	 into	 the	50	matters	
and/or	 in	observations	and	conversations	with	 the	 lawyers,	 in	some	cases	 the	PAP	
was	strictly	adhered	to58,	and	 in	other	cases,	 the	 lawyer	would	advise	 that	 the	PAP	
                                                 
55	See	Chapter	4.2	for	a	detailed	narrative	of	Matter	No	47	[‘Final	Two	Invoices’].	
56	CPR	r31.5(3):		Not	less	than	14	days	before	the	first	CMC	each	party	must	file	and	serve	a	
report	 (Disclosure	 Report)	which	 describes	what	 documents	 exist	 or	may	 exist,	where	 the	
documents	 are	 located/stored	 and	 what	 the	 broad	 range	 of	 costs	 could	 be	 if	 standard	
disclosure	were	to	be	ordered.	 	In	cases	where	the	Electronic	Documents	Questionnaire	has	
been	exchanged,	this	should	also	be	filed	with	the	Disclosure	Report	(CPR	r31.5(4)).	






was	not	 applicable	 owing	 to	 the	 history	 of	 the	 parties	 and	negotiations	which	had	
already	taken	place59.		Regarding	the	pre‐action	meeting,	in	some	cases	the	meeting	
did	 take	place60,	 and	 in	other	cases	 it	did	not61.	 	 In	some	cases	 the	PAP	resulted	 in	
settlement62,	and	in	some	cases	it	did	not63.		Furthermore,	the	use	of	the	PAP	(or	lack	
thereof)	 may	 also	 create	 additional	 disputes	 regarding	 procedure,	 add	 further	




basis,	pursuant	 to	a	consensual	mechanism	under	which	 the	dispute	 is	adjudicated	
upon	by	a	private	tribunal	in	a	similar	manner	to	how	a	court	adjudicates	on	matters	
before	it	(Bailey,	2011:	1620).			
Arbitration	 in	England	 and	Wales	 is	 governed	 by	 the	Arbitration	Act	 1996.	 	 It	 is	 a	
voluntary	 procedure,	 provided	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 litigation,	 and	 generally	 is	





procedure	 (eg	 the	 Construction	 Industry	 Model	 Arbitration	 Rules,	 ICC	 Rules	 of	
Arbitration,	etc.).	
On	the	international	scene,	it	is	clear	that	there	is	a	preference	towards	arbitration	as	
a	mean	 by	which	 to	 resolve	 construction	 disputes.	 	 In	 a	 recent	 2013	 international	
arbitration	survey	of	corporate	entities	(PwC,	2013),	it	was	found	that	84%	“agreed”	
or	 “strongly	 agreed”	 that	 arbitration	 is	 well	 suited	 to	 the	 construction	 industry.		
Furthermore,	 arbitration	 ranked	 first	 (over	 mediation,	 litigation	 and	
adjudication/expert	determination)	in	terms	of	the	most	popular	dispute	resolution	
method:		68%	choose	arbitration	as	their	most	preferred	method.			
















English	 courts	 are	 renowned	 for	 their	 supervisory	 approach	 in	 enforcing	









often	 more	 expensive.	 	 Accordingly,	 though	 it	 is	 an	 alternative	 to	 litigation,	
arbitration	 tends	 not	 to	 be	 categorised	 as	 an	 ADR	 procedure	 for	 construction	







Construction	 industry	adjudication	 (“statutory	adjudication”	or	 “adjudication”)	was	
introduced	 in	 England,	 Wales	 and	 Scotland	 in	 May	 1998	 under	 Housing	 Grants,	
Construction	 and	 Regeneration	 Act	 1996	 (HGCRA).	 	 Since	 its	 introduction,	
adjudication	 is	 now	well‐established	within	 the	 construction	 industry	 (Gould,	King	
and	 Britton,	 2010:2)	 and	 is	 a	 “common	 occurrence”	 (Gould	 and	 Goldsmith,	
2013:348).	 	 Its	wide	use	 is	demonstrated	by	the	number	of	appointments	made	by	
the	adjudicator	nominating	bodies	 (ANB)	and	 the	 regular	 surveys	produced	by	 the	
Adjudication	Reporting	Centre	based	 at	Glasgow	Caledonian	University	 (Gould	and	
Goldsmith,	2014:348).	
                                                 
67	 “New	 York	 Convention	 awards”	 of	 course	 benefit	 from	 s100‐104	 of	 the	 Arbitration	 Act	
1996.	 	 An	 award	made	 in	 a	 state	which	 is	 party	 to	 the	New	York	 Convention	 is	 treated	 as	







3%	 increase	 from	 the	 previous	 year.	 	 These	 figures	 do	 not	 include	 adjudications	
conducted	by	agreement	of	the	parties	or	those	adjudications	where	the	adjudicator	
was	 named	 in	 the	 contract.	 	 Accordingly,	 the	 number	 of	 adjudications	 carried	 out	
each	year	well	exceeds	the	number	of	cases	referred	to	the	TCC	(see	above).		Having	
said	 that,	 the	 reported	 figures	 illustrate	 an	 overall	 decline	 in	 adjudications	 since	
2002.	 	 Trushell,	 Milligan	 and	 Cattanach,	 2012,	 consider	 that	 this	 pattern,	 at	 least	
between	 2008‐2011,	 may	 be	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 economic	 recession	 causing	
constraints	on	resources	to	deal	with	disputes	and,	in	addition,	a	willingness	to	settle	





















































































Adjudication	 is	 a	 28‐day	 process	 (which	 can	 be	 extended	 by	 agreement	 of	 the	
parties69)	whereby	 an	 independent	 third	person	 (an	 adjudicator)	 issues	 a	 decision	
which	is	binding,	unless	or	until	it	is	revised	either	through	arbitration	or	litigation.		






























disputes.	 	 It	put	 into	effect	 the	key	recommendation	made	by	Sir	Michael	Latham’s	
report,	 Constructing	 the	 Team	 (Latham,	 1994),	 that	 adjudication,	 supported	 by	
legislation,	 should	 be	 the	 normal	 form	 of	 dispute	 resolution.	 	 The	 process	 was	




Minister	 knows	 and	 as	 Clause	 106	 allows,	 that	 adjudication	
produces	 rough	 justice,	but	 it	 is	a	 rough	 justice	which	 can	 be	put	
right	at	a	later	stage.”70	
“Rough	 justice”	 and	 “a	 quick	 fix”	 are	 common	phrases	 associated	with	 construction	
adjudication	(Sykes	v	Packham,	2011).	 	However,	as	the	Adjudicator’s	decision	is	not	
binding,	 it	 is	 perceived	 that	 rough	 justice	 is	 therefore	 somehow	 acceptable.	 	 His	
decision	 is	 only	 interim	 binding	 “until	 the	 dispute	 is	 finally	 determined	 by	 legal	
proceedings,	 by	 arbitration	 (if	 the	 contract	 provides	 for	 arbitration	 or	 the	 parties	
otherwise	agree	to	arbitration)	or	by	agreement”	(Paragraph	108(3)	of	the	HGCRA,	as	




One	 notable	 requirement	 of	 the	 HGCRA	 (as	 amended)	 is	 that	 the	 parties	 to	 a	
construction	 contract	 have	 the	 right	 to	 refer	 any	 ‘dispute’	 to	 adjudication	 (Section	
108(1)).		Accordingly,	as	case	law	has	demonstrated,	a	dispute	must	be	in	existence	
before	a	party	has	a	right	to	refer	it	to	adjudication.		In	other	words,	a	dispute	must	
have	 crystallised	 between	 the	 parties	 before	 the	 legislation	 will	 apply.	 	 This	
requirement	for	‘crystallisation’	and	the	definition	of	‘dispute’	has	been	the	subject	of	













Negotiation	 is	 “a	 very	 flexible	process	 involving	written	and/or	 oral	 communication	
between	parties	and/or	their	lawyers	with	a	view	to	reaching	settlement”	(Blake	et	al,	
2013:	 124).	 	 Blake	 et	 al,	 2013	 assert	 that	 negotiation	 is	 the	most	 commonly	 used	
form	of	ADR	(Blake	et	al,	2013:	124).		This	appears	to	hold	true	for	the	construction	





Firstly,	 in	Matter	No	2	 [‘Chase	Payment	No	1]	 the	 client	was	owed	£15,000	–	 the	
invoice	 had	 been	 outstanding	 for	 over	 seven	 months	 and	 his	 attempts	 to	 obtain	
payment	 had	 not	 been	 successful.	 	 The	 client	 sought	 the	 advice/assistance	 of	 his	




public.	 	 No	 negotiations	 took	 place.	 	 The	 client	 simply	 disputed	 the	 allegation,	
submitted	 evidence	 and	was	 required	 to	 attend	 the	 hearing	 before	 the	 tribunal	 to	
give	 reasons	 for	 this	 conduct	 and/or	 defend	 the	 allegation	 made	 and	 prove	 the	
competency	of	his	company.	
Mediation	 is	 “a	 flexible,	 cost‐effective,	 confidential	 process	 which	 can	 be	 arranged	
relatively	speedily,	in	which	a	neutral	third	party	(the	mediator)	facilitates	discussions	
and	 negotiations	 between	 the	 parties	 in	 dispute	 within	 a	 relatively	 structured	 but	
flexible	process,	in	a	formal	setting,	during	a	defined	period	of	time,	all	of	which	helps	to	
create	 an	 impetus	 for	 settlement”	 (Blake	 et	 al,	 2013).	 	 In	 other	words:	 	 “a	 form	 of	
neutrally	assisted	negotiation”	(Aird	v	Prime	Meridian	Ltd,	2006).	It	has	gained	wide	







acceptance	 in	 England	 and	Wales	 as	 an	 appropriate	 and	 efficient	means	 by	which	
construction	disputes	can	be	resolved.	 	A	recent	survey	carried	out	by	the	TCC	and	
King’s	 College	 London	 (“The	 TCC	 Research”)	 showed	 that	 35%	 of	 all	 disputes	
referred	to	court	are	resolved	by	mediation.		Of	these	mediations,	91%	occurred	as	a	
result	of	the	parties’	own	initiative,	and	not	as	a	result	of	an	indication	by	the	court	
(Gould	 et	 al,	 2010).	 	 No	 doubt	 the	 Civil	 Procedure	 Rules	 have	 played	 a	 part	 in	
encouraging	this	acceptance:			
(i) all	 parties	 to	 litigation	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 consider	 whether	
some	 form	 of	 alternative	 dispute	 resolution	 (ADR)	might	 enable	
them	to	settle	the	matter	without	court	proceedings73;	and		
(ii) the	 court	 may	 now	 consider	 cost	 penalties	 against	 a	 party	 who	
unreasonably	refuses	to	mediate74.			
Many	of	the	standard	form	construction	contracts	include	a	reference	to	negotiation	
and/or	 mediation	 as	 part	 of	 their	 options	 for	 dispute	 resolution75.	 	 For	 example,	
Clause	9.1	of	the	JCT	Standard	Building	Contract	2011	states:	
“…if	a	dispute	or	difference	arises	under	this	Contract	which	cannot	
be	 resolved	 by	 direct	 negotiations,	 each	 party	 shall	 give	 serious	





“The	 court	 will	 provide	 encouragement	 to	 the	 parties	 to	 use	
alternative	 dispute	 resolution	 ("ADR")	 and	 will,	 whenever	
appropriate,	facilitate	the	use	of	such	a	procedure…	 	In	most	cases,	
ADR	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 inter‐party	 negotiations	 or	 a	 mediation	
conducted	by	a	neutral	mediator…”	
The	Courts	will	 also	 enforce	 agreements	 to	mediate	where	 they	 are	part	 of	 such	 a	
procedure/contract.	 	 In	Cable	&	Wireless	Plc	v	 IBM	United	Kingdom	Limited	 (2002)	
                                                 
73	CPR	r1.1	and	r1.4(2)(e).	
74	CPR	r44.4(3)(ii). 
75	 Examples	 include:	 	 JCT	 Standard	 Building	 Contract	 2011,	 Clause	 9.1;	 RIBA	 Standard	







have	 binding	 effect.	 	 The	 ADR	 clause	 was	 a	 sufficiently	 defined	mutual	 obligation	
upon	 the	 parties	 to	 go	 through	 the	 process	 of	 initiating	 mediation,	 selecting	 a	
mediator	 and	at	 least	presenting	 the	mediator	with	 its	 case	and	documents.	 	 Since	
the	 clause	 described	 the	 means	 by	 which	 such	 an	 attempt	 should	 be	 made	 the	
engagement	required	not	merely	an	attempt	in	good	faith	to	achieve	resolution	of	the	
dispute,	 but	 also	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 parties	 in	 the	 procedure	 specified.	 	 That	
procedure	had	sufficient	certainty	for	a	Court	readily	to	ascertain	whether	it	should	
have	been	compiled	with.			
However,	 a	 note	 of	 caution	 has	 been	 sounded	 in	 the	 recent	 case	 of	Balfour	Beatty	
Construction	Northern	Limited	v	Modus	Corovest	(Blackpool)	Ltd	(2008).		In	this	case	
the	mediation	agreement	was	characterised	as	nothing	more	than	an	“agreement	to	




summary	 Judgment	 on	 that	 Claim	 and/or	 Counterclaim,	 i.e.	 that	




the	past	15	years,	 the	Courts	have	been	active	supporters	of	mediation:	 	 from	Lord	
Woolf’s	 fundamental	 review	 of	 the	 civil	 justice	 system	 and	 his	 Access	 to	 Justice	
reports	of	1995	and	1996	(Woolf,	1995	&	1996)	to	the	most	recent	case	law	in	2013	
concerning	 the	 meaning	 of	 “unreasonable	 refusal	 to	 mediate”	 (PGF	 II	 SA	 v	 OMFS	
Company	1	Ltd),	 the	Courts	have	encouraged	mediation	and/or	ADR	at	all	stages	of	
the	litigation	process76.			
In	 the	 recent	 TCC	 case	 of	PGF	 II	SA	 v	OMFS	Company	1	Ltd	 (2013),	 the	 trial	 Judge	
accepted	 that	 OMFS’s	 silence	 in	 the	 face	 of	 two	 offers	 to	mediate	 amounted	 to	 an	
unreasonable	 refusal,	 and	 agreed	 that	 it	was	 appropriate	 to	 depart	 from	 the	usual	
                                                 











June	 2011	 the	 government	 signed	 a	Dispute	Resolution	 Commitment,	 replacing	 the	
Alternative	 Dispute	 Resolution	 Pledge	 2001,	 which	 requires	 all	 government	
departments	 and	 agencies	 to	 use	 ADR	 forms	 such	 as	 mediation,	 arbitration	 and	
conciliation,	 where	 possible,	 prior	 to	 commencing	 litigation	 (Ministry	 of	 Justice,	
2011b).	
With	regard	to	mediators	 in	the	construction	 industry,	 the	vast	majority	tend	to	be	
legally	qualified	in	construction	disputes.	The	TCC	Research	showed	that	only	16%	of	
the	 mediators	 were	 construction	 professionals.	 There	 is	 no	 requirement	 that	
mediators	 undertake	 some	 form	 of	 training	 prior	 to	 appointment;	 however,	 it	 is	
common	 practice	 for	 mediators	 to	 obtain	 accreditation	 by	 one	 of	 the	 commercial	
mediation	training	schemes.		
Appointing	bodies	such	as	the	Centre	for	Effective	Dispute	Resolution	are	sometimes	
utilised	 to	 appoint	 mediators;	 however,	 the	 TCC	 Research	 suggests	 that	 the	
construction	mediation	market	is	quite	sophisticated	and	parties	more	often	appoint	
a	mediator	by	agreement,	choosing	ones	they	have	worked	with	previously.		




of	 the	 50	 disputes	witnessed	 employed	mediation.	 	 Of	 these	 six,	 five	were	 settled	














commonly	 used	methods	 for	 dealing	with	 disputes;	 however,	 other	 forms	 do	 exist	
and	are	used,	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	project	and	type	of	dispute.			
Expert	determination	
One	 such	 example	 is	 expert	determination:	 	 generally	used	where	 a	quick,	 binding	
process	 is	 needed	 for	 settling	 a	 technical	 dispute.	 	 A	 third	 party,	 ‘the	 expert’,	 is	
selected	because	of	his	or	her	particular	expertise	in	relation	to	the	issues	between	
the	 parties.	 	 It	 is	 a	 creature	 of	 contract	 and	 an	 essential	 feature	 of	 expert	









feature	 of	English	 commercial	 and	 legal	 practice	 for	 at	 least	 250	
years.	 	 The	 first	 reported	 case	 is	 found	 in	 1754:	 	 Belchier	 v	
Reynolds…”			
The	origins	of	expert	determination	arose	out	of	the	need	to	deal	with	circumstances	
where	 parties	 required	 machinery	 for	 determining	 a	 price	 without	 negotiations,	




in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 other	 circumstances:	 	 valuing	 shares	 in	 private	 companies,	
certifying	profits	or	 losses	of	a	company	during	sale	and	purchase,	valuing	pension	
rights	on	transfer	and	determining	market	values	in	long	term	agreements	(Arenson	
v	 Arenson	 (1977),	 Nikko	 Hotels	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 MEPC	 plc	 (1991),	 Jones	 v	 Sherwood	










by	 contrast,	 are	 subject	 to	 control	 by	 the	 court,	 some	 of	 their	 decisions	 may	 be	
appealable	(in	 theory)	and	they	are	 immune	to	claims	of	negligence.	 	Furthermore,	
while	litigation	and	arbitration	require	the	“due	process”	rule	of	natural	justice	–	the	
requirement	 that	each	party	must	be	given	a	 fair	opportunity	 to	be	heard	–	expert	
determination	does	not	(unless	otherwise	agreed	between	the	parties).	
With	regard	to	the	construction	industry,	expert	determination	currently	is	and	has	
been	 used	 historically,	 particularly	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 process	 plants	 as	 the	
standard	form	contract	published	by	the	Institution	of	Chemical	Engineers	(IChemE)	
refers	 a	 number	 of	 disputes	 to	 an	 expert:	 	 disputes	 concerning	 nominations	 of	
subcontractors,	 specified	variations,	documentation,	 certificates,	performance	 tests,	
specified	 defects	 and	 suspension.79	 	 Parties	 may	 also	 refer	 other	 disputes	 to	 the	
expert	 under	 this	 standard	 form;	 however,	 any	 dispute	 which	 is	 referred	 to	 the	
expert	is	no	longer	referable	to	arbitration.	
Though	 expert	 determination	 is	 used	 in	 the	 construction	 industry,	 it	 was	 neither	
employed	nor	discussed	by	any	of	the	lawyers	in	the	Firm	during	the	course	of	this	
research	 as	 a	 possibility	 for	 any	 of	 their	 disputes.	 	 This	 perhaps	 was	 because	 no	
disputes	 concerning	process	 plants	were	 available	 for	 observation	 in	 this	 research	




which	 is	 normally	 established	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 a	 project	 and	 remains	 in	 place	
throughout	the	project’s	duration	–	a	 ‘job‐site’	dispute	adjudication	process	(Chern,	
2011:2).	 	 It	may	comprise	one	or	 three	members	who	become	acquainted	with	 the	
contract,	the	project	and	the	individuals	involved	with	the	project.		Depending	on	the	
contract,	 the	 Dispute	 Board	 may	 provide	 informal	 assistance,	 recommendations	
about	how	disputes	should	be	resolved	and/or	binding	decisions.	






“Dispute	 Review	 Board”	 (DRB)	 and	 “Dispute	 Adjudication	 Board”	 (DAB)	 are	
relatively	new	terms	(Gould	and	Goldsmith,	2013:351)	and	are,	 in	essence,	types	of	
Dispute	 Boards.	 	 DRBs	 were	 originally	 developed	 in	 the	 US	 for	 domestic,	 major	
projects.	 	 It	 is	understood	that	 the	 first	use	of	a	DRB	 in	 the	US	was	 in	1975	for	 the	
Eisenhower	 Tunnel	 (Gould	 and	 Goldsmith,	 2013:351).	 	 DRBs	 continue	 to	 be	 used	
primarily	on	US	domestic	projects,	though	their	use	has	also	spread	internationally.		






of	 projects,	 coupled	 with	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 Dispute	 Review	 Boards	 (Gould	 and	
Goldsmith,	2013:351).		The	World	Bank	and	FIDIC	are	two	organisations	which	have	
opted	for	a	binding	dispute	resolution	process	(DAB)	during	the	course	of	projects.80			
Furthermore,	 the	 International	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 (ICC)	 developed	 Dispute	
Board	Rules81,	which	 is	arguably	a	hybrid	approach.	 	Should	a	contract	 incorporate	
these	 rules,	 three	 alternatives	 are	 available	 to	 the	 parties:	 	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
Dispute	 Review	 Board	 (DRB),	 a	 Dispute	 Adjudication	 Board	 (DAB)	 or	 a	 Combined	
Dispute	Board	(CDB).	 	Parties	specify	whether	 the	Dispute	Board	shall	be	a	DRB,	a	
DAB	or	 a	 CDB	 at	 the	 time	 they	 enter	 into	 the	 contract	 (Article	 3).82	 	 In	 addition,	 a	
Dispute	Board	can	also	be	a	 flexible	and	 informal	advisory	panel.	 	Article	16	of	 the	
ICC	Dispute	Board	Rules	(Informal	Assistance	with	Disagreements)	allows	any	party	
                                                 
80	 	 See	 clause	 20.2‐20.8	 of	 the	 Conditions	 of	 Contract	 for	 Construction,	 “the	 Red	Book”,	 1st	





82	Dispute	 Review	 Board	 (Article	 4):	 	 The	 DRB	 issues	 a	 Recommendation,	 in	 line	 with	 the	
traditional	approach	of	DRBs.		The	parties	may	comply	with	it,	but	are	not	required	to	do	so.		
However,	if	neither	party	expresses	dissatisfaction	with	the	written	recommendation	within	
30	days,	 then	the	parties	agree	 to	comply	with	the	recommendation.	 	The	recommendation	
therefore	 becomes	 binding,	 if	 it	 has	 not	 been	 rejected	 by	 one	 of	 the	 parties.	 	 Dispute	
Adjudication	Board	(Article	5):		The	DAB	issues	a	Decision	which	is	binding	on	the	parties	and	
is	 to	 be	 complied	 with	 “without	 delay”,	 in	 other	 words	 immediately,	 notwithstanding	 any	
expression	of	dissatisfaction	by	one	of	the	parties.	 	Combined	Dispute	Board	(Article	6):	 	The	
CDB	 attempts	 to	 blend	 the	 DAB	 and	 DRB.	 	 The	 ICC	 rules	 require	 the	 CDB	 to	 issue	 a	






to	 invite	 the	 Dispute	 Board	 to	 informally	 assist	 with	 the	 resolving	 of	 any	
disagreement	during	the	performance	of	the	contract.83			
In	 any	 event,	 Dispute	 Boards	 tend	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 multi‐tiered	 dispute	 resolution	






Delivery	 Authority	 set	 up	 an	 Independent	 Dispute	 Avoidance	 Panel	 (IDAP)	 of	 ten	





use	 of	 Dispute	 Boards	 include:	 	 Ertan	 Hydroelectric	 Dam	 (China),	 Hong	 Kong	










person	 whose	 opinion	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 respected	 by	 the	 parties).	 	 The	 Judge’s	
evaluation	 of	 the	 case	 is	 not	 binding	 on	 the	 parties	 and	 if	 the	 evaluation	 does	 not	
result	 in	 settlement,	 an	 alternative	 TCC	 Judge	 will	 be	 assigned	 to	 the	 case,	 unless	
otherwise	 agreed	 (HM	 Courts	 &	 Tribunals	 Service,	 2014).	 	 The	 Court	 Settlement	
                                                 
83	The	assistance	may	be	 in	 the	 form	of	a	conversation	on	site	between	 the	parties	and	the	
Dispute	Board	and/or	a	written	note	based	on	documents	and/or	a	 site	visit.	 	Again,	 if	 the	






carried	out	by	a	TCC	Judge.	 	Again,	 the	 Judge	who	conducts	 the	Settlement	Process	
will	take	no	further	part	in	the	proceedings	if	the	mediation	is	not	successful.					
In	 addition	 to	 all	 of	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures	 discussed	 above,	 numerous	
further	 procedures,	 rules	 and	 variations	 on	 the	 mediation/conciliation/ADR	 are	
available.	 	 This	 research	does	 not	 attempt	 to	 identify	 nor	 quantify	 those	 available;	
nevertheless,	 by	 way	 of	 example,	 these	 include:	 	 ICE	 Mediation/Conciliation	







dispute	 as	no	 further	 conversations	or	 steps	were	 taken	 to	propose	 it	 to	 the	other	
side	or	investigate	it	as	an	option.	 	The	Court	Settlement	Process	does	appear	to	be	
utilised	by	some,	the	case	of	McLennan	Architects	v	Jones	and	Roberts	(2014)	being	a	
recent	example.	 	However,	 it	 is	not	something	which	 the	Firm	appears	 to	regularly	
recommend	and/or	is	regularly	involved	with.	
                                                 
84	 Available	 for	 download	 at:	 	 http://www.ice.org.uk/Information‐resources/Document‐
Library/ICE‐Mediation‐Conciliation‐Procedure.	
85	Available	for	download	at:		http://www.cedr.com/about_us/modeldocs/?id=22.	






Collins	 (1999:28)	 considers	 that	when	 two	 individuals	 enter	 into	 a	 contract,	 “they	
create	 a	 discrete	 communication	 system”,	 though	 “…one	 which	 is	 never	 entirely	
closed…”	and	the	legal	system	“is	charged	with	the	task	of	evaluating	and	regulating	
contractual	behaviour	 in	the	 light	of	this	complex	normative	matrix”.	 	 	 	 	 In	summary,	
the	 purpose	 of	 the	 description	 of	 the	 construction	 industry,	 its	 projects,	 it	
participants,	 its	contracts	and	its	dispute	resolution	procedures	in	this	chapter	was	
to	 provide	 a	 contextual	 account	 and	 overview	 of	 the	 environment	 within	 which	
construction	 lawyers	 and	 these	 disputes	 exist	 and	 operate;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	
complex	 normative	 matrix	 of	 the	 construction	 industry.	 	 As	 seen	 above,	 the	
complexity	of	the	formal	law,	the	contractual	and	procedural	mechanisms	for	dealing	
with	disputes	and	the	framework	of	the	construction	participants	themselves	makes	
for	 an	 intricate	 platform	 within	 which	 these	 projects	 are	 constructed	 and	 the	
subsequent	disputes	are	fought.		On	one	view,	as	we	will	see	next	in	Chapter	2,	these	




mechanisms	are	 formulated	within	 the	 context	of	 the	 formal	 legal	 rules/legislation	







This	 research	 explores	 the	 nature	 of	 construction	 disputes	 by	 tracing	 their	
associations	 in	the	context	of	 the	 law	firm	and	the	construction	 industry.	 	To	do	so,	
the	 thesis	 is	 constructed	by	providing	an	ethnographic	description	of	 the	disputes,	
the	lawyers	and	other	interfacing	elements.	 	Narratives	are	provided	throughout	to	
present	 the	 data	 and	 illustrate	 the	 findings.	 	 As	with	 Latour	 (2010	 [2002]:x),	 this	
thesis	is	not	a	presentation	of	construction	law	within	the	English	legal	system	or	an	
analysis	of	the	UK	construction	industry:	 	 it	 is	a	zoom‐free	ethnographic	account	 in	
an	 attempt	 to	 be	 a	 good	 ANT’s	 view	 of	 disputes.	 	 Context	 is	 provided	 by	 way	 of	
background	to	site	the	data	collected	and	narratives	provided.				
Following	 this	 introduction,	 Chapter	 2	 reviews	 the	 literature	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
contractual/non‐contractual	 and	 commercial	 context	 of	 transactions	 and	 the	
relevant	 literature	 concerning	 disputes,	 dispute	 transformations	 and	
lawyers/lawyering.	
Chapter	 3	 then	 outlines	 the	 methods	 employed	 in	 this	 research	 to	 study	 these	
disputes	 and	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 construction	 lawyer.	 	 It	 explains	 the	 strategy,	
approach,	ethical	issues	and	obstacles	encountered.	
Chapter	4	investigates	construction	disputes.	 	 I	consider	those	entities	which	shape	
or	 transform	 construction	 disputes:	 	 the	 associations.	 	 	 	 During	 the	 course	 of	 the	
fieldwork	carried	out	at	the	law	firm,	it	was	clear	that	the	following	were	significant	
in	 terms	 of	 influencing	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 disputes	 and	 their	 outcome:			




identification	 of	 the	 dispute	 and	 how	 lawyers	 define	 it.	 	 Felstiner,	 et	 al.	 (1980‐81)	
assert	that	a	dispute	is	not	a	dispute	until	a	claim	has	been	rejected	and	that	lawyers	
play	a	role	in	the	dispute	transformation:		recommending	whether	a	claim	should	be	
made,	 setting	 the	 strategy	 as	 to	 negotiations/settlement,	 providing	 only	 minimal	
assistance	 (at	 times)	 thereby	 arresting	 further	 development	 of	 a	 dispute,	 etc.	
(Felstiner,	et	al.,	1980‐81:645‐647).			This	research	recognises	and	confirms	lawyers’	
influence	 on	 construction	 disputes	 and	 goes	 on	 to	 find	 that,	 once	 engaged,	 one	 of	
                                                 





their	 principle	 objectives/roles	 is	 to	 identify	 or	name	 (or	 rename)	 the	dispute.	 	As	
such,	 a	 reverse	 trajectory	 of	 Claiming,	 Blaming,	 Naming…	 is	 seen.	 	 The	 chapter	
concludes	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 lawyering	 utilising	 the	 “Reverse	 Trajectory”	 –	 or	 in	
other	 words,	 the	 notion	 of	 “designing	 disputes”.	 	 Naming	 the	 dispute	 in	 the	 best	



























Ltd  commenced  proceedings.    For  the  first  three  months,  the  lawyer  conducted  the 







The Client:  As  I  said,  I need  this over and done with as quickly as possible 
and I understand there is something called “summary judgment”.  
I hear this may be a good idea in order to end this quickly.   
The Lawyer:  Well  yes,  a  summary  judgment  in  your  favour  certainly would 
end the proceedings sooner rather than later; however, based on 
what  I have heard  so  far,  your  chances of  success  in  a dispute 
such as  this are  limited.   Let me consider  this  further and  I will 
get back to you next week.  






The Lawyer:  Ok,  I  see.   Well,  have  you  ever  considered  adjudication?    It  is 

























As	 seen	 from	 the	 background	 provided	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 construction	 industry	
endures	 a	 plethora	 of	 disputes	 which	 concern	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 commercial	 and	
contractual	 issues	 arising	 out	 of	 contracts	 (or	 not	 as	 the	 case	 may	 be).	 	 As	 this	
research	 concerns	 the	 socio‐legal	 aspects	 of	 these	 contractual	 disputes,	 with	 the	




(and	 ultimately	 their	 disputes).	 	 Reflecting	 on	 construction	 contracts	 and	
transactions	 in	 this	 light	 provides	 a	 basis	 and	 perspective	 for	 the	 disputes	 in	 this	
research,	as	well	as	an	insight	into	the	disputes	which	construction	clients	present	to	
their	lawyer	at	the	outset	of	the	engagement.	
As	 such,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	 context	 of	 this	 research	 and	
structure	of	 this	chapter,	 the	 following	 first	 reviews	 the	 literature	 in	respect	of	 the	
contractual/non‐contractual	 and	 commercial	 context	 of	 business	 transactions	
generally,	thereby	giving	perspective	to	the	construction	contracts	and	the	disputes	
which	follow.	 	This	chapter	then	reviews	the	 literature	 in	respect	of	 ‘disputes’:	 	 the	
existing	and	commonly	used	definitions	 in	both	a	 legal	 and	socio‐legal	 context,	 the	
transformations	 of	 disputes	 and	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 perspective	 or	 theoretical	
framework	 from	which	 this	 research	 approaches	 these	 disputes,	 this	 being	 Actor‐
Network	 Theory	 (ANT).	 	 Finally,	 this	 chapter	 concludes	 with	 a	 review	 of	 the	




How	does	 the	 business	 community	 at	 large	 use	 contracts?	 	 Do	 they	 carefully	 plan	
contracts	in	advance	of	the	transaction?		Once	agreed,	if	adjustments	are	necessary,	
are	 they	 formally	 amended?	 	 Is	 the	 contract	 referred	 to	 when	 one	 party	 feels	
aggrieved?		Does	the	construction	industry	conform	to	these	general	findings	of	the	
wider	business	community?	 	The	 following	briefly	discusses	 these	questions	 in	 the	
context	of	the	relevant	literature	and	then	the	construction	disputes	investigated	in	





Before	 doing	 so,	 I	 note	 that	 the	 examples	 given	 below	 in	 respect	 of	 construction	
contracts	 are	 included	 to	 provide	 a	 flavour	 of	 the	 transactions	 out	 of	 which	 the	
disputes	in	this	research	arose.		In	addition,	the	discussion	below	is	included	to	begin	
to	 reflect	 on	 the	 construction	 industry	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 it	 is	 aligned	 with	 the	
general	business	community’s	approach	 to	contracting.	 	One	certainly	cannot	draw	
conclusions	here	on	the	construction	contracts	and	construction	industry’s	approach	
to	contracting	as	the	emphasis	 in	this	research	 is	on	the	disputes	 from	the	point	at	
which	the	lawyer	becomes	involved.		Nevertheless,	this	discussion	provides	a	useful	
background	and	context	to	these	disputes.		Future	research	specifically	investigating	









courts	 to	 settle	 disputes	 …	 while	 detailed	 planning	 and	 legal	




is	 dead	 and/or	 it	 is	 acceptable	 to	 criticise	 and	disregard	 the	actual	 law	 (Campbell,	
2013:159‐162).	 	Rather,	Macaulay	 is	of	 the	view	that	the	parties’	contract	has	been	
drafted	on	a	classical	understanding	of	contract	law	which	does	not	fit	with	the	way	
the	parties	wish	to	conduct	their	relationship	and	in	turn,	as	the	contract	therefore	














it	 is	 clearly	 that	 not	 all	 transactions	 are	 neatly	 rationalized…		
Businessmen	often	prefer	to	rely	on	“a	man’s	word”	in	a	brief	letter,	




and	 most	 problems	 are	 avoided	 without	 legal	 sanctions	 as	 the	 parties	 recognise	




of	 the	day,	most	products	are	or	can	be	tested	to	see	 if	 it	 is	 in	accordance	with	 the	
order	 (Macaulay,	 1963:62‐63).	 	 Macaulay	 did	 distinguish	 between	 ‘important	
transactions’	and	‘routine	transactions’	noting	that	important	transactions	not	in	the	
ordinary	course	of	business	are	dealt	with	using	a	detailed	contract	where	as	routine	
transactions	 are	 dealt	 with	 by	 ‘standardized	 planning’,	 this	 generally	 being	 an	
exchange	of	standard	terms	and	conditions	(Macaulay,	1963:57).	 	 In	conclusion,	he	
found	 that	while	many	 business	 exchanges	will	 involve	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 planning,	
equally	 many	 “reflect	 no	 planning,	 or	 only	 a	 minimal	 amount	 of	 it,	 especially	
concerning	legal	sanctions	and	effect	of	defective	performances”	(Macaulay,	1963:60).		
Accordingly,	as	Campbell	(2013:165)	notes,	it	is	not	the	literal	non‐use	of	contracts,	
but	 rather	 “a	 complex	 interplay	 between	 the	 use	 of	 legal	 and	 non‐legal	 sanctions”	
which	 Macaulay	 explains	 by	 reference	 to	 “the	 functions	 and	 dysfunctions	 of	 using	
contract	to	solve	exchange	problems”	(Macaulay,	1963:56).				
Approximately	 10	 years	 after	 Macaulay’s	 seminal	 text,	 Beale	 and	 Dugdale’s	 also	
considered	the	extent	to	which	businessmen	consciously	use	contract	law,	this	time	
in	 the	 UK	 context	 and	 specifically	 in	 respect	 of	 engineering	manufacturers.	 	 Their	
findings	 generally	 supported	 Macaulay’s	 study.	 	 In	 addition,	 they	 found	 that	
professionals	in	this	industry	considered	it	expensive	to	plan	in	detail	in	advance	of	
the	transaction,	that	a	carefully	negotiated	contract	might	be	insufficiently	flexible	to	




relationship	 (Beale	 and	 Dugdale,	 1975:47).	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 businesses	 in	 Beale	
and	Dugdale’s	 study	 traded	 regularly	with	 each	other	 and	 the	perception	was	 that	
each	 knew	what	 the	 other	would	 accept.	 	 Firms	 stated	 that	 they	would	 take	more	
care	in	planning	their	contracts	with	those	who	they	were	not	familiar	–	particularly	
those	 outside	 of	 the	 engineering	 trade.	 	 Beale	 and	 Dugdale	 found	 that	 only	 rarely	
were	 contracts	 formed	as	a	 result	of	detailed	negotiation.	 	When	 they	were,	 it	was	
generally	for	engines	or	machinery	worth	more	than	£50,000,	this	being	a	sufficient	
sum	to	justify	the	time	and	trouble	(Beale	and	Dugdale,	1975:47).	
Nearly	 10	 years	 after	 Beale	 and	 Dugdale’s	 study,	 Richard	 Lewis	 investigated	 the	
tendering	 practices	 specifically	 in	 the	 building	 industry	 and	 the	 commercial	
relationship	between	general	contractors	and	their	sub‐contractors	when	bidding	for	
a	 project	 (Lewis,	 1982).	 	 Lewis	 found	 that,	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
these	two	parties,	informal	remedies	such	as	re‐negotiation	between	the	parties,	cost	




relationship	 and	 notably	 supports	 the	 previous	 studies	 of	 the	 manufacturing	
industry.	
More	 recently,	 Hugh	 Collins	 has	 expressed	 his	 dissatisfaction	with	Macaulay’s	 and	
other’s	 empirical	 studies	 on	 the	 non‐use	 of	 contracts	 (Collins,	 1999:136‐140).		
Collins	 considers	 that	 these	 studies	 fail	 to	 appreciate	 the	 presence	 of	 all	 three	
normative	frameworks	in	all	contractual	contexts,	these	being:		the	business	relation	
framework,	 the	 economic	 deal	 framework	 and	 the	 contractual	 framework	 (Collins,	
1999:	 137).89	 	 The	 competing	 presence	 of	 these	 three	 frameworks	 is	 constantly	 at	
play,	 though	one	discourse	will	 take	priority	over	another	 for	good	business	sense.		
This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 other	 frameworks	 fall	 away,	 but	 rather,	 they	may	 be	
temporarily	 “occluded”	 and	 will	 be	 “resuscitated”	 at	 a	 later	 point	 in	 the	 business	
relationship.	 Collins	 interprets	 the	 non‐use	 of	 contracts	 as	 the	 contractual	
framework	 being	 used	 whenever	 it	 is,	 or	 is	 not,	 rational	 to	 do	 so:	 	 “non‐use	 of	
contracts	 is	 not	 fuelled	 by	 an	 irrational	 hatred	 of	 lawyers,	 nor	 a	 blinkered	
incompetence	 in	 business	 planning,	 but	 guided	 by	 good	 business	 sense”	 (Collins,	
                                                 
89	 Collins	 also	 suggests	 that	 these	 original	 studies	 need	 to	 be	 viewed	 in	 the	 context	 of	
American	industry	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.	 	He	asserts	that	now	that	the	post‐war	boom	is	





1999:140).	 	 Accordingly,	 a	 business’s	 conduct	 or	 behaviour	 is	 governed	 to	 some	
extent	by	all	three	frameworks	simultaneously,	with	one	dominating	over	the	others	
in	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	 particular	 outcome.	 	 By	 way	 of	 example,	 where	 a	 business	
deems	 it	 sensible	 to	overlook	breaches	of	contract	 in	 favour	of	maintaining	a	 long‐
term	 business	 relationship,90	 the	 contractual	 framework	 has	 been	 curbed	 for	 the	





to	 reveal	 to	 us”	 (Campbell,	 2013:161).	 	 Campbell	 notes	 that	Macaulay	 did	 not	 and	
does	not	want	to	be	responsible	for	the	death	of	contract	(Campbell,	2013:160,185)	
but	 importantly	 has	 shown	 us	 the	 “irrelevance	 of	 traditional	 contract	 theory”	
(Gilmore,	1995).		In	Campbell’s	view,	it	is	not	the	law	of	contract	that	is	at	fault,	but	
rather	“the	contracts	entered	into	on	the	basis	of	the	classical	law	of	contract.		Complex	
contracts	 do	 not	 have	 to	 take	 the	 classical	 form	 which	 leads	 to	 their	 non‐use…”	
(Campbell,	2013:177)	
A	stark	example	of	this	non‐use	of	contracts	and	non‐contractual	relations	is	seen	in	
Sally	Wheeler’s	 study	 of	Romalpa	 clauses91	 (Wheeler,	 1991).	 	 Here	Wheeler	 found	
that	 although	 92%	 of	 the	 sellers	 reviewed	 the	 Romalpa	 clauses	 in	 their	 standard	




category	 of	 “the	 complex”	 or	 “the	 relational”	 contract	 (see	 further	 below).	 	 Indeed	
they	are	to	be	distinguished	from	the	contracts	 involved	in	the	Macaulay	and	Beale	
and	Dugdale	studies.		This	certainly	is	not	to	say	that	the	contracts	investigated	there	
were	 not	 complex	 or	 relational,	 but	 rather,	 contracts	 in	 the	 construction	 industry	
comprise	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 issues	 which	 often	 go	 beyond	 sale	 and	 purchase	
agreements.	 	 Beale	 and	 Dugdale’s	 study	 was	 in	 respect	 of	 sale	 and	 purchase	
                                                 
90	 Collins	 (Collins,	 1999:134)	 refers	 to	 an	 example	 in	 Macaulay’s	 study	 where	 a	 regular	
business	customer	cancelled	an	order	and	the	sales	representative	took	no	action	(Macaulay,	
1963)	 and	 in	 Beale	 and	 Dugdale’s	 study	 where	 a	 defect	 in	 a	 product	 is	 repaired	 without	
charge	or	prices	are	reduced	in	future	transactions	(Beale	and	Dugdale,	1975:45	and	59).		
91	 The	 term	Romalpa	 clause,	 generated	 from	 the	 case	 of	 Aluminium	 Industrie	 Vassen	 BV	 v	





agreements	 between	 engineering	 manufacturers;	 for	 example,	 contracts	 involving	
the	 sale	 and	 purchase	 of	 small	 tools,	 machines	 and	 engines.	 	 Macaulay	 also	 was	




for	 use	when	 carrying	 out	 their	 services.	 	 However,	 these	 agreements	 are	 but	 one	
element	of	 the	 industry.	 	The	upstream	contracts,	 from	which	 these	hire/purchase	
contracts	ultimately	flow,	are	contracts	between	the	employer	and	the	contractor(s)	
as	well	 as	 those	 contracts	which	employ	 the	design	professionals	 are	 contracts	 for	
services	 ‐	 these	 being	 design	 and/or	 construction	 services	which	 could	 potentially	
last	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years92.	 	 Here,	 the	 ‘product’	 (eg,	 the	 office	 building,	 the	wind	
farm,	the	highway)	generally	is	not	something	which	is	designed	for	replication	and	
generally	is	a	bespoke	product.		Furthermore,	it	could	be	case	that:		(1)	the	employer	
may	 not	 necessarily	 have	 specified	 the	 product	 in	 any	 detail	 (or	 even	 have	 a	
developed	concept	design	for	that	matter)	when	the	contract	is	entered	into;	(2)	the	
site	 conditions,	 environmental	 conditions	 and/or	 innovative	 technology/materials	
are	 unknown	 or	 unfamiliar;	 and	 (3)	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 product	 has	 not	 or	 cannot	 be	
determined.	 	The	contracts	used	tend	to	be	either	industry	standard	form	contracts	
or	bespoke	contracts	(often	derived	from	those	standard	forms),	some	with	complex	
payment	 terms	 such	 as	 target	 cost/maximum	 cost	 provisions	 and	 pain	 share/gain	
share	 mechanisms.	 	 A	 business’s	 own	 standard	 terms	 and	 conditions	 are	 used	 as	
well,	particularly	for	smaller	projects	between	contractors	and	subcontracts.			
I	 point	 out	 these	 distinguishing	 factors	 merely	 to	 emphasize	 the	 incredible	
complexity	of	certain	contracts	within	the	construction	 industry.	 	This	 is	not	to	say	
that	 Macaulay’s	 and	 Beale	 and	 Dugdale’s	 findings	 are	 not	 relevant	 because	 the	
subject	 nature	 of	 the	 contracts	 is	 different,	 but	 quite	 the	 contrary.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	
businesses	 in	 the	 construction	 industry	 are	 in	 line	 with	 businesses	 in	 the	
manufacturing	 industry	at	 least	 to	some	degree:	 	 in	certain	situations	contracts	are	
highly	used	and	pre‐planned	in	fine	detail,	and	in	other	situations	no	formal	contract	
is	used	whatsoever.	 	For	example,	some	of	 the	disputes	 in	this	study	arose	out	of	a	
‘gentleman’s	 agreement’	 or	 projects	where	 no	 contracts	were	 put	 in	 place.	 	 Either	
way,	 recourse	 to	 the	 courts	 to	 settle	 disputes	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 both	 in	 the	
manufacturing	industry	as	well	as	the	construction	industry.	
                                                 
92	For	example,	one	dispute	investigated	in	this	research	concerned	a	project	whose	concept	





Macaulay	 did	 consider	 “non‐use”	 in	 a	 construction	 context	 in	 his	 review	 of	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 Johnson	 Administration	 Building93,	 designed	 by	 the	 world‐
renowned	 architect	 Frank	 Lloyd	 Wright	 in	 1936	 (Macaulay,	 1996).	 	 Here,	 he	
investigated	“how	people	can	perform	complex	commitments	without	formal	planning	
and	 even	 implicit	 threats	 to	 use	 legal	 sanctions”	 (Macaulay,	 1996:77).	 	 Macaulay	
certainly	depicts	a	vivid	tale	of	Frank	Lloyd	Wright,	Hibbard	Johnson	(the	President	
and	controlling	shareholder	of	the	Johnson	Company)	and	John	Ramsey	(the	General	
Manager	 of	 the	 Johnson	 Company)	 in	 their	 trials	 and	 tribulations	 concerning	 the	
design,	 construction,	 costs,	 innovative	 materials,	 defects,	 delay,	 personalities	 and	
behaviours.		In	summary,	Wright	advised	Johnson	at	the	outset	of	their	relationship	
that	the	building	would	cost	$200,000.		Three	years	later	(this	being	two	years	longer	
than	 the	 Johnson	Company	expected)	 the	reported	costs	were	 thought	 to	be	 in	 the	
region	of	$750,000	‐	$900,000	(Macaulay,	1996:99).		There	appears	not	to	have	been	
a	 signed,	 formal,	 detailed	 agreement	 between	 Wright	 and	 Johnson	 –	 only	
correspondence	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 Wright	 would	 be	 paid	 10%	 of	 the	 construction	
costs.	 	Whilst	 the	 Johnson	 Administration	 Building	 certainly	 could	 not	 be	 labelled	
“your	 typical	 building	 project”	 as	 it	 involved	 creating	 a	 landmark,	 iconic	 building	
with	materials	 and	 innovations	 not	 yet	 tried	 and	 tested	 and	 designed	 by	 celebrity	
architect,	 the	 problems	 this	 project	 encountered	 in	 the	 1930s	 are	 nevertheless	
illustrative	 of	 the	 problems	 in	 today’s	 construction	 industry:	 	 variations,	 defects,	
delay	 and	 cost	overruns.	 	Macaulay	offers	 explanations	as	 to	why	 the	parties	dealt	
with	 these	 problems	 the	 way	 they	 did	 and	 did	 not	 resort	 to	 contract	 law	 and	
litigation	in	the	courts:		a	relational	contract	approach	pointing	to	management	of	the	
relationship	and	a	commitment	to	cooperate	so	that	“each	gains	appropriate,	but	not	
necessarily	 equal,	 returns”,	 in	 other	 words,	 “mutuality”	 (Macaulay,	 1996:111).		
Contributing	 factors,	 amongst	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 imbedded	 relations,	 included	 the	
parties’	 friendship,	 the	 Johnson	 Company’s	 reputation	 and	 desire	 for	 a	 Wright‐
designed	building	and	Wright’s	need	for	flexibility.						
In	 terms	of	 today’s	 use	 of	 contracts	 and	 contract	 law	 in	 the	 construction	 industry,	





                                                 
93	 For	 SC	 Johnson	 and	 Son	 Inc,	 headquartered	 in	 Racine,	 Wisconsin,	 who	 was	 one	 of	 the	









to	 their	 lawyers.	 	 Furthermore,	 mediations	 and	 without	 prejudice	 meetings	 and	




With	regard	to	 the	disputes	 in	 this	ethnography,	as	 indicated	above,	some	disputes	
clearly	arose	in	situations	where	no	formal	contract	had	been	negotiated	and/or	put	









witnessed	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 did	 arise	 out	 of	 a	 formal,	 physical	
contract	 that	existed	between	the	parties	and	had	been	negotiated	at	 least	 to	some	
extent.	 	 It	could	be	argued	this	research	would	only	witness	disputes	arising	out	of	
contracts	 and	 parties	 which	 were	 minded	 towards	 the	 use	 of	 contract	 law	 as	
otherwise	 they	 would	 not	 be	 knocking	 on	 the	 lawyer’s	 door.	 	 Perhaps;	 however,	
when	 considering	 the	 parties’	 conduct	 during	 the	 course	 of	 these	 projects	 and	 the	
clients’	 overwhelming	 general	 desire	 to	 avoid	 litigation,	 simply	 because	 a	 contract	
exists	and	was	negotiated	to	some	extent,	does	not	necessarily	equate	to	use	of	that	




To	what	 extent	 the	 specific	 contractual	 clauses	 and	 obligations/entitlements	were	
invoked	or	enforced	after	contract	formation,	during	the	course	of	the	project,	varied	
widely.		Some	disputes	observed	certainly	did	arise	out	of	the	non‐use	of	contractual	




firstly,	 a	number	of	disputes	 concerned	 the	parties’	 failure	 to	operate	 the	payment	
notice	regime	required	under	the	HGCRA	1996,	as	amended.94		A	number	of	disputes	
arose	seemingly	out	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	employer	 failed	 to	serve	a	Pay	Less	Notice	
before	withholding	money	from	the	sum	stated	in	the	Payment	Notice	as	being	due	









cost	 and/or	 time	 needed	 to	 complete	 the	works	 and	 are	 events	which	 are	 not	 the	
fault	of	the	contractor.		The	NEC3	contract	aims	to	highlight	and	assess	these	events	
as	 early	 as	 possible	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 project	 and	 therefore	 imposes	 strict	
notification	 provisions	 on	 the	 contractor.	 	 In	 accordance	 with	 clause	 61.3,	 if	 the	
contractor	 does	 not	 notify	 a	 compensation	 event	 within	 eight	 weeks	 of	 becoming	
aware	 of	 the	 event,	 he	 is	 not	 entitled	 to	 his	 claim	 for	 a	 change	 in	 the	 price	 or	 the	
completion	date	of	the	works.		Whilst	some	projects	clearly	operated	the	procedure	
religiously,	others	were	rather	“loose”	and	when	the	relationship	broke	down,	only	
then	did	arguments	over	 this	 clause	ensue.	 	The	disputes	witnessed	 in	 this	 respect	
concerned	 whether	 the	 procedure	 had	 been	 followed	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	
project;	 specifically,	 did	 the	 contractor	 notify	 the	 event	 within	 the	 relevant	
timeframe	 and	 therefore	 was	 entitled	 to	 submit	 the	 (sometimes	 numerous)	
compensation	 events	when	 it	 did	 and	did	 the	 event	 fall	within	 the	 specified	 list	 of	
compensation	 events	 (at	 clause	 60.1	 or	 as	 amended).	 	 Had	 the	 relationships	 not	
become	strained,	 it	 is	arguable	whether	a	dispute	over	of	 the	 interpretation	of	 this	
clause	would	have	occurred	and	whether	further	“non‐contractual”	relations	would	
                                                 
94	Generally,	both	standard	form	building	and	bespoke	contracts	do	tend	to	expressly	address	
and	 incorporate	 the	HGCRA	1996	 terms	 to	 this	 effect,	 otherwise,	 they	 are	 implied	 into	 the	
contract.	






have	 continued.	 	 Notably,	 very	 little	 case	 law	 specifically	 concerns	 the	 NEC3’s	
compensation	event	procedure.96	
Whilst	 there	 are	 certainly	 instances	where	 the	 construction	 community	 fails	 to	 or	
chooses	 not	 to	 use	 the	 contractual	 machinery,	 it	 must	 be	 recognised	 that	 the	
contractual	 provisions	 of	 standard	 form	and	bespoke	 contracts	 are	 often	 followed.		
Many	 large	 and	 small	 contractors,	 developers	 and	 commercially	 minded	 design	
professionals	do	systematically	comply	with	the	contractual	requirements	of	notices,	
claims	and	payment,	these	requirements	being	commonly	included	and	expected	in	
contracts	 throughout	 the	 industry.	 	 Clearly	 further	 research	 in	 this	 area	would	 be	
welcomed	 to	 understand	 better	 the	 construction	 industry’s	 knowledge	 and	 use	 of	
particular	commonly	included	and/or	implied	contractual	provisions.			
Collins	 (1999:	 139)	 suggests	 that	 once	 Macaulay’s	 thesis	 about	 the	 non‐use	 of	
contracts	 in	 the	 manufacturing	 industry	 is	 interpreted	 in	 the	 light	 of	 his	 three	
frameworks,	 the	 findings/evidence	may	 be	 generalised	 across	markets	 and	 across	
time.	 	 This	 certainly	 accords	 with	 the	 construction	 contracts	 concerned	 in	 this	




A	 further	 notable	 element	 of	 the	 contracts	 in	 the	 business	 community	 is	 that,	
“contrary	 to	 the	 classical	 model’s	 assumption	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 certainty,	









in	 contracts:	 	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 design	 and	 innovation	 in	 technology,	 to	 exploit	
                                                 
96	In	Atkins	Ltd	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Transport	(2013)	the	contract	was	a	heavily	amended	
NEC3	and	 the	 case	 concerned	 the	 validity	 of	Atkins’s	 claim	 for	 a	 compensation	 event	 for	 a	






which	 render	 the	 original	 bargain	 not	 economically	 satisfactory	 for	 one	 or	 both	
parties	(Collins,	1999:167).	 	Collins	refers	to	construction	projects	as	an	example	of	
how	 a	 governance	 structure	 can	 be	 put	 in	 place	 to	 resolve	 aspects	 of	
“incompleteness”	 in	 the	 contract:	 	 an	 architect	 is	 empowered	 in	 the	 construction	
project	 to	 determine	 how	 much	 the	 contractor	 is	 due	 on	 a	 monthly	 basis.		
Nevertheless,	 as	he	 notes,	 there	 still	will	 be	 an	 element	of	 “incompleteness”	 in	 the	
contract	 in	 respect	 of	 how	 this	 neutral	 third	 party	 should	 exercise	 the	 discretion	
conferred	upon	him	or	her	(Collins,	1999:	169).	
Campbell	 and	 Harris	 (1993)	 considered	 flexibility	 in	 long‐term	 contractual	
relationships	and,	using	the	two	paradigms	of	individual	utility	maximization	and	co‐
operation,	 explained	 long‐term	 contracts	 as	 requiring	 “the	 rejection	 of	 immediate	
individual	self‐interest	as	the	measure	of	economic	rationality	and	 its	replacement	by	
common	interest	as	this	measure”	(Campbell	and	Harris,	1993:167).		In	other	words,	
co‐operation	 in	 long‐term	contracts	 is	 the	adequate	 form	of	self‐interest.	 	Campbell	
and	Harris	noted	that	parties	to	a	contract	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	flexibility	




The	 issues	 introduced	 above	 in	 respect	 of	 flexibility	holds	 true	 in	 the	 construction	
industry	and	its	contracts.	 	Parties	to	a	construction	contract	generally	recognise	at	
the	 outset	 of	 project	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 circumstances	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 arise,	 but	
cannot	 be	 foreseen	 and/or	 dealt	with	 prior	 to	 formation	 of	 the	 contract.	 	 In	 other	
words,	what	do	the	parties	agree	should	happen	‘if’	a	particular	event	occurs?		Both	
standard	 form	and	bespoke	contracts	attempt	 to	address	 these	 issues	with	express	
contractual	terms.	 	If	one	conceptualises	standard	form	contracts	as	a	“private	form	
of	ordering	in	which	industries	are	able	to	formalise	shared	understandings	about	what	
constitutes	 fair	practice	and	 sound	 economic	 sense”,	 then	 these	 contracts	 positively	
and	 proactively	 plan	 for	 future	 relations	 and	 allow	 for	 flexibility	 (Mulcahy,	 2008:	
168).			







Variations	 What	 happens	 if	 the	 employer97	 wants	
to	 change	 the	 specification	 or	
something	 else	 in	 the	 contract	
documentation?	
Delay	 What	 happens	 if	 the	 contractor	 is	 in	
delay?	
Completion	 What	happens	if	the	contractor	does	not	





works	 found	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	
project,	or	after?	













for	 various	 interpretations.	 	 Many	 of	 the	 matters	 discussed	 in	 Chapters	 4	 –	 7	
illustrate	 the	 issues	 and	 disputes	 arising	 out	 of	 different	 contract	 interpretation	
where	 the	 contract	 was	 not	 suitably	 flexible	 and/or	 considered.	 	 Outside	 of	 this	
research,	 the	 well‐known	 example	 of	 course	 is	 the	 classic	 and	 well‐debated	
construction	 case	Williams	v	Roffey	Bros	&	Nicholls	 (Contractors)	Ltd	 (1991)	which	
reached	the	Court	of	Appeal.		The	plaintiff	sub‐contractor	(a	carpenter)	was	in	delay	
and	 was	 not	 going	 to	 meet	 the	 agreed	 completion	 date,	 which	 meant	 that	 the	
defendant	main	contractor	would	have	been	penalised	for	late	completion	under	the	
main	contract	with	the	employer.	 	The	parties	then	reached	an	agreement	whereby	
                                                 
97 Standard	form	construction	contracts	tend	to	use	the	defined	term	“Employer”	or	“Client”	
when	referring	to	the	party	who	commissions	the	project.	 	Again,	this	research	employs	the	





the	 main	 contractor	 promised	 to	 pay	 the	 sub‐contractor	 additional	 monies	 to	
accelerate	 his	work	 and	 complete	what	 he	was	 already	 contractually	 bound	 to	 do.		
The	 main	 contractor	 failed	 to	 pay	 this	 promised	 money	 and	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	
found	that	“the	doctrine	of	consideration	should	not	restrict	the	ability	of	commercial	
contractors	 to	 make	 periodic	 consensual	 modifications,	 and	 even	 one‐sided	
modifications,	as	 the	work	under	a	construction	contract	proceeded”	 (Steyn,	1997)	–	
the	 sub‐contractor	 was	 entitled	 to	 payment.	 	 Here,	 the	 contract	 was	 not	 suitably	
flexible	enough	to	provide	for	the	events	which	occurred,	which	arguably	could	not	
be	foreseen	or	fixed	at	the	outset	of	the	contract.		Indeed,	the	doctrine	of	contract	law	
was	 not	 suitably	 clear	 or	 flexible	 enough	 to	 accommodate	 this	 transaction	 or	
modification	of	 the	 contract,	which	 resulted	 in	 a	 judgment	 in	 considerable	 interest	
and	subsequent	discussion.		As	Campbell,	2014	notes	Williams	v	Roffey	is	remarkable	
in	 the	 sense	 that	 this	 case	 concerned	 challenges	 to	 two	 central	 features	 of	








established	 trade	 practice	 in	 the	 industry,	 the	 commercial	 context,	 the	 contractual	
context	and	the	legal	context.		In	other	words,	they	are	by	no	means	straight‐forward.			
When	 the	 parties’	 contract	 or	 transaction	 does	 not	 go	 according	 to	 plan,	 and	 the	
dispute	 finds	 its	 way	 to	 the	 lawyer’s	 doorstep,	 the	 lawyer	 is	 presented	 with	 this	
‘baggage’	and	complex	set	of	competing	factors,	regardless	of	what	the	classical	law	
of	contract	and	legal	reasoning	says	about	the	resolution	of	the	dispute.		As	such,	the	
theories	 in	respect	of	 these	 implicit	dimensions	of	contracts	 (Campbell,	Collins	and	
Wightman,	 2003)	 and	 specifically	 the	 late	 Macneil’s	 relational	 contract	 theory,	 or	










the	 construction	 contracts,	 and	 therefore	 the	 construction	 disputes,	 which	 were	
presented	 to	 the	 lawyers	 studied	 in	 this	 research.	 	 Relational	 contract	 approaches	
tend	to	describe	construction	contracts	and	construction	processes	more	effectively	
and	more	suitably	than	neo‐classical100	ones	–	 indeed	this	 is	what	Macaulay	said	 in	
respect	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Frank	 Lloyd	 Wright’s	 Johnson	 Administration	
Building	(Macaulay,	1996:111).	
On	 one	 view,	 relational	 contract	 theory	 distinguishes	 discrete	 contracts	 from	
relational	 contracts	 in	 that	 a	 relational	 contract	 fundamentally	 embodies	 the	 long‐
term	 business	 interests	 of	 the	 parties.	 	 A	 relational	 contract	 requires	 trust,	 co‐
operation	and	a	 recognition	and	consideration	of	 all	 significant	 relational	 elements	
surrounding	a	transaction	(Macneil,	1980)	and	the	express	terms	of	the	contract	are	
part	and	parcel	of	a	“dense	web	of	relations”	(Macneil,	2003:208).		Performance	of	the	
contract	 persists	 over	 a	 period	 of	 time	 and	 the	 contract	 provides	 an	 incomplete	
specification	of	obligations.	 	 In	contrast,	a	discrete	contract	 is	a	one‐off	 transaction	
such	 as	 purchasing	 a	 newspaper.	 	 On	 another	 view,	 this	 discrete	 versus	 relational	
description	 is	 a	 simplistic	 account	 of	 relational	 contract	 theory	 and	 some	 consider	
this	 to	 be	 overly	 simplistic	 and	 not	 particularly	 helpful	 in	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	
distinction	between	the	two	as	implicit	dimensions	are	involved	in	both	discrete	and	
relational	contracts	(Campbell,	1996;	Collins,	1999:141).		Indeed,	the	main	thrust	of	
Macneil’s	 work	 is	 rather	 to	 reveal	 the	 relational	 constitution	 of	 all	 contracts	
(Campbell,	2001:	5)	and	in	this	respect	his	ten	common	contract	norms	apply	to	and	
underpin	 all	 contracts:	 	 (1)	 role	 integrity;	 (2)	 reciprocity;	 (3)	 implementation	 of	
planning;	(4)	effectuation	of	consent;	(5)	flexibility;	(6)	contractual	solidarity;	(7)	the	
restitution,	reliance	and	expectation	interests	–	the	‘linking	norms’;	(8)	creation	and	
restraint	 of	 power;	 (9)	 propriety	 of	 means;	 and	 (10)	 harmonisation	 with	 the	
particular	 social	 matrix	 (Macneil,	 2003;	 Macneil;	 1983).	 	 A	 further	 description	 of	
relational	 contract	 theory	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘network’	 (Collins,	 2003:19101),	 a	
common	 example	 being	 “a	 construction	 project,	 where	 the	 employers	 of	 the	main	
contractor	may	 not	 have	 direct	 contractual	 relations	with	 sub‐contractors	 and	 the	
                                                 
99	See	for	example:		Macneil,	1978;	Macneil,	1980;	Macneil,	2000a;	Macneil,	2000b;	Wightman,	
1996;	 Campbell,	 2001;	 the	 collection	 of	 essays	 in	 Campbell,	 Collins	 and	 Wightman,	 2003	













1993;	 Campbell,	 2013;	 Campbell,	 2013/2016:138).	 	 Campbell	 prefers	 the	 term	





interesting	development	 in	 this	respect	 in	 the	context	of	 the	doctrine	of	good	 faith.		
Leggatt	J	recognised	the	existence	of	such	contracts	(para	142):	
“English	 law	 has	 traditionally	 drawn	 a	 sharp	 distinction	 between	
certain	 relationships	 –	 such	 as	 partnership,	 trusteeship	 and	 other	
fiduciary	relationships	–	on	the	one	hand,	in	which	the	parties	owe	
onerous	 obligations	 of	 disclosure	 to	 each	 other,	 and	 other	
contractual	relationships	in	which	no	duty	of	disclosure	is	supposed	
to	operate.		Arguably	at	least,	that	dichotomy	is	too	simplistic.	While	
it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 any	 duty	 to	 disclose	 information	 in	
performance	of	 the	 contract	would	be	 implied	where	 the	 contract	
involves	a	simple	exchange,	many	contracts	do	not	fit	this	model	and	
involve	a	 longer	 term	 relationship	between	 the	parties	which	 they	
make	a	substantial	commitment.	Such	‘relational’	contracts,	as	they	
are	sometimes	called,	may	require	a	high	degree	of	communication,	
co‐operation	 and	 predictable	 performance	 based	 on	mutual	 trust	
and	 confidence	 and	 involve	 expectations	 of	 loyalty	which	 are	 not	
legislated	for	in	the	express	terms	of	the	contract	but	are	implicit	in	
the	parties’	understanding	and	necessary	to	give	business	efficacy	to	
the	 arrangements.	 Examples	 of	 such	 relational	 contracts	 might	
include	 some	 joint	 venture	 agreements,	 franchise	 agreements	 and	
long	term	distributorship	agreements.”	
Having	 said	 that	and	 though	not	wishing	 to	 rain	on	 this	parade,	one	must	note	Mr	
Justice	Akenhead	in	the	TCC	declined	to	draw	any	principles	from	Yam	Seng	Pte	in	his	




concerned	 an	 alleged	 implied	 term	 of	 good	 faith	 in	 a	 standard	 form	 partnering	
contract102	(para	46):	
“Because	 cases	and	 contracts	are	 sensitive	 to	 context,	 I	would	not	
draw	any	principle	from	this	extremely	illuminating	and	interesting	
judgment	 which	 is	 of	 general	 application	 to	 all	 commercial	
contracts.	I	do	not	see	that	implied	obligations	of	honesty	or	fidelity	
to	the	contractual	bargain	impinge	in	this	case	at	all.”	
As	 Macneil	 summarised,	 the	 four	 core	 propositions	 which	 inform	 any	 relational	
approach	to	contracts	are	(Macneil,	2003;	Macneil,	2000):	
“1.			 every	transaction	is	embedded	in	complex	relations…	
2.			 understanding	 any	 transaction	 requires	 understanding	 all	










the	 complexity	 of	 the	 construction	 projects	 and	 contracts	which	 clients	 present	 to	


















2.			 understanding	 any	 dispute	 requires	 understanding	 all	
elements	 of	 its	 enveloping	 relations	 that	 might	 affect	 the	
dispute	significantly…	
3.			 effective	 analysis	 of	 any	 dispute	 requires	 recognition	 and	
consideration	of	all	significant	relational	elements…	
4.			 combined	 contextual	 analysis	 of	 relations	 and	 disputes	 is	
more	efficient	and	produces	a	more	complete	and	sure	final	
analytical	 product	 than	 does	 commencing	 with	 non‐
contextual	analysis	of	disputes…	
The	 above	 amended	 quote	 succinctly	 summaries	 and	 establishes	 this	 research’s	
viewpoint	 of	 disputes.	 	 The	 following	 now	 considers	 the	 literature	 in	 respect	 of	







The	 existing	 data	 and	 literature	 with	 respect	 to	 construction	 disputes	 has	 largely	
been	compiled	by	legal	and	construction	professionals	in	an	attempt	to	pin	point	why	
construction	 projects	 are	 so	 likely	 to	 encounter	 some	 kind	 of	 disagreement	 or	
dispute.		In	the	early	1990s	the	UK	government	commissioned	Sir	Michal	Latham	to	
review	the	contractual	and	procurement	arrangements	in	the	construction	industry.		
In	 1994	 he	 published	 his	 highly	 influential	 report	Constructing	 the	Team	 (Latham,	
1994)	 which	 provided	 recommendations	 for	 limiting	 the	 quantity	 and	 effect	 of	
construction	 disputes.	 	 Sir	 John	 Egan	 then	 followed	 in	 1998	 with	 Rethinking	
Construction	 (Egan,	 1998),	 making	 further	 recommendations	 for	 change	 in	 the	
construction	industry.		Academics	at	the	King’s	College	Centre	for	Construction	Law	
&	 Dispute	 Resolution	 also	 provide	 further	 reasons	 as	 to	 why	 there	 are	 so	 many	
disputes	in	the	construction	industry	(Capper,	1997).		In	each	case	the	emphasis	has	
largely	 focused	on	 the	design,	 contractual	and	economic	conditions	of	 construction	
projects	as	the	genesis	for	construction	disputes.			
Similarly,	there	has	been,	and	of	course	continues	to	be,	considerable	analysis	of	the	
legal	 and	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 established	 dispute	 resolution	 methods	 (Chern,	
2008;	 Chatterjee	 and	 Lefcovitch,	 2008;	 Coulson	 2015).	 	 In	 addition	 ‘disputing’,	
negotiation	 and	 settlement	 of	 disputes,	 both	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	 court	 context,	 have	








In	order	to	understand	what	influences	the	outcomes	of	disputes,	 it	 is	 important	to	
recognise	 that	 there	are	various	definitions	 ‘dispute’	 and	 the	 context	 in	which	 they	
are	 used	 are	 wide‐ranging.	 	 The	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 provides	 perhaps	 the	
most	 commonly	 used	 definition:	 	 “a	 disagreement	 or	 argument”	 (OED,	 2014).		






the	 definition	 becomes	 much	 more	 complex	 and	 fine‐tuned	 to	 the	 practices	 and	
procedures	of	the	court	and	legal	system.103		
Perhaps	 one	 of	 the	 first	 construction	 cases	 to	 consider	 the	 “legal”	 definition	 of	 a	
dispute	was	Monmouthshire	County	Council	v	Costelloe	&	Kemple	Ltd	 (1965).	 	Here,	
the	 contractor	 referred	 certain	 claims	 to	 the	 engineer	 under	 clause	 66	 of	 the	 ICE	
conditions,	 4th	 edition.	 	 Thereafter,	 the	 contractor	 commenced	 arbitration.	 	 The	
Council	 challenged	 the	 arbitrator’s	 appointment	 contending	 that	 there	 was	 no	
dispute	 as	 the	 contractor’s	 claims	 had	 been	 referred	 and	 settled	 by	 the	 engineer	
some	years	ago.		In	relation	to	this	issue	Lord	Denning	MR	said:	
"The	 first	point	 is	 this:	was	 there	any	dispute	or	difference	arising	
between	 the	 contractors	 and	 the	 engineer?	 It	 is	 accepted	 that	 in	
order	 that	a	dispute	or	difference	can	arise	on	 this	contract,	 there	
must	in	the	first	place	be	a	claim	by	the	contractor.	Until	that	claim	
is	 rejected	 you	 cannot	 say	 that	 there	 is	 a	 dispute	 or	 difference.	




he	was	 then)	summarised	 the	position	 in	AMEC	Civil	Engineering	Ltd	v	Secretary	of	
State	 for	 Transport	 (2004)106.	 	 He	 adopted	 a	 flexible	 approach	 to	 the	 question	 of	
identifying	when	a	dispute	has	arisen	and	the	meaning	of	a	dispute	in	the	context	of	
construction	adjudication	and	arbitration	cases.		His	seven	propositions	included107:	
1. The	word	 "dispute"	which	occurs	 in	many	arbitration	 clauses	and	
also	 in	 section	 108	 of	 the	Housing	Grants	Act	 should	 be	 given	 its	
                                                 





Shipping	 Corporation	 v	 Sopex	 Oils	 Ltd	 (1998),	 Sindall	 Ltd	 v	 Solland	 (2001),	 Fastrack	
Contractors	Ltd	v	Morrison	Construction	Limited	(2000)	and	Beck	Peppiatt	Ltd	v	Norwest	Holst	
Construction	Ltd	(2003).	









2. Despite	 the	 simple	meaning	of	 the	word	 "dispute",	 there	has	been	
much	litigation	over	the	years	as	to	whether	or	not	disputes	existed	
in	particular	situations.	This	litigation	has	not	generated	any	hard‐
edged	 legal	 rules	 as	 to	what	 is	 or	 is	 not	 a	 dispute.	However,	 the	
accumulating	judicial	decisions	have	produced	helpful	guidance.	
3. The	mere	 fact	 that	 one	 party	 (whom	 I	 shall	 call	 "the	 claimant")	





4. The	 circumstances	 from	which	 it	may	emerge	 that	a	 claim	 is	
not	admitted	are	Protean.	For	example,	there	may	be	an	express	
rejection	of	the	claim.	There	may	be	discussions	between	the	parties	
from	 which	 objectively	 it	 is	 to	 be	 inferred	 that	 the	 claim	 is	 not	
admitted.	The	 respondent	may	prevaricate,	 thus	giving	 rise	 to	 the	
inference	 that	 he	 does	 not	 admit	 the	 claim.	 The	 respondent	may	




and	 the	 contractual	 structure.	Where	 the	 gist	 of	 the	 claim	 is	well	
known	 and	 it	 is	 obviously	 controversial,	 a	 very	 short	 period	 of	
silence	may	suffice	to	give	rise	to	this	inference.	Where	the	claim	is	
notified	 to	 some	agent	of	 the	 respondent	who	has	a	 legal	duty	 to	
consider	 the	 claim	 independently	 and	 then	 give	 a	 considered	
response,	a	 longer	period	of	time	may	be	required	before	 it	can	be	
inferred	that	mere	silence	gives	rise	to	a	dispute.	







its	 imposition	 may	 be	 relevant	 factors	 when	 the	 court	 comes	 to	
consider	what	is	a	reasonable	time	for	responding.	
7. If	 the	 claim	 as	 presented	 by	 the	 claimant	 is	 so	 nebulous	 and	 ill‐
defined	 that	 the	 respondent	 cannot	 sensibly	 respond	 to	 it,	neither	
silence	 by	 the	 respondent	 nor	 even	 an	 express	 non‐admission	 is	







“(i)	 A	 dispute	 arises	 generally	when	 and	 in	 circumstances	 in	which	 a	







one	 party	 initiates	 adjudication;	 put	 another	 way,	 everything	 in	
issue	 at	 that	 time	 does	 not	 necessarily	 comprise	 one	 dispute,	
although	it	may	do	so.	
(iv) What	a	dispute	 in	any	given	case	 is	will	be	a	question	of	 fact	
albeit	 that	 the	 facts	 may	 require	 to	 be	 interpreted.	 	 Courts	
should	 not	 adopt	 an	 over	 legalistic	 analysis	 of	 what	 the	 dispute	
between	 the	 parties	 is,	 bearing	 in	 mind	 that	 almost	 every	
                                                 
108	For	example,	 in	VGC	Construction	Ltd	v	 Jackson	Civil	Engineering	Ltd	 [2008]	EWHC	2082	
(TCC),	Akenhead	J	held	that	one	must	 look	at	all	 the	surrounding	circumstances	 in	deciding	
whether	 a	 claim	 is	 nebulous	 or	 ill‐defined.	 	 A	 briefly	 defined	 one‐line	 claim	 may	 not	
necessarily	be	nebulous	or	ill‐defined,	depending	on	the	circumstances.	
109	 In	developing	 this	definition	Akenhead	 J	 referred	 to	 the	 following	cases:	 	Cantillon	Ltd	v	
Urvasco	 Ltd	 (2008),	 Amec	 Civil	 Engineering	 Ltd	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Transport	 (2004),	







would	 necessarily	 have	 to	 attract	 a	 separate	 reference	 to	
adjudication…”	
[Emphasis	added]	
Here,	 the	 Judge	 also	 asserted	 that	 a	 dispute	 does	 not	 arise	 until	 a	 claim	 has	 been	
expressly	 or	 implicitly	 rejected	 by	 the	 other	 party.	 	 Indeed	 he	 went	 further	 to	
recognise	 that	 a	 dispute	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 change	 or	 transform	 its	 nature,	
‘metamorphose’,	 into	 something	 different	 –	 it	 may	 not	 be	 a	 static	 or	 fixed	
issue/disagreement	 which	 requires	 resolution.	 	 The	 Judge	 also	 appreciated	 that	 a	
dispute	is	a	question	of	fact	–	facts	which	may	need	to	be	investigated	or	interpreted.		
This	 perhaps	 recognises	 that	 each	 party	 puts	 forward	 its	 own	 set	 of	 facts:	 	 facts	
which	are	subject	to	and	originate	from	their	own	perspective	–	facts	which	perhaps	
have	been	manipulated	to	make	a	legal	argument	(Graham,	2005:34).	
In	 the	 cases	 above	 the	 court	 was	 concerned	 with	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘a	 dispute’	




In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 dispute,	 an	 appointed	 adjudicator	 or	 arbitrator	 will	 not	 have	
jurisdiction.		 	Accordingly,	much	case	law	has	developed,	particularly	in	the	context	
of	construction	adjudication,	which	considers	whether	a	dispute	has	crystallised.113		












by	 the	 engineer…”)	 	 Following	 their	 s31	 challenge	 they	 commenced	 proceedings	 in	 court	
under	 s67	 of	 the	 Arbitration	 Act	 1996	 (“Powers	 of	 the	 court	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 award:		
Challenging	the	award	–	substantive	jurisdiction”).		
In	addition,	s6	defines	“arbitration	agreement”	as	an	agreement	to	submit	“present	or	future	








accordingly.	 	 They	 represent	 the	 disputes	 as	 ‘cases’	 –	 “discrete,	 bounded	 and	





do	 not	 accept	 “conventional	 understandings	 as	 adequate	 and	 conventional	 ideas	 of	
justice	as	acceptable”	(Felstiner,	et	al.,	1980‐81:632).			




Roberts	 and	 Palmer	 also	 consider	 that	 disputes	 are	 informed	 by	 social	 values	
(Roberts	and	Palmer,	2005:1):		
“The	 nature	 of	 disputes,	 the	 appropriate	 responses	 to	 disputing	
situations,	 and	 the	 remedies	 considered	 proper	 are	 inevitably	
informed	by	 fundamental	social	values	and	even	cultural	 identity.”	
(Roberts	and	Palmer,	2005)	
Mather	and	Yngvesson	use	 the	 term	dispute	 to	mean	“a	particular	stage	of	a	social	
relationship	 in	which	conflict	between	 two	parties	 (individuals	or	groups)	 is	asserted	
publicly	–	this	is,	before	a	third	party”	(Mather	and	Yngvesson,	1980‐81:776).		This	is	
a	 narrow	 definition	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 two	 above	 and	 somewhat	 resembles	 the	
“legal”	definitions	in	that	it	is	a	stage	which	has	been	reached.		In	any	event,	Mather	












them.	 	 A	 dispute	 is	 something	which	 changes	 in	 shape	 and	 identity	 depending	 on	
time	and	other	social	 factors.	 	 In	 this	context,	a	dispute	 is	not	simply	a	question	of	







action	 (or	not	as	 the	 case	may	be)	has	been	an	area	of	 research	 for	many	 law	and	
society	scholars	 (Felstiner,	et	al.,	1980‐81;	Miller	and	Sarat,	1980‐1;	Fitzgerald	and	
Dickens,	 1980‐1;	 Trubek,	 1980‐81;	 Galanter,	 1983;	 Trubek,	 et	 al.,	 1983;	 Bumiller,	
1988;	 Kritzer,	 et	 al.,	 1991;	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998;	 Genn,	 1999;	 Nielsen,	 2000).		
Similarly,	 scholars	 have	 explored	 what	 prompts	 (or	 deters)	 dissatisfied	 users	 or	
consumers	to	complain	and	the	relationship	between	dissatisfaction	and	complaints	
(Mulcahy	and	Tritter,	1998;	Annandale	and	Hunt,	1998),	as	well	as	and	how	mishap,	
dissatisfaction	 and	 complaints	 have	 come	 to	 be	 defined	 and	 conceptualized	
(Mulcahy,	2003).	
As	 Mulcahy	 and	 Tritter	 (1998)	 note,	 two	 models	 of	 complaining	 or	 dispute	





see	 further	below).	 	Mulcahy	and	Tritter	 (1998)	 go	 further	 and	 identify	 the	notion	
(by	 reference	 to	 Lempert,	 1980‐1	 and	 Best	 and	 Andreasen,	 1977)	 that	 voiced	
grievances	are	at	the	tip	of	an	iceberg:		the	complaints	people	make	represent	only	a	
fraction	of	the	problems	people	perceive.			
Scholars114	suggest	that	 in	 the	pathway	and	pyramid	dispute	models,	 if	disputes	do	
emerge,	they	do	so	only	after	having	been	through	a	series	of	events	which	transform	
human	 experiences	 into	 legal	 claims	 –	 though	 not	 all	 claims	 result	 in	 formal	 legal	








from	 the	 concept	 of	 “cases”	 to	 a	 broader	 notion	 that	 the	 life	 of	 a	 dispute	 occurs	
before,	during	and	after	formal	legal	disputes	(Menkel‐Meadow,	2004:12).117		
The	seminal	text	concerning	transformations	is	of	course	Felstiner,	Abel	and	Sarat’s	
“Transforming	 of	 Disputes:	 	 Naming,	 Blaming,	 Claiming…”	 (Felstiner,	 et	 al.,	 1980‐
1981)	–	hereafter	 referred	 to	as	Naming,	Blaming,	Claiming…	 	Their	 theory	asserts	
that	a	dispute	exists	only	after	a	claim	has	been	asserted	by	one	party	and	rejected	by	
the	 other.	 	 More	 specifically,	 a	 dispute	 only	 takes	 shape	 after	 a	 series	 of	
transformations:	 	 an	unperceived	 injurious	 experience	 transforms	 into	 a	 grievance	
and	that	grievance	ultimately	is	transformed	into	a	dispute.	
The	 first	 stage,	Naming,	 occurs	when	 one	 party	 or	 person	 recognises	 or	 perceives	




stage,	Claiming,	 occurs	when	 the	 injured	person	communicates	 its	grievance	 to	 the	
person	 it	 considers	 responsible.	 	 Finally,	 a	dispute	 only	materialises	 if	 this	 claim	 is	
rejected,	in	whole	or	in	part,	by	the	person	allegedly	responsible.	 	In	other	words,	a	
dispute	only	exists	after	the	Claiming	stage	when	the	grievance	is	rejected.		Prior	to	
this	 stage,	 the	 theory	holds	 that	 a	 dispute	has	 not	 formed	 and	 that	 the	parties	 are	





(see	above).	 	Akenhead	 J’s	definition	–	“claim	or	assertion	 is	made	by	one	party	and	
expressly	or	implicitly	challenged	or	not	accepted”	–	recognises	that	a	series	of	events	
must	 have	 occurred	 in	 order	 for	 a	 dispute	 to	 exist.	 	 Of	 course	 Naming,	 Blaming,	
Claiming…	 goes	 further	 to	 recognise	 the	 social	 construct	 within	 which	 the	
transformation	takes	place.		
                                                 
115	“It	turns	out	that	although	almost	any	social	interaction	could,	in	theory,	become	a	matter	of	
contest	 and	 dispute,	 few	 do.”	 (Ewick	 and	 Silby,	 1998:	 19)	 See	 also:	 	 Nader	 and	 Singer,	
1976:262;	Best	and	Andreasen,	1977:701;	and	Burman,	et	al.,	1977:47.	








seminal	work	 focus	on	why	 (or	why	not)	 a	 grievance	 is	 transformed	 into	 a	 formal	
claim	 and	 as	 such,	 the	 focus	 and	 purpose	 of	 Naming,	 Blaming,	 Claiming…	 is	 to	
consider	the	transformation	of	grievances	at	their	early	stages	and	what	impacts	the	
aggrieved’s	decision	as	to	whether	to	continue	the	transformation.			
Research	 since	 this	 seminal	 work	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 various	 stages	 are	 not	
necessarily	 connected,	 nor	 are	 they	 necessarily	 consecutive	 –	 people	 do	 not	
necessarily	arrive	at	their	perceptions	and	decisions	in	a	specific	order.		Sally	Lloyd‐
Bostock	 first	 challenged	 the	 traditional	 trajectory	 in	 her	 study	 of	 personal	 injury	
actions	(Lloyd	Bostock,	1984).	 	She	argued	 that	blaming	does	not	 logically	precede	
consideration	of	legal	action	and	that	knowledge	of	the	legal	remedy	is	an	important	
consideration	 in	 claiming	behaviour.	 	 Then	 in	 her	 review	of	 Kritzer’s	 study	 on	 the	
propensity	to	sue	in	both	England	and	the	US	in	personal	injury	cases	under	the	law	
of	 tort	 (Kritzer,	 1991a),	 Lloyd‐Bostock	 disagreed	 to	 an	 extent	 with	 Kritzer’s	
‘Developmental	Theory	of	Litigation’	model,	which	is	premised	on	Naming,	Blaming,	
Claiming…		(Lloyd‐Bostock,	1991).		In	Kritzer’s	model,	individuals	progress	through	a	
series	 of	 steps	or	 stages,	 crossing	 a	 series	 of	 barriers/transition	points,	 each	 stage	
being	 contingent	 on	 the	 one	 before	 to	 some	 degree.	 	 Kritzer	 finds	 ‘blame’	 or	
‘recognition’	central	to	and	preceding	the	process	of	‘claiming’	or	‘attribution’.		Lloyd‐
Bostock	differs	 to	Kritzer	 in	 that	“too	much	of	what	happens	 in	practice	does	not	sit	
easily	 in	a	model	of	 this	kind”	 (Lloyd‐Bostock,	 1991:430).	 	 Lloyd‐Bostock	 considers	
that	people	in	different	situation	may	move	through	the	dispute	transformation	in	a	
different	 order,	 not	 necessarily	 a	 consecutive	 order,	 and	 indeed	 a	 particular	 stage	
may	even	be	skipped	altogether:		“the	model	does	not	easily	accommodate	the	to‐and‐
fro,	 interactive	 processes	 of	 evolving	 attributions	 of	 cause	 and	 fault,	 arriving	 at	
perceptions	of	entitlement	to	compensation,	and	bringing	and	pursuing	claims”.		In	her	
recent	consideration	of	the	public	perception	of	risk	and	the	‘compensation	culture’	
in	 the	 UK,	 Lloyd‐Bostock	 again	 argues	 that	 such	 models	 of	 disputing	 and	 talk	 of	
compensation	culture	in	the	context	of	tort	claims	are	“framed	by	norms	of	disputing,	
and	it	is	this	that	gives	them	plausibility”	(Lloyd‐Bostock,	2010:107).		She	asserts	that	
we	 can	 expect	 rules	 and	 norms	 about	 attributing	 responsibility	 and	 liability	
operating	when	investigating	the	social	processes	of	disputing;	however,	we	should	





A	 further	 development	 is	Mulcahy’s	 and	 Tritter’s	 study	 of	 the	 NHS	 health	 service.		
Here,	they	found	that	satisfaction,	dissatisfaction	and	complaining	(complaints	being	
a	similar,	though	distinct,	area	of	research)	are	“sometimes	but	not	inevitably	linked”	
(Mulcahy	and	Tritter,	1998:827)	and	need	 to	be	 seen	as	distinct	 constructs.	 	 Some	
may	complain	about	certain	issues	but	not	others,	just	because	dissatisfaction	is	not	
expressed	it	does	not	therefore	mean	that	there	is	an	expression	of	satisfaction	and	
“complaining	 is	an	atypical	 reaction	 to	dissatisfaction	and	 is	 rarely	considered	as	an	
option	by	aggrieved	patients”.			
As	 to	what	motivates	 one	 to	 take	 that	 final	 step	 and	make	 a	 claim	or	 a	 complaint,	
various	 factors	 have	 been	 identified:	 by	 way	 of	 example,	 the	 source	 and	
amount/desire	for	compensation,	conditions	which	affect	the	ability	and	willingness	
to	 transform	 injuries	 into	 claims	 (Galanter,	 1983)	 and	 legal	 consciousness	 which	
shapes	 perceptions	 and	 the	 ability/willingness	 to	 claim	 (Sarat,	 1990;	 Ewick	 and	
Silbey,	 1991‐2;	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	 1998;	 Galanter,	 2001‐2;	 Cowan,	 2004).	 	 With	
regard	to	complaints,	in	contrast	to	model	developed	by	Felstiner,	et	al.,	1980‐1981,	
Mulcahy	 and	 Lloyd‐Bostock	 (1994a)	 developed	 an	 “account	 model”	 which	 argues	
that	 not	 all	 disputes	 are	 aimed	 at	 seeking	 compensation	 or	 some	 other	 personal	
benefit	 –	 citizens	may	 use	 complaint	 systems	 to	 call	 a	 public	 agency	 into	 account	
when	 their	 expectations	 are	 not	 met	 (see	 also	 Lloyd‐Bostock,	 1999	 and	 Mulcahy,	
2003).	
Whilst	 research	 continues	 to	 develop	 and	 refine	 the	 Naming,	 Blaming,	 Claiming…	
model,	 it	nevertheless	continues	to	be	a	useful	 framework	for	research	on	disputes	
and	 their	 transformation	 (see	 for	 example	 Morris	 (2007)	 which	 considers	 the	
propensity	to	claim	in	personal	injury	disputes).			
The	role	of	the	third	party	in	dispute	transformations	
It	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 dispute	 transformations	 described	 above	 are	 not	
simply	 a	 linear	 and	 straight‐forward	 process,	 but	 rather,	 they	 are	 subjective,	
unstable,	 reactive,	 complicated	 and	 incomplete	 (Felstiner,	 et	 al,	 1980‐1:637).	 	 In	
other	words,	disputes	and	their	transformations	are	messy.		A	further	complexity	in	
the	transformation	is	the	role	of	third	parties	in	this	process	and	previous	research	
has	 revealed	 various	 parts	 which	 these	 actors	 might	 play:	 	 shaper,	 translator,	
gatekeeper,	dispute	handler,	opposition/support	roles,	etc.			
In	Naming,	Blaming,	Claiming…	Felstiner,	et	al.,	discuss	the	distinction	between	what	





example,	 the	 parties,	 attributions,	 the	 scope	 of	 conflict,	 objectives	 sought,	
representatives	 and	 officials	 (ie	 lawyers)	 and	 dispute	 institutions	 as	 subjects	 and	
agents	which	 influence	dispute	 transformations.	 	Though	certainly	not	 the	 focus	of	
their	 study,	 Felstiner,	 et	 al.	 (1980‐1)	 do	 offer	 examples	 as	 to	 how/why	 lawyers	
(“representatives	and	officials”)	settle	or	shape	the	grievances/claims.		For	example,	
Felstiner,	 et	 al.,	 refers	 to	Macaulay’s	 research	 on	 consumer	 cases	which	 finds	 that	














Mather	 and	 Yngvesson	 identify	 the	 importance	 of	 language,	 participants	 and	
audience	 as	 three	 factors	 which	 influence	 the	 transformation.	 	 They	 explored	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 dispute	 and	 its	 transformation	 and	 assert	
that	 the	 transformation	 involves	 a	 process	 of	 rephrasing	 –	 a	 process	whereby	 the	
disputants	and	others	 (ie	 third	parties)	might	accept	a	different	 formulation	of	 the	
dispute.	 	This	rephrasing	may	involve	narrowing119	or	expansion120	of	the	dispute	in	
                                                 
118	Mather	and	Yngvesson	use	the	term	“third‐party”	to	mean	a	mediator,	go‐between,	judge,	
supporters	or	audiences.		However,	the	majority	of	the	examples	do	not	concern	adjudicators	
or	 judges	 as	 such,	 but	 rather	 supporters	 and/or	 audiences	 within	 the	 community	 who	
participate	in	the	negotiations	and/or	defining	of	the	dispute	(Mather	and	Yngvesson,	1980‐
81:776).		
119	Narrowing	 is	 the	 “process	 through	which	established	categories	 for	classifying	events	and	
relationships	 are	 imposed	 on	 an	 event	 or	 series	 of	 events,	 defining	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 a	















her	ox	cart	struck	the	boy.	 	According	to	the	customs	of	 this	community,	 the	 father	
was	 liable	 for	 his	 daughter’s	 acts.	 	 The	 two	 men	 agreed	 what	 compensation	 was	
owed	 to	 the	 father	 of	 the	 dead	 boy;	 however,	 he	 subsequently	 pursued	 additional	
money	though	the	Thai	court	system.		To	do	so,	he	had	to	comply	with	the	legal	code	
which	required	that	the	dispute	be	rephrased:		he	was	not	the	proper	representative	
of	 the	 dead	 boy	 as	 his	marriage	 had	 not	 been	 registered	 (his	wife	was	 the	 proper	
representative)	and	according	to	the	legal	code	it	was	the	16‐year‐old	girl	who	was	
responsible	 for	 the	 death,	 not	 her	 father.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 dispute	 was	 redefined,	
involving	the	wife	of	one	and	the	daughter	of	the	other.		Ultimately,	the	claimant	lost	
as	 he	 failed	 to	 appropriately	 or	 adequately	 rephrase	 his	 dispute	 (he	 did	 not	 have	
standing	as	his	marriage	to	the	boy’s	mother	had	not	been	registered).			
The	 Ox	 Cart	 Dispute	 exemplifies	 the	 need	 to	 shape/shoehorn	 the	 definition	 of	 a	
dispute	in	a	particular	way	in	order	to	make	it	suitable	for	legal	action.		Indeed	the	Ox	
Cart	Dispute	 also	highlights	 that	skills	and	knowledge	of	a	specialised	 language	are	
necessary	to	do	so	(Mather	and	Yngvesson,	1980‐81:791).121		
A	 further	 example	 is	 seen	 in	 the	Mulcahy	 and	 Lloyd‐Bostock	 (1994:185)	 study	 of	
senior	 managers	 who	 handle	 complaints	 about	 the	 NHS.	 	 They	 found	 that	 the	
managers	 had	multifaceted	 roles	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 transformation,	management	 and	
resolution	of	disputes.		Depending	on	the	situation,	the	manger	may	be	a	gatekeepter,	
dispute	handler,	opposition/support	roles,	etc.			
In	 the	 context	of	 a	 construction	or	engineering	project,	disputes	 (the	 rejection	of	 a	
claim)	 often	materialise	 prior	 to	 the	 lawyer’s	 involvement	 and	 indeed	without	 the	
lawyer’s	 involvement.	 	 The	 practices	 and	 customs	 of	 the	 construction	 industry,	
construction	contracts	and	at	times	the	economic	climate,	encourage	this	behaviour.		
It	 is	 not	 commonly	 the	 case	 that	 aggrieved	 construction	 professionals	 approach	
construction	lawyers	to	explore	who	is	to	blame	for	their	grievance	as	it	is	generally	










what	 extent	 do	 lawyers	 shape	 that	 outcome?	 	 The	 background	 of	 dispute	
transformations	 discussed	 above	 is	 useful	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 context	 of	 disputes	
generally	 and	 indeed	 informative	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 various	 stages	 of	 the	 disputing	
process.		
Actor‐Network	Theory		
In	 order	 to	 examine	 construction	 disputes	 and	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	
their	 identity/definition	 and	 their	 transformation,	 this	 research	 required	 a	
perspective	and	framework	that	would	allow	for,	or	at	least	provide	the	potential	for,	
revealing	 all	 influencing	 factors	 on	 disputes.	 	 The	 Actor‐Network	 Theory	 (ANT)	





ANT	 is	mentioned	only	briefly	here	 in	order	 to	provide	an	 initial	understanding	of	
how	 this	 research	 views	 and	 investigated	 the	 disputes	 as	 ANT	 is	 adopted	 in	 this	
research	 more	 for	 its	 ‘method’	 than	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 its	 organising	 theory	 and	
Latour’s	 approach	 to	 thick	 description	 ethnography.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 please	 see	
Chapter	3	for	a	further	description	of	ANT.	
As	 Harman	 (2014:viii)	 notes,	 ANT	 rejects	 sweeping	 categories	 of	 analysis	 such	 as	




other	 words,	 ANT	 is	 largely	 concerned	 with	 relations	 and	 that	 entities	 are	
constituted	by	these	relations.	 	ANT	treats	all	entities	in	the	same	way	–	there	is	no	
real	 versus	 non‐real	 and	 size	 is	 no	 barrier	 either	 (anything	 from	 atomic	matter	 to	
green	giants	is	fair	game).		Provided	an	entity	“acts”	in	some	way	and	has	an	“effect”	





This	 perspective	 results	 in	 investigating	 or	 “tracing”	 the	 relations	 –	 tracing	 the	
associations	–	looking	at	what	the	relations	have	left	behind,	what	effects	they	have	
on	 some	 other	 entity,	 and	 describing	 them.	 	 Accordingly,	 what	 perhaps	 looks	 like	
data,	 both	 in	 this	 research	 and	 elsewhere	 (eg,	 Latour,	 2010	 [2002]),	 is	 actually	 an	




of	 respects.	 	 Firstly,	 it	 assisted	 methodologically	 with	 the	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	
carried	out	in	that	it	allowed	the	ethnographer	to	view	a	whole	host	of	entities	and	
associations,	 both	 human	 and	 non‐human	 of	 any	 size,	which	 influenced	 or	 formed	
part	of	the	dispute	and	the	dispute’s	trajectory.		This	research	is	not	simply	about	the	
actions	 of	 lawyers	 and	 their	 resulting	 impact	 on	 disputes.	 	 As	 such,	 it	 was	 most	
important	 to	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 view	 other	 actants	 and	 how	 disputes	 responded,	
developed	and	 took	shape	as	a	 result.	 	 In	other	non‐Latourian	words,	ANT	has	 the	
ability	to	reveal	influencing	factors	on	disputes	which	goes	well	beyond	the	actions	of	
the	law	firm.			
Secondly,	 as	 ANT	 deals	 in	 “relations”,	 “associations”	 and	 “alliances”,	 this	 approach	
allows	for	the	understanding	(of	the	reality	or	truth)	of	things	in	a	similar	way	that	
relational	 contract	 theories	 do	 of	 contracts:	 	 every	 object	 (ANT)	 or	 transaction	
(essential	 contract	 theory)	 is	 embedded	 in	 “dense	 web	 of	 relations”	 (Macneil,	
2003:208).	 	 The	 idea	 that	 “alliances	 are	 more	 important	 than	 hidden	 individual	
essences	and	potentialities”	(Latour,	Harman	and	Erdélyi,	2011:51)	is	central	to	both:		
in	 relational	 contract	 theories,	 understanding	 the	 essence	 of	 a	 contract	 requires	
recognition	 of	 all	 relationships	 and	 alliances,	 not	 simply	 the	 express	 terms	 of	 a	
contract	 and	 the	 formal	 legal	 rule	 of	 contract	 law.	 	 If	 alliances	 (or	 non‐contractual	
relations)	become	more	important	than	the	contract	itself,	parties	look	outside	of	the	
contract	 provisions	 to	 conduct	 their	 transaction	 and	 any	 problems	 arising.		
Furthermore,	with	regard	to	“translation”,	ANT’s	notion	that	“one	thing	can	never	be	
fully	 translated	 into	another	place	or	 time	…	 there	 is	always	going	 to	be	 information	
loss,	or	 energy	 loss	…	 you	have	 to	pay	a	price	when	 translating	 something	 from	one	
place	to	another…”	(Latour,	Harman	and	Erdélyi,	2011:28)	is	along	the	lines	of	what	
relational	 contract	 theorists	 might	 say	 of	 interpreting	 a	 complex	 contract	 using	
formal	 legal	 rules:	 	 translating	 a	 complex	 contract	 using	 the	 express	words	 of	 the	
contract	and	formal	 legal	rules	 is	 irrelevant	and	fails	to	capture	the	true	essence	of	




notably	 Latour	 is	 clear	 that	 he	 does	 not	 associate	 himself	 with	 the	 doctrine	 that	
“everything	 is	 relational”	 (Latour,	 Harman	 and	 Erdélyi,	 2011:43).	 	 Rather,	 Latour	




yet	 it	 can	be,	provided	 the	proper	 labour	 is	done	and	a	more	 fundamental	 layer	of	
reality	 is	 revealed.	 	 The	 intention	 here	 is	 not	 to	 set	 out	 Latour’s	 “philosophy”	 in	
detail,122	but	 instead	to	 illustrate	 that	ANT	 in	some	respects	 is	aligned	to,	or	rather	
sits	 nicely	 alongside,	 theories	 of	 complex	 contracts,	which	 in	 turn	provides	 a	 solid	
platform	for	 investigating	disputes.	 	Some	of	these	similarities	which	exist	between	
ANT	and	relational	contract	theory	was	by	no	means	essential	as	this	research	was	
not	 focused	 on	 contracts	 per	 se;	 however,	 as	 most	 of	 the	 construction	 disputes	
witnessed	were	 largely	 contractual	disputes,	 an	 integrated	contractual	 and	dispute	










ethnography.	 	 By	way	 of	 example,	 I	 considered	Bourdieu’s	work	 on	 the	 notions	 of	
habitus,	capital	and	field.	 	As	set	out	above,	the	questions	this	research	investigates	
are	not	solely	confined	to	the	impact	of	lawyers	on	disputes.		Bourdieu’s	social	agents	
and	 theories	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 power	 of	 law	 and	 lawyers/legal	 culture	 (Bourdieu,	
1987)	appear	more	applicable	to	“the	broader	context	of	 law’s	interrelationship	with	
social	 forces	 other	 than	 those	 immediately	 at	 stake	 only	 in	 the	microcosm	 of	 law”	
(Dezalay	 and	 Madsen,	 2012:436)	 and	 in	 turn,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 difficult	 to	
investigate	disputes	from	this	perspective.		Having	said	that,	as	Dezalay	and	Madsen	
note,	studying	the	effect	of	the	force	of	law	and	lawyers	on	the	sociology	of	law	calls	
                                                 





for	 Bourdieu’s	 work	 on	 reflexive	 sociology,	 this	 being	 the	 need	 for	 (Dezalay	 and	
Madsen,	2012:447):	
“…the	 researcher	 both	 to	 follow	 the	 agents	 and	 their	 actions	 in	
order	 to	 empirically	 document	 actual	movements	 and	 to	 seek	 to	






or	 she	 has	 far	 greater	 mobility	 within	 the	 field	 than	 the	 actual	
agents	who	by	definition	are	more	trapped	by	their	specific	position	
in	the	field	…	What	we	suggest	here	is	basically	to	turn	the	logic	of	
field	 inside	out	as	a	means	 for	deconstruction	 social	practices	and	
reconstructing	them	in	terms	of	fields.”	
Whilst	this	type	of	approach	is	seemingly	helpful	and	could	have	been	employed	in	
this	 research,	 again,	 it	 seemed	 limiting	 in	 that	 nonhuman	 entities	would	 not	 have	
been	immediately	included.			
In	any	event,	again,	ANT	is	adopted	in	this	research	more	for	its	‘method’	than	for	the	
whole	 of	 its	 organising	 theory.	 	 ANT’s	 view	 of	 entities	 as	 “associations”	 (albeit	
irreducible	 objects	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day)	 and	 its	 method	 of	 tracing	 of	 these	







As	Flood	 (2013:19)	notes,	 “the	majority	of	research	on	 the	 legal	profession	has	 to	a	
large	extent	taken	for	granted	what	lawyers	actually	do	(cf	Abel	and	Lewis	1989).”		One	
of	 the	aims	of	 this	research	 is	 to	 fill	 this	gap	and	add	to	 the	more	recent	studies	of	
what	exactly	 is	 it	 that	 lawyers	do	(Flood,	2013;	Kirkland,	2012).	 	As	to	what	others	
say	lawyers	do,	it	is	notable	the	extent	to	which	lawyers	wear	a	number	of	hats	when	




in	 the	 sociology	 of	 the	 professions	 is	 the	 works	 of	 Talcott	 Parsons123	 and	 Everett	
Hughes124	 (Dinwall	 and	 Lewis,	 1983:1).	 	 With	 regard	 to	 Parson’s	 work	 of	 the	
professions	 (before	 moving	 onto	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 normative	 order	 of	 modern	
capitalist	 societies),	 his	 study	 of	 medical	 practice	 in	 the	 Boston	 area	 (US)	 is	 of	
particular	 interest.	 	 He	 used	 this	 context	 to	 explore	 the	 question	 of	 “What	




fact”,	 but	was	 also	 an	 institutionalised	 role	 (Fox,	 et	 al.,	 2005:6).	 	Even	 though	 this	
study	 dealt	 with	 the	 medical	 profession,	 it	 nevertheless	 addressed	 the	
professional/client	 relationship	 and	 the	 professional	 knowledge	 in	 that	 industry.		
Parson	 was	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 social	 foundation	 of	 its	 knowledge	 and	 its	
translation	 into	 the	 impersonal	 normative	 order	 of	 science	 (Dingwall	 and	 Lewis,	
1983:3).	 	 In	addition,	 it	appeared125	to	embody	some	of	the	principles	of	ANT	(well	
before	ANT	was	established)	as	both	human	and	non‐human	participants	were	active	
in	the	empirical	study	and	Parsons	was	essentially	following	the	actors.		With	regard	
to	 Hughes,	 his	 contribution	 most	 relevant	 to	 this	 research	 is	 the	 assertions	
concerning	 licence	 and	 mandate:	 he	 recognises	 the	 influence	 and	 authority	 that	
professionals	 have	 over	 the	 conduct	 of	 their	work	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 set	 the	 very	




an	 assortment	 of	 papers	 only	 ever	 substantially	 collected	 and	 published	 in	 the	 The	
Sociological	Eye	in	1971	(Dingwall	and	Lewis,	1983:1).		





terms	 of	 thinking	 about	 problems	which	 fall	 in	 their	 domain	 (Dingwall	 and	 Lewis,	
1983:5).	
Specifically	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 legal	 profession,	 as	 Flood	 (2013:18‐26)	 documents,	
there	 are	 two	 approaches	 to	 past	 research:	 	 the	 structural	 approach	 and	 the	
interactional	 approach.	 	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 structural	 approach	 (this	 being	 research	
which	analyses	the	client‐base,	religious,	ethnic,	class	and	values	of	lawyers,	though	
has	 been	 unable	 to	 reveal	 what	 lawyers	 actually	 do	 for	 whatever	 reason)	 Flood	
traces	the	research	from	Garrison	(1935)	&	Twining	(1968)	to	Carlin	(1962	&	1966)	
&	 Smigel	 (1969)	 and	 finally	Heinz	 and	 Laumann	 (1982).	 	 	McCahery	 and	Picciotto	
(1995)	 note	 that	 structuralism	 was	 predominant	 from	 circa	 1975	 to	 1995	 and	
focused	 on	 the	 control	 of	 specialised	 expertise.	 	 In	 respect	 of	 the	 interactional	
approach	 (this	 being	 research	which	 produces	 “a	 dynamic	 picture	 of	 the	 processes	
involved	 in	 being	 a	 lawyer”)	 Flood	 considers	 the	 research	 of	 Rosenthal	 (1974),	
Macaulay	(1979),	Hosticka	(1979),	Mann	(1985),	Griffiths	(1986),	Sarat	and	Felstiner	
(1986),	 Macaulay	 (1984),	 Cain	 (1983	 &	 1985),	 Maynard	 (1984),	 Travers	 (1997),	
Mather	(2003)	and	Scheffer	(2010).	
This	research	of	construction	disputes	and	construction	lawyers	is	closely	aligned	to	
the	 interactional	 approach.	 	Whilst	 it	 does	not	purport	 to	provide	a	 full	 account	of	
what	construction	lawyers	do,	the	aim	is	obtain	a	better	understanding	of	how	their	
actions	 and	 professional	 services	 influence	 their	 clients	 and	 their	 clients’	 disputes.		
For	 a	 further	 description	 of	 the	 Firm	 which	 was	 the	 study	 of	 the	 ethnographic	
research	and	the	lawyers	therein,	see	Chapter	3;	however,	I	note	here	that	the	Firm	
did	not	fit	squarely	in	either	of	the	two	hemispheres	of	the	legal	profession	identified	
by	Heinz,	 et	 al.,	 (2005):	 	 one	 side	 representing	 large	 organisations	 and	 practice	 in	
large	firms	and	the	other	side	representing	individuals	and	small	businesses,	practice	
in	small	firms	and	solo	practitioners	(Heinz	and	Laumann,	1982;	Heinz,	et	al.,	2005;	




(1995),	 here	 I	 consider	 those	 concepts	 on	 lawyering	 which	 were	 particularly	







Research	 into	 power	 in	 lawyer/client	 interactions	 and	 power	 as	 a	 function	 of	
coercion,	 knowledge	 and	 economic	 advantage	 (Hosticka,	 1979;	 Mann,	 1985;	 Sarat	
and	Felstiner,	 1995)	 is	 a	well‐investigated	arena.	 	The	perceived	dominance	of	 the	
lawyer	 and	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 lawyers	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 exercise	 control	 over	





demand	 for	 these	 services”	 (Larson,	 1977;	 Abel	 and	 Lewis,	 1989;	 McCahery	 and	
Picciotto,	1995).	
Lawyers	as	translators	
As	 introduced	 above	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 role	 of	 third	 parties	 in	 dispute	
transformations,	 lawyers	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 become	 as	 “conceptive	 ideologists”,	
guardians	 of	 a	 translation	 process	 and	 “peddle	 the	 language	 of	 the	 law”	 (Cain,	
1979|1983).		Cain	considered	that	the	ability	to	translate	and	reconstitute	issues	had	
trans‐situational	 applicability.	 	 Lawyers	 also	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 shape,	 define,	
present,	phrase	and	rephrase	disputes	(Mather	and	Yngvesson,	1980‐81).	
Lawyers	as	transformers	
“Of	all	 the	agents	 of	dispute	 transformation	 lawyers	are	probably	
the	most	important…”		(Felstiner,	et	al.,	1980‐81:645)	
When	 researching	 the	 mediators126	 of	 construction	 disputes,	 it	 quickly	 became	
apparent	 that	 construction	 lawyers	 and	 the	 legal	 framework	 within	 which	 they	
operate	 are	 clearly	 entities	which	 transform,	 translate	 and	modify	meaning	 in	 the	
context	 of	 disputes.	 	As	 the	quote	 above	 indicates,	 Felstiner,	 et	 al.,	 considered	 that	
lawyers	 influenced	 dispute	 transformation,	 though	 they	 did	 recognise	 that,	 at	 that	
time,	relatively	few	studies	of	lawyer	conduct	had	been	informed	by	a	transformation	
perspective	 (Felstiner,	 et	 al.,	 1980‐81:645).	 	 Indeed	 they	 called	 for	 further	
transformation	 studies	 that	 observe	 lawyer/client	 interactions	 (1980‐81:649‐652).		
Since	 then,	 further	 studies	 have	 of	 course	 been	 conducted	 and	Naming,	 Blaming,	
Claiming…	 has	 proven	 influential	 in	 studies	 of	 disputing	 behaviour	 and	 legal	






consciousness	 (see	 discussion	 above,	 along	 with,	 Merry,	 1990;	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey,	
1998;	Albiston,	2005).		
More	recently,	in	the	medical	negligence	arena,	Mulcahy	(2001)	asserts	that	lawyers	




In	 addition	 to	 all	 of	 the	 other	 hats	 lawyers	might	wear,	 a	 professional	 skill	 of	 the	
lawyer	 is	 that	of	a	storyteller.	 	Lawyers	create	and	 tell	 stories	during	 the	course	of	
providing	their	services	(Kirkland,	2012).		The	more	recent	socio‐legal	research	has	
considered	 the	 professional	 skills	 lawyers	 require	 when	 dealing	 with	 clients	 and	







Along	 this	 same	vein	 is	 the	 lawyer’s	 role	 in	 creating	 and	 contesting	meaning	 –	 the	
meaning	 of	 law,	 the	 legal	 system	 and	 the	 client’s	 position	 therein	 (Sarat	 and	
Felstiner,	1995;	Graham,	2005).		
Lawyers	as	engineers	
Finally,	 though	not	conclusively,	we	see	 the	 lawyer	as	engineer	 (Collins,	1999:149).		
This	notion	is	discussed	and	developed	further	in	Chapter	6,	though	introduced	here	
in	 that	 the	 lawyer,	 when	 assembling	 contracts	 and	 transactions	 has	 the	 ability	 to	
plan,	construct	and,	I	posit,	design,	the	competing	needs,	constraints	and	relations	of	











Following  the  initial  client/lawyer meeting at Mr Hunter’s office,  the next  four months 
were filled with various actions:‐   
Mr  Hunter’s  assistant  researched  various  legal  points,  Mr  Cahill  forwarded  numerous 




an  aggressive  letter  to  Structures  Ltd’s  lawyer.    Exchanges  of written  correspondence 
between the lawyers then ensued.  Mr Hunter and his assistant internally discussed each 
letter/email received and liaised with and advised Mr Cahill by both telephone and email, 
following  which  Mr  Hunter  and  his  assistant  drafted  a  response.    The  exchanges 
continued, each  side asserting  its position and  representing  it as a position of  strength 
with good chances for success. 








“Where	 is	 law	most	 “in	 action”	 in	 society?	 	 Very	 often,	 it	 seems,	
where	it	is	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	observe	directly.		Courtrooms	
can	 be	 observed,	 though	 private	 offices	 can	 hide	 bargaining	 and	




data	 to	 anecdotal	 evidence,	 not	 to	 mention	 instinct,	 drove	
researchers	to	break	down	these	barriers.”	
	(Halliday	and	Schmidt,	2009:187)	
This	research	adds	to	 those	 few	who	previously	broke	down	the	barrier	of	 the	 law	
firm	door	(for	example,	Flood,	2013;	Latour,	2010	[2002];	Sarat	and	Felstiner,	1995;	
Mann,	 1985;	 Flood,	 1983;	 Katz,	 1982).	 	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 understand	 how	 lawyers	
deal	with	construction	disputes	and	how	disputes	evolve	and	develop	once	the	client	
engages	 the	 lawyer,	 this	 research	 utilised	 ethnography	 to	 follow	 the	 actors’	 own	
ways	and	the	traces	they	left	behind	(Latour,	2005:29).		To	do	so,	the	fieldwork	was	
sited	 in	 and	 amongst	 construction	 lawyers,	where	 “law	 is	most	 in	action”:	 	 the	 law	
firm.	 	This	enabled	a	front	and	centre	position	–	a	viewpoint	essential	for	obtaining	
valuable	 empirical	 data	 on	 the	 influencing	 factors	 and	 outcomes	 of	 disputes.	 	 The	





lawyers”	 in	England	and	Wales	 in	order	 to	have	a	baseline	and	background	 for	 the	
field	investigated.			
Construction	law	and	construction	lawyers	
Until	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 there	 was	 no	 branch	 of	 law	 that	
identified	 itself	 as	 “construction	 law”	 (Bailey,	 2011:1).	 	 Cases	 which	 concerned	
construction	projects	were	regarded	as	a	“contract”	case,	a	“negligence”	case,	a	“tort”	
case,	 etc	 depending	 on	 the	 issues	 involved.	 	 Over	 time,	 legal	matters	 in	 respect	 of	




contracts	 became	 more	 elaborate	 and	 ultimately	 government	 introduced	 new	





corporate	 law	 firm	 (either	 in	 a	 specialist	 “construction”	 department	 therein	 or	 as	






































within	 these	 firms	 are,	 on	 the	 whole,	 specialists	 in	 construction	 law	 and	
contracts/disputes	 involving	 construction	 projects.	 	 Some	 construction	 lawyers	 go	
further	and	specialise	either	 in	contentious	or	non‐contentious	matters.	 	By	way	of	
example,	 some	 construction	 lawyers	 only	 advise	 on	 the	 assembling	 of	 contracts	
(putting	the	deal	together	and	project	financing)	and	the	interpretation	of	contracts,	
though	 do	 not	 represent	 parties	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 dispute	 arising	 out	 of	 or	 under	
those	 contracts.	 	 Having	 said	 that,	 many	 construction	 lawyers	 do	 advise	 on	 both	
contentious	 and	 non‐contentious	matters	 –	 though	 clients/construction	 companies	
may	not	necessarily	 instruct	 the	same	 law	firm	to	do	both	tasks	(Flood	and	Caiger,	
1993:426).	
Construction	law	is	not	a	specific	discipline	within	the	undergraduate	law	degree	at	
universities	 (like	 that	 of	 Contract	 Law,	 Tort	 Law,	 Property	 Law,	 etc).	 	 A	 Masters	
degree	 in	Construction	Law	 is	available	 (eg,	King’s	College),	 though	 the	majority	of	
construction	lawyers	appear	to	specialise	simply	by	practising	solely	in	this	area	for	
a	number	of	years.	
This	 research	 focuses	 on	 disputes	 in	 this	 specific	 area	 of	 law	 and	 these	 specialist	




As	 the	 research	 question	 inherently	 called	 for	 an	 investigation	 into	 the	 actions	 of	
lawyers	 and	 any	other	 influences	on	 construction	disputes,	 ethnography	was	most	
appropriate	as	it	provides	“uniquely	privileged	opportunities	to	enter	into	and	to	share	
the	everyday	lives	of	other	people”	as	well	as	“the	challenge	of	transforming	that	social	
world	 into	 text	and	other	 forms	of	representation	 that	analyse	and	reconstruct	 those	
distinctive	lives	and	actions”	(Atkinson,	2015:3).		
The	 ethnography	 enabled	 a	 first‐hand	 experience	 of	 “the	 relative	 messiness	 of	
practice”	 (Law,	 2004:18‐19)	 in	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 setting	 in	 which	 it	 occurs	
(Atkinson	et	al,	2001).		It	was	most	fitting	as	it	allows	for	the	“analysis	of	social	action	
and	 social	 organisation”	 through	 the	 collection	 and	 analysation	 of	 data	 in	 “the	






is	 a	 “method	 for	 those	who	wish	 to	describe	 the	 culture	of	a	group	or	organisation”	
(Silby,	 2002),	 which	 aligns	 with	 the	 needs	 of	 ANT	 (Actor‐Network	 Theory),	 a	
theoretical	 perspective	 of	which	 this	 research	 adopts	more	 for	 its	 ‘method’	 than	 it	
does	for	the	whole	of	its	organising	theory	(see	further	below).			
As	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 gain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 what	 influences	
construction	disputes,	 it	was	 imperative	 to	be	 literally	 surrounded	by	construction	
disputes,	 “living	 with	 and	 living	 like	 those	 who	 are	 studied	 …	 [with]	 an	 ongoing	
interaction	 with	 the	 human	 target	 of	 study	 on	 their	 home	 ground”	 (Van	 Maanen,	
1988).	 	 Utilising	 ethnography	meant	 that	 I	 was	 able	 to	 collect	 and	 record	 various	
types	of	data	from	various	sources	and	situations	during	the	course	of	the	fieldwork.			
The	 ideal	 environment	 for	 this	 full‐time	 involvement	 and	 an	 in	 situ	 monitoring	 of	
construction	 disputes	 (Latour	 and	Woolgar,	 1979)	 is	 in	 a	 law	 firm	 specialising	 in	
construction	 disputes,	 or	 alternatively	 in	 the	 construction	 department	 of	 a	 multi‐
disciplinary	 law	 firm.	 	 I	 was	 fortunate	 to	 be	 able	 to	 secure	 this	 position	 which	
allowed	 for	 an	 immersion	 within	 construction	 disputes,	 construction	 clients	 and	
construction	lawyers	(see	further	below).			
The	 ethnography	 involved	 and	 emphasised	 participant	 observation	 and	 the	
collection/analysis	 of	 the	 documentation	 and	 conversation	 material	 gathered	 and	
involved	in	these	construction	disputes.		A	mere	analysis	of	reported	case	decisions,	
governmental	reports	and	academic	writings	was	unlikely	 to	reveal	 the	 full	picture	





ethnography	 with	 a	 series	 of	 interviews	 with	 the	 lawyers	 involved	 and/or	 their	
clients.	 	 However,	 after	 much	 deliberation	 it	 seemed	 to	me	 that	 in	 this	 particular	
circumstance,	 these	 proposed	 interviews	 raised	 a	 number	 of	 adverse	 issues	which	
outweighed	any	perceived	benefit	to	the	research.			
Firstly,	I	was	conscious	that	the	interviews	would	provide	little	or	no	opportunity	“to	
investigate	 the	multiple	 forms	of	 social	organisation	and	action	 that	are	 the	 stuff	of	





Formal	 interviews	certainly	would	have	obtained	 the	 lawyers’	 and	clients’	point	of	
view	on	the	disputes	and	their	development;	however,	they	would	have	done	so	in	a	
vacuum	 and	 in	 a	 very	 formal	 setting.	 	 The	 participant	 observation	 and	 essentially	
living	 and	 working	 within	 the	 law	 firm	 afforded	 the	 opportunity	 generally	 to	
understand	 the	 lawyers’	 views	 on	 a	 particular	 case	 in	 any	 event:	 	 I	 observed	
intralawyer	 conversations,	 posed	 informal	 questions	 to	 them	 in	 passing	 as	




at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 research	 I	 did	 initially	 “test	 the	 waters”	 with	 a	 few	 informal	
interviews	with	past	 clients	with	whom	I	was	 familiar;	however,	 it	quickly	became	
clear	 that	 their	views	on	 the	dispute,	 the	disputing	process	and	 the	 involvement	of	
lawyers	 were	 not	 revealing	 any	 additional	 information,	 but	 rather,	 were	 either	 a	
confirmation	 of	 the	 factual	 elements	 of	 the	 case	 and	 the	 legal	 process	 and/or	 a	
reiteration	of	 their	 frustrations	with	 the	opposition.	 	With	 regard	 to	 their	 views	of	
the	 lawyers	 involved	 and	 the	 services,	 advice	 and	 influence	 they	 provided,	 their	
comments	and	reflections	were	rather	limited.		I	can	only	speculate;	however,	as	it	is	
quite	possible	that	these	clients	viewed	me	a	part	of	the	Firm,	it	perhaps	was	the	case	




Secondly,	 I	 was	 of	 the	 view	 that	 formal,	 or	 even	 informal,	 interviews	 would	
compromise	 the	 necessary	 relationship	 I	 required	 with	 the	 Firm	 to	 carry	 out	 the	
ethnography	 and	 participant	 observation.	 	 Participant	 observation	 requires	 the	
researcher	to	be	both	stranger	and	friend	(Powdermaker,	1966)	in	the	environment	
under	study.	 	The	participation	element	 is	vital	 to	 the	ethnography	 in	 that	 “only	by	
attempting	 to	 enter	 the	 symbolic	 lifeworld	 of	 others	 that	 one	 can	 ascertain	 the	
subjective	 logic	on	which	 it	 is	built	and	feel,	hear	and	see	a	 little	of	social	 life	as	one’s	
subjects	 do”.	 	 Equally,	 observation	 is	 essential	 in	 that	 it	 allows	 the	 researcher	 to	
“stand	 back	 and	 analyse	 in	 a	way	 possibly	 foreign	 to	 the	 subject,	 asking	 questions	
deemed	eccentric	or	irrelevant	for	practical	purposes	by	the	subject”	(Rock,	2001).	
In	 this	 study,	 the	participant	 observation	 oscillated	between	 ‘complete	participant’	
and	 ‘observer‐as‐participant’	 (Hammersley	 &	 Atkinson,	 2007;	 Junker,	 1960;	 Gold,	




the	 partner	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 matter,	 locating	 relevant	 documents	 and	 authorities,	
obtaining	 information	 from	 clients/witnesses,	 attending	 meetings	 and	 hearings,	
conducting	legal	research,	etc.		In	this	sense,	the	research	followed	in	the	footsteps	of	
Mann	 (1985),	 Flood	 (1991)	 and	 Cunningham	 (1992).	 	 On	 other	matters	 or	 events	
within	 the	 office,	 the	 fieldwork	was	more	 akin	 to	 pure	 observation.	 	 I	 was	 seated	
amongst	the	lawyers	and	secretaries	in	the	office	which	provided	a	front	row	seat	for	
observing	 how	 their	 daily	 activities	 are	 carried	 out.	 	 This	 location	 enabled	




This	 oscillation	 between	 ‘complete	 participant’	 and	 ‘observer‐as‐participant’	
facilitates	the	search	for	a	relationship	between	the	emic	and	etic128	understanding	of	
human	 behaviour	 and	 enables	 the	 researcher	 to	 maintain	 an	 insider	 and	 outsider	
point	of	view	during	the	study	(Madden,	2010).129		It	also	enables	the	documentation	
of	 people’s	 experiences	 of	 law	 in	 daily	 life	 (Griffiths,	 2005)	 whilst	 maintaining	 a	





roles	 of	 total	 newcomer	 (an	 unattainable	 ideal)	 and	 that	 of	
complete	 participant	 (who	 in	 going	 native	 is	 unable	 usefully	 to	




exercise	 to	 avoid	 jeopardising	 the	necessary	 ‘stranger	 and	 friend’	 relationship.	 	On	
                                                 
127	With	regard	to	telephone	calls,	these	were	either	“one‐sided”	in	the	sense	that	I	could	only	







is	necessary	to	understand	the	psychological	realities	of	a	culture,	that	 is,	 its	meanings	 for	the	





conclusion	 of	 the	 18	 months	 of	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 I	 reassessed	 my	 initial	
decision	not	to	carry	out	interviews.	 	However,	considering	the	amount	and	quality	
of	data	collected	during	the	 fieldwork	(discussed	 further	below),	 there	were	 few,	 if	
any,	 areas	 left	 within	 the	 boundaries	 defined	 by	 the	 research	 question	 and	
aims/objectives	of	the	research	that	could	benefit	from	further	development	by	way	
of	interview.		No	doubt	there	is	a	wealth	of	further	information	and	research	which	
could	 be	 achieved	 from	 such	 interviews	 with	 these	 lawyers	 and	 their	 clients;	
however,	I	must	leave	that	to	future	studies	and	other	research	questions.		Here,	I	am	
most	 interested	 in	 the	 shape	 and	 development	 of	 disputes	 after	 the	 lawyer	 is	
engaged,	 and	 identifying	 those	 elements	 which	 influence	 this	 ‐	 not	 strictly	 or	
necessarily	from	any	particular	 lawyer	or	client	point	of	view.	 	Lawyers	and	clients	
may	well	have	different	views	and	agendas	as	 to	why	disputes	develop	as	 they	do;	
however,	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 research	 was	 to	 identify	 and	 analyse	 the	 influences.		
Their	 perceptions	 in	 this	 respect	 are	 of	 course	 helpful	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 potential	
identification	of	the	relevant	influences,	though	these	perceptions	are	only	useful	to	a	
limited	 extent	 given	 their	 subjective	 and	 pointed	 nature.	 	 Indeed	 this	 data	 was	
collected	outside	of	formal	interviews	in	any	event.	 	This,	combined	with	the	issues	




disputes	was	 critical	 and	 the	most	 suitable	 location	 for	 this	was	within	 a	 law	 firm	
with	both	lawyers	and	the	disputes	continuously	in	action.	 	 I	was	fortunate	to	have	
the	opportunity	to	conduct	this	ethnographic	fieldwork	at	a	leading	construction	law	
firm	 in	 London.	 	 For	 confidentiality	 reasons	which	 I	 discuss	 further	 below,	 I	 shall	







is	concerned	with	 lawyer	 involvement.	 	These	companies	certainly	do	exist,	 though	





counsel/legal	 department	 would	 have	 been	 most	 problematic	 as	 access	 to	 those	
disputes	 which	 involved	 outside	 lawyers	 (this	 being	 lawyers	 in	 private	 practice	
whom	they	 instruct)	 likely	would	have	been	 limited.	 	Secondly,	 the	work	which	 in‐
house	 counsel/legal	 departments	 take	 on	 is	 not	 necessarily	 all	 dispute	 work	 –	 a	
proportion	of	it	is	inevitably	transactional	(eg	advising	on	and	negotiating	contracts,	
joint	 ventures,	 property	 issues	 etc).	 	 Therefore,	 any	 ethnographer	 would	 not	
necessarily	be	encapsulated	by	disputes	in	this	environment.			
The	 Firm	 in	 which	 this	 ethnography	 took	 place	 was	 ideal	 on	 a	 number	 of	 levels.		
Firstly,	 the	Firm	specialises	 in	construction	law,	thereby	enabling	the	ethnographer			
with	 continuous	 access	 to	 the	 type	of	 disputes	 in	 focus.	 	On	 the	whole,	 it	 does	not	
advise	on	other	construction‐related	 issues	such	as	banking	and	 finance,	 corporate	
matters,	tax,	intellectual	property	or	environmental/land	law	issues.		The	Firm	does	
advise	 on	non‐contentious	matters	 though	 the	majority	 of	 the	Partners	 are	 largely	
concerned	with	disputes	or	potential	disputes	(see	further	below).		
Secondly,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	I	had	the	requisite	access	to	this	particular	
firm.	 	Prior	 to	commencing	 this	 thesis,	 I	was	employed	by	 the	Firm	to	assist	 in	 the	




ultimately	 rendered	 this	 research	 possible	 –	 the	 research	 depended	 upon	 the	
successful	negotiation	and	maintenance	of	this	access	(Atkinson,	2015:176).			
I	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 potential	 issues	 this	 connection	 raises:	 	 would	 this	 impair	my	
ability	to	approach	the	fieldwork	with	an	open	mind,	did	I	see	myself	as	an	 insider	
and/or	 part	 of	 the	 Firm	 which	 would	 therefore	 skew	 my	 perspective	 or	 data	
collection	 and	 had	 I	 already	 developed	 pre‐conceived	 ideas	 about	 the	 Firm,	 these	
lawyers	and/or	 the	disputes	 they	deal	with?	 	Whilst	 I	was	most	 conscious	of	 these	
issues,	I	had	to	assess	these	concerns	in	the	context	of	obtaining	an	appropriate	site	
for	 the	 fieldwork	 which	 would	 grant	 me	 a	 “licence	 to	 witness,	 participate	 in	 and	
converse	 about	 issues	 that	might	 otherwise	 reach	 a	more	 restricted	 social	 circle	…	
having	privileged	access	 to	 the	everyday	activities	…	 that	are	based	on	some	sense	of	
membership”	 (Atkinson,	 2015:176).	 	On	balance,	 it	 seemed	 to	me	 that	whilst	 I	 had	
been	employed	previously	by	the	Firm,	I	certainly	was	not	deemed	to	be	a	complete	
                                                 






“member”	 of	 the	 Firm:	 	 at	 that	 point	 I	was	not	 a	 qualified	 Solicitor	 and	 I	 had	 only	
been	at	 the	Firm	 for	one	year.	 	 I	 previously	worked	as	 an	Architect	 and	 the	whole	
culture	and	ethos	of	law	and	lawyers	was	still	a	strange	new	world	to	me.		I	did	not	
feel	 any	particular	 affinity	 to	 the	Firm	or	 any	obligation	 to	depict	 it	 in	 a	particular	







I	was	 also	mindful	 of	 the	 issues	 in	 respect	 of	 selecting	 this	 particular	 Firm	 for	 the	
fieldwork,	 over	 other	 construction	 law	 firms,	 or	 alternatively,	 using	 only	 one	 firm	
rather	 than	 several	 to	 witness	 the	 disputes	 in	 different	 law	 firm	 environments.		
Having	analysed	some	of	the	leading	construction	law	firms	in	London	(those	being	
selected	 from	 the	 Legal500	 list	 above	 ‐	 many	 of	 which	 are	 also	 identified	 in	
Chambers	UK	and	The	Lawyer	UK200	both	in	terms	of	the	services	they	provide	and	
the	structure	of	the	firms	(to	the	extent	possible),	there	was	no	perceived	advantage	
or	 disadvantage	 of	 any	 one	 firm	 –	 it	 is	 likely	 that	many	 of	 them	would	 have	 been	
appropriate	 for	 such	 a	 study.	 	 Of	 course	 internal	 company	 politics	 and/or	 the	
structuring	of	the	departments	within	each	of	these	firms	are	inevitably	different	and	
unique	 on	 some	 level,	 thus	 perhaps	 in	 turn	having	 its	 own	 influences	 on	disputes.		
However,	on	the	face	of	it	I	could	not	see	any	one	firm	being	more	advantageous	than	




draw	 conclusions	 from	 the	 data	 if	 access	 was	 different	 for	 each	 site	 and	 to	 what	
extent	would	the	experiences,	disputes	and	firms	be	comparable?		No	doubt	a	larger	
and	 longer	 study	 would	 overcome	 these	 issues;	 however,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	
research	question,	one	site	was	sufficient	to	collect	the	necessary	data.		
Given	 the	above,	 I	 therefore	appreciate	 that	 some	may	view	 this	 research	as	being	
limited	to	those	disputes	and	lawyers	found	within	the	Firm.		Of	course	that	may	well	
be	the	case	for	certain	findings,	though	given	the	variety	and	number	of	disputes	and	
lawyers	 witnessed	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 fieldwork,	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 some	




disputes	 in	 the	 industry	 –	 not	 just	 those	 which	 involve	 the	 Firm.	 	 This	 research	
therefore	 is	 an	 in‐depth	 look	 at	 the	 Firm’s	 disputes	 and	 lawyers,	 which	 in	 future	
studies	could	be	compared	and	contrasted	to	other	firms	and	construction	disputes.			
However,	certain	elements	in	the	following	chapters	clearly	are	representative	of	the	
industry	 as	 a	whole,	 as	 exemplified	 by	 the	 case	 law,	 literature	 and	 other	 research	
reference	herein.															
Composition	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 Firm,	 at	 the	 time	 I	 conducted	 the	 fieldwork	












speaking,	 these	 services	 can	be	 categorised	 into	 ‘contentious’	 and	 ‘non‐contentions’.			
The	 contentious	 services	 include	 advising	 and	 representing	 a	 party	 in	 any	 of	 the	
dispute	 resolution	 methods:	 	 negotiation,	 mediation,	 adjudication,	 arbitration,	
litigation,	 etc.	 	 The	 non‐contentious	 work	 is	 that	 of	 a	 transactional	 nature	 and	
includes	 advising	 on,	 drafting	 and	 negotiating	 construction	 contracts	 ‐	 these	 being	
building,	energy	or	engineering	contracts	and	agreements	 for	professional	services.		
Of	the	14	partners,	at	the	time	of	writing,	only	one	solely	deals	with	non‐contentious	












individual	 residential	 occupiers.	 	 Their	 clients	 are	 a	mix	 of	 both	 repeat	 players	 as	
well	as	one‐shotters	(Galanter,	1974).			
The	legal	profession	is	commonly	thought	of	as	being	divided	into	two	hemispheres:		





These	 clients	 engage	 the	Firm	 to	 advise	on	and	 resolve	a	wide	variety	of	 disputes.		
The	 list	 is	 arguably	 endless,	 including	 health	 and	 safety	 matters,	 professional	
negligence	 and	 contract	 interpretation	 points;	 however,	 the	 majority	 of	 disputes	
appear	to	concern	payment,	defects	and	delay.132			
Indeed,	 these	 three	 ‘types’	 of	 disputes	 are	 often	 inherently	 linked	 and	 could	 be	
considered	 as	 three	 elements	 of	 one	 dispute	 which	 informs	 the	 dispute’s	
development	 and	 outcome.	 	 By	 way	 of	 example,	 a	 contractor	 may	 be	 aggrieved	
because	it	has	not	been	paid	by	the	employer	the	full	amount	agreed	in	the	contract;	
however,	 the	 employer	 has	 not	 done	 so	 because	 it	 considers	 the	 contractor	
responsible	for	the	defects	in	the	building	and	the	delay	to	the	completion	date.			
Structure	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 Firm’s	 management	 structure,	 it	 does	 hold	 true	 to	 the	 traditional	
model	(Gabarro,	2007:xix).	 	 In	contrast	to	the	corporate	model133,	 the	Firm	does	not	
have	a	clear	demarcation	between	producers	and	managers	and	indeed	the	partners	
                                                 
131	As	consultants	(eg	Architects	and	engineers)	are	required	to	have	professional	indemnity	
insurance	 in	 place,	 their	 insurers	 tend	 to	 conduct	 any	 disputes	 on	 their	 behalf	 (or	 appoint	
their	preferred	lawyers)	owing	to	their	right	of	subrogation.		As	the	Firm	is	not	instructed	by	





size,	 scale	 and	 complexity	 of	 large	 manufacturing	 business	 that	 emerged	 owing	 to	 the	
industrial	 revolution	and	 that	 its	distinguishing	 feature	 is	 its	emphasis	on	specialization	by	





of	 the	Firm	are	 “producing	managers”	–	 they	 continue	 to	practice	 law	even	 though	
they	have	management/leadership	responsibilities	(Lorsch	and	Mathias,	1987).		The	
Firm	 is	 not	 organised	 into	 separate	 marketing,	 sales	 and	 production	 functions.		
Rather,	 all	 of	 these	 activities	 reside	 in	 the	 role	 of	 each	 partner.	 	 There	 are	 two	
employees	 who	 are	 designated	 as	 “marketing”	 individuals	 for	 the	 Firm;	 however,	
they	merely	assist	the	partners	in	their	marketing	duties	–	by	way	of	example,	they	
research	new	business	opportunities,	organise	client	parties	and	marketing	functions	











Though	 “ethnography	 is	 among	 the	 most	 ethical	 forms	 of	 research”	 (Atkinson,	
2015:172)	I	am	acutely	aware,	and	was	so	both	before	and	throughout	the	duration	
of	 the	 fieldwork,	 of	 the	 ethical	 and	 moral	 issues	 ethnography	 does	 raise	
(Hammersley	and	Traianou,	2012:8‐11),	 some	of	 these	being:	 client	confidentiality,	
informed	consent	and	membership.		For	the	avoidance	of	doubt,	before	commencing	








obtain	 the	 clients’	 consent	 to	 participate	 where	 appropriate	 and	 necessary.	 	 The	
Senior	 Partner	 generally	 did	 not	 have	 any	 concerns	 provided	 there	 would	 be	 no	
burden	or	tasks	required	of	his	lawyers	and	that	client	confidentiality	would	be	not	




partnership	 meeting,	 though	 I	 do	 not	 know	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 occurred	 as	 I	 of	
course	 was	 not	 party	 to	 those	meetings.	 	 I	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 leave	 that	 to	 his	
discretion.	 	After	 further	discussing	client	confidentiality	 the	Senior	Partner	agreed	
to	the	research.		He	signed	a	“Consent	Form”	which	I	prepared	stating:	
“We	 understand	 that	 Stacy	 is	 carrying	 out	 research	 for	 her	 PhD	
thesis	 regarding	 construction	 disputes	 which	 may	 involve	
interviews,	ethnography	and/or	 the	collection	of	data	at	our	 firm.		
We	 understand	 that	 any	 client	 data	will	 remain	 confidential	 and	
anonymous	and	no	individual	will	be	identifiable	from	the	collected	
data,	 written	 report	 of	 the	 research,	 or	 any	 publications	 arising	
from	it.”	




In	 terms	 of	 the	 other	 lawyers	 and	 their	 clients,	 I	 approached	 each	 Partner	
responsible	 for	 the	 matters	 which	 I	 intended	 on	 investigating	 in	 more	 detail	 and	
asked	 whether	 they	 would	 like	 me	 to	 approach	 the	 client	 to	 obtain	 consent,	 or	




as	 to	 how	 the	 relationship	 was	 managed,	 not	 wanting	 anything	 to	 jeopardise	 the	
relationship	 or	 upset	 the	 client	 unnecessarily.	 	 I	 did	 discuss	 the	 research	 directly	
with	a	number	of	clients.		In	these	situations,	I	explained	the	purpose	of	the	research	
and	 that	 I	 would	 review	 and	 observe	 all	 documentation	 and	
correspondence/conversations	when	possible,	in	addition	to	providing	assistance	on	
















them.	 	 I	 therefore	 revisited	 the	 client’s	 position	 continuously	 throughout	 the	
research,	 almost	 on	 their	 behalf	 as	 it	 were.	 	 Continual	 reflection	 throughout	 was	
essential	 for	 issues	of	 consent	 (Miller	and	Bell,	2012).	 	As	 it	 turns	out,	 there	 really	
was	never	a	situation	where	I	considered	that	the	research	fieldwork	or	its	findings	
would	 jeopardise	 the	 clients’	 identity	 or	 dispute.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 took	 great	 care	
during	 the	 write	 up	 of	 this	 thesis	 when	 describing	 the	 disputes	 and	 individuals	
involved,	such	that	events	and	names	are	suitably	anonymous	or	pseudonymous.		By	








brief	 discussion	 on	 ANT	 in	 order	 to	 contextualise	 the	 type	 and	 nature	 of	 data	
collected,	before	 turning	 to	 the	data	 itself	which	 is	discussed	 further	below,	and	 to	
provide	 further	 perspective	 and	 background	 on	 the	 methodology	 implemented	 in	
this	research	–	and	indeed	its	link	to	the	theoretical	framework.			
In	 order	 to	 examine	 construction	 disputes	 and	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	
their	 identity/definition	 and	 their	 transformation,	 ANT	 provides	 a	 most	 useful	
platform	 for	observing	 these	disputes	as	 it	empowers	both	human	and	non‐human	
participants	to	be	active	entities	in	the	study.		It	does	so	by	making	a	change	of	scale	a	
consequence	 of	 using	 organizational	 as	 well	 as	 material	 technologies	 (Latour,	
2012:11).	 	 Ultimately,	 ANT	 places	 the	 dispute	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 study	 whilst	





ANT,	 developed	 by	 sociologists	 Latour134,	 Callon	 and	 Law,	 holds	 that	 entities	 take	
their	 form	 and	 acquire	 their	 attributes	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 relations	 with	 other	
entities	(Law	and	Hassard,	1999;	Latour,	2005).	 	In	other	words,	an	event	or	object	
can	only	be	understood	through	these	associations.		ANT	takes	as	a	basic	assumption	











black	 boxes	 that	 you	 can	 open	 up	 to	 find	many	more	 actors	 hidden	within.	 	 Each	
actor	 influences	 other	 actors.	 	 Relations,	 or	 associations,	 are	 formed	 only	
occasionally	 and	 require	 a	 mediator,	 or	 third	 entity,	 to	 link	 the	 actors	 (Latour,	
Harman	 and	Erdélyi,	 2011).	 	 	 ANT	 distinguishes	 between	mediators,	 those	 entities	
which	 transform,	 translate	 and	 modify	 meaning	 when	 it	 comes	 into	 contact	 with	





that	 is,	 its	 network	 (Latour,	 2010:5).	 	 The	 word	 network137	 is	 used	 not	 simply	 to	
designate	 things	 that	 have	 the	 shape	 or	 characteristics	 of	 a	 net,	 but	 rather	 to	
                                                 
134	For	an	historical	account	of	ANT,	see	Latour’s	“Biography	of	an	Inquiry	–	About	a	Book	on	
Modes	of	Existence”	(Latour,	2012)	which	discusses	the	development	of	ANT	and	the	modes	of	
existence	 from	a	 biographical	 perspective.	 	 Latour	 cites	 “Unscrewing	 the	Big	Leviathans”	 as	
the	foundational	text	of	ANT	(Callon	and	Latour,	1981). 
135	 Whether	 ANT	 is	 a	 “theory”	 is	 doubtful	 (Law,	 2004:157)	 and	 may	 indeed	 be	 more	













translations	 of	 scholars’	 accounts	 or	 represents	 a	 flow	 of	 translations	 (Latour,	
2005:108,132).	 	 It	 is	a	 concept,	not	a	 thing	out	 there	 and	 is	a	 tool	 to	help	describe	
something,	 not	what	 is	 being	 described	 (Latour,	 2005:131).	 	 Latour	 notes	 the	 four	
important	features	of	a	network	(Latour,	2005:132):	
“a)	 a	 point‐to‐point	 connection	 is	 being	 established	 which	 is	 physically	
traceable	and	thus	can	be	recorded	empirically;	
b) such	 a	 connection	 leaves	 empty	most	 of	what	 is	 not	 connected,	 as	 any	
fisherman	knows	when	throwing	his	net	in	the	sea;	






an	 actor	 is	 nothing	 but	 a	 network,	 except	 that	 a	 network	 is	 nothing	 but	 actors	
(Latour,	2010:5).		In	this	context,	an	actor	is	not	the	source	of	action,	but	rather	is	a	
moving	 target	of	a	vast	array	of	entities	 swarming	 toward	 it	 (Latour,	 2005:46).	 	As	
such,	 this	 social	 theory	dissolves	 the	 individual	 versus	 society	 conundrum	(Latour,	
2010:9)	 and	 champions	 Gabriel	 Tarde’s	 notion	 that	 the	 micro/macro	 distinction	
stifles	any	attempt	at	understanding	how	society	is	being	generated	(Latour,	2001).		
Accordingly,	using	ANT’s	 infra‐language139,	 this	research	is	an	investigation	into	(or	
rather,	 search	 for)	 the	mediators	 of	 construction	 disputes,	 and	how	 they	 affect	 the	
disputes’	 development	 or	 outcome	 –	 construction	 disputes	 being	 actors,	 networks	
and	 a	 group	 formation140.	 	 As	 ANT	 maintains	 that	 an	 object	 (or	 system)	 is	 only	






nature	 of	 groups,	 there	 exist	 many	 contradictory	 ways	 for	 actors	 to	 be	 given	 an	 identity	
(Latour,	2005:22	&	27‐42).	 	Arguably,	though	I	have	used	the	term	group	 formation	here	(a	
term	used	by	ANT	theorists),	group,	a	term	more	commonly	used	by	sociologist	of	the	social,	





understood	through	a	set	of	associations	with	other	objects	and	events	 ‐	 it	 is	 these	
objects	and	events	which	warrant	scrutiny.	 	ANT	therefore	enables	an	investigation	










the	 methodology	 provides	 a	 unique	 perspective	 on	 the	 study	 of	 construction	
disputes	and	their	outcomes.			
                                                                                                                                      
established	group,	set‐out	prior	 to	 the	research	being	carried	out.	 	Nevertheless,	 I	maintain	
















The	 primary	 focus	 of	 the	 research	 concerned	 participant	 observation	 of	 all	 of	 the	
Firm’s	 activities,	 namely:	 	 lawyer/client	 discourse	 (telephone	 conversations	 &	
meetings),	 lawyer/lawyer	 discussions	 and	 meetings	 in	 the	 office,	 lawyer/expert	
discourse,	 lawyer/client/other	 side142	 interactions	 (telephone	 conversations	 &	









from	 both	 the	 Firm’s	 current	 files	 (electronic	 and	 hard	 copy	 files)	 as	 well	 as	 its	
archives	 stored	 off‐site.	 	 The	 files	 generally	 consisted	 of	 lawyer/client	
correspondence	 (emails/letters	 of	 advice/bills/etc),	 client	 documents,	 inter‐party	
correspondence	 and	 formal	 documentation	 such	 as	 pleadings,	 court	 forms,	
applications/notices,	etc.				
                                                 
142	A	term	used	by	the	lawyers	when	referring	to	the	party	(and	their	legal	representatives)	
who	their	client	considers	is	responsible	for	the	creation	of	a	dispute	(or	potential	dispute).	
143	However,	 if	 a	matter	 had	been	 archived	 it	was	more	difficult	 to	 research	 as	 it	 required	
retrieving	 boxes	 of	 files	 from	 an	 off‐site	 storage	 facility.	 	 Nevertheless,	most	 of	 the	 Firm’s	
information	 is	stored	electronically,	particularly	 for	matters	commenced	within	 the	past	10	










particular	matters,	 as	well	 as	 provided	 information	 for	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 50	
specific	 matters	 within	 the	 Firm	 (see	 “Matter	 Database”	 below).		
Collecting/researching	 this	 data	 was	 particularly	 useful	 on	 those	 matters	 which	
commenced	 several	 months	 or	 even	 years	 prior	 to	 when	 I	 began	 the	 study.	 	 It	
provided	me	with	a	historical	account	of:		the	procedures	followed,	the	trajectory	of	
the	disputes	and,	at	 times,	an	 insight	 into	 the	relationship	between	 the	 lawyer	and	
client.	 	Lawyers	were	not	always	available	(or	willing)	to	take	the	time	to	provide	a	
detailed	 chronology	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 Accordingly,	 the	 ability	 to	 research	 the	 Firm’s	
files	greatly	assisted	in	my	general	understanding	of	what	took	place	previously.	
Furthermore,	 as	 field	 notes	 taken	during	 the	 course	 of	 participant	 observation	 are	
inevitably	 ‘selective’	 (Emerson,	 Fretz	 and	 Shaw,	 2001)	 in	 that	 the	 ethnographer	
writes	 about	 certain	 things	 that	 seem	 significant	 and	 leaves	out	 other	matters,	 the	
quantitative	data	gathered	from	the	Firm’s	files	provided	a	further	account	and	data	
which	 is	 less	 subjective.	 	 It	 also	 offered	 a	 further	 factual	 account,	 irrespective	 of	
whether	 I	 found	 it	 significant,	 from	 a	 different	 point	 of	 view	 or	 perspective	 –	 one	
which	I	was	not	able	to	choose	or	construct.			
This	 quantitative	 method	 complements	 the	 qualitative	 information	 obtained	 from	
participant	observation	and	 ‘should	be	viewed	as	a	complementary	rather	than	rival	
camp[s]’	 (Jick,	 1983).	 	 A	 combination	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research	
methods	may	 be	 pursued	 either	 to	 obtain	 knowledge	 about	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 study	
which	 is	 broader	 than	 the	 single	 approach	 provided	 or	 to	 mutually	 validate	 the	
findings	of	both	approaches	(Flick,	2009).		Here,	the	use	of	two	methods	provided	a	





In	 1922,	 Bronislaw	 Malinowski,	 the	 grandfather	 of	 ethnography,	 called	 for	 an	












matter,	 but	 rather,	 describe	 the	 research	 setting	 or	 the	 general	 experience	 of	 the	
daily	 life	 in	 the	Firm.	 	 In	 addition,	general	notes	 are	 those	which	 I	was	not	 able	 to	
determine	which	matter	the	conversation	or	event	related	to.		By	way	of	example,	on	










seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 lawyers	may	 create	 a	 somewhat	virtual	 environment	 (either	






By	 “specific	notes”,	 I	 refer	 to	 those	 field	 notes	 taken	which	 relate	 to	matters	 I	was	
either	 familiar	 with	 or	 knew	 which	 matter	 the	 conversation	 or	 event	 related	 to.		
During	 the	 course	 of	 the	 fieldwork,	 I	 closely	 followed	 approximately	 50	 cases,	
attending	meetings	 and	 assisting	 the	 relevant	 partner	 in	 charge	 as	 necessary.	 	 For	
these	 cases,	 where	 possible,	 I	 took	 notes	 of	 specific	 conversations	 between:	 	 the	











descriptors	 of	 what	 the	 event	 or	 conversation	 concerned.	 	 As	 the	 research	
progressed,	clear	and	recurring	themes	or	descriptors	emerged	as	I	was	able	to	code	
my	notes	more	effectively.	 	This	enabled	the	notes	to	be	categorised	and	organised	










my	 aim	 was	 to	 create	 a	 full	 ethnographic	 ‘description’	 of	 the	 lawyers	 and	 the	
disputes,	something	which	is	most	difficult	to	do	as	“it	requires	so	much	metaphysics	
just	 to	 find	 the	 right	 description”	 (Latour,	 Harman	 &	 Erdélyi,	 2011),	 I	 simply	 took	
notes	where	possible	and	without	tailoring	or	choosing	their	subject	matter.		This	of	
course	resulted	in	many	field	notes	which	were	not	as	informative	as	others.			
The	 field	 notes	 varied	 in	 both	 length	 and	 nature.	 	 Some	 notes	 were	 20+	 pages	 of	
hand‐written	or	typed	notes	taken	during	meetings,	hearings	or	on	telephone	calls.		
Other	notes	were	only	several	lines,	or	only	several	words,	of	hand‐written	text	when	
say	 I	manually	 noted	 a	 brief	 exchange	 between	 two	 lawyers	 as	 they	passed	 in	 the	
corridor.	 	 Accordingly,	 I	 generally	 took	 field	 notes	 during	 the	 event	 or	 shortly	
thereafter.	 	At	 times	 it	was	necessary	 to	generate	 field	notes	at	 the	end	of	 the	day,	
though	this	was	limited	where	possible.	 	Digital	recording	generally	simply	was	not	
possible	 and	 therefore	 I	 was	 not	 able	 to	 employ	 this	 method	 of	 documentation.		
There	were	 certain	 circumstances	which	 presented	 themselves	where	 a	 recording	
was	possible	or	available,	as	some	lawyers	record	events	for	their	own	purposes	(eg	








Firm’s	current	 files	as	well	as	 its	archives	on	50	of	 the	Firm’s	contentious	matters.		




access	 to	 information	 and	 access	 to	 the	 lawyers	 involved.	 	 The	 selection	 of	 the	
matters	 was	 random	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 –	 I	 did	 not	 seek	 out	 cases	 which	 had	




matter	 or	 for	 the	whole	 duration	 of	 the	matter.	 	 For	 the	 other	 14%	 (7	matters),	 I	
gathered	 the	 information	 from	 the	 Firm’s	 files	 and	 archives	 and	 had	 informal	
discussions	with	the	lawyers	involved	if	possible.		




of	 the	 cases	 the	 Firm	 takes	 on,	 but	 by	 no	means	 represent	 the	 sole	 extent	 of	 the	
services	provided	by	the	Firm.			
For	each	matter,	 information	such	as	 the	 type	of	client,	 the	 typology	of	 the	parties,	
the	type	of	dispute,	the	methods	of	dispute	resolution	employed	(or	attempted)	and	
the	duration	of	the	dispute	is	recorded.	
The	 Firm	 identifies	 each	matter	 by	 a	 unique	 number.	 	 In	 addition,	 clients	 are	 also	
allocated	 a	 unique	 number.	 	 Accordingly,	 where	 one	 client	 instructs	 the	 Firm	 for	
different	disputes	say	on	different	projects	(most	likely	a	“repeat‐player”),	the	client	
number	will	 remain	constant	and	a	unique	number	 is	applied	to	each	new	dispute.		
                                                 








In	 order	 to	 preserve	 the	 anonymity	 of	 the	 clients	 and	 confidentiality	 of	 the	 cases,	
client	and	project	names	have	been	generalised	in	the	database.	 	In	addition,	I	have	
not	referred	to	the	Firm’s	unique	matter	number	when	referencing	the	case,	but	have	





number	 of	matters	 are	 discussed	 several	 times	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 to	 exemplify	
the	 themes	 and	 conclusions	 which	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	 research.	 	 The	 label	 is	
brief	 description	 of	 the	 issues	 or	 dispute	 concern	 and	 attempts	 to	 act	 as	 an	 aide	
memoire.	
The	 following	 is	 a	 list	 of	 statistics	 generated	 from	 the	 matters	 included	 in	 the	
database:	





perception	 and	 knowledge	of	 the	 other	 side.	 	 For	 some	parties,	 I	was	 aware	 that	 they	 had	
been	 in	 involved	 in	disputes/proceedings	previously.	 	Where	 I	simply	had	no	knowledge	of	
the	other	side,	I	classified	the	typology	of	the	parties	as	“unknown”.		The	“unknown”	category	





Number	of	repeat	player	clients (RP) | 22















                                                 
148	The	period	of	 time	was	 calculated	 from	when	 the	 client	 instructed	 the	Firm	–	not	 from	
when	the	client	or	the	parties	considered	that	a	dispute	had	arisen.	
149	These	disputes	include	those	which	were	“resolved”	after	two	years	from	when	the	client	
instructed	 the	 Firm,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 disputes	 which	 are	 still	 ongoing	 and	 not	 “resolved”	
during	the	course	of	the	fieldwork.	
150	The	duration	of	these	disputes	are	unknown	for	a	number	of	reasons:		(i)	the	Partner	left	












































































issues	 of	 payment,	 defects,	 delay,	 employment,	 land	 and	 negligence.	 	 Please	 see	
Chapter	 1.3	 (“Construction	 disputes”)	 for	 a	 further	 description	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	
disputes	included	in	the	Matter	Database.	
The	 purpose	 of	 the	Matter	Database	was	 to	 complement	 the	 information	 gathered	
from	 the	 participant	 observation.	 	 This	 often	 enabled	 a	 detailed	 and	 deeper	
understanding	 of	 the	 issues	 concerned,	 the	 history	 of	 the	 matter	 and	 the	 actors	
involved.	 	 In	 addition,	 as	 the	 database	 included	 a	 diverse	 and	wide‐ranging	 set	 of	
clients	 and	 matters	 (illustrated	 in	 the	 statistics	 above)	 this	 afforded	 a	 better	














The Client  …Thank  you  for  your  time  yesterday…    I  have  spoken  to  my 
business partner and we would  like you to act on our behalf.    I 
truly believe that they don’t want to go to court over this as they 
have a pretty weak  case and  they  run  the  risk of accumulating 
huge  legal costs should this go to court.   I hope that seeing you 






get back  to me with where  this would  take us as  I  think  that  it 
may be  the  case  that  instructing  you  to  act on our behalf  and 
some pretty aggressive  letters may be enough to bring this to a 
close or at the very least bring in an improved offer… 
The Lawyer  …Further  to our  conversation  yesterday and  your email below, 
our initial £5k fee is likely to include the following: 




costs/timetable  going  forward  (if  the  case  continues  in 
Court) and your query regarding summary judgment; 
 Going  on  the  record  as  acting  for  you  (which  includes 
sending a notice to both Structures Ltd and the Court); and 









At  this  point,  it  is  difficult  to  confirm what  else  the  initial  fee 
might include.  It really depends on how Structures Ltd responds 
to our  initial  letters/moves.    It may be  that  the dispute  can be 
concluded within a  few  letters  in which  case your  costs will be 
more  in  the  region  of  £2k  or  £3k.    Equally,  the  £5k  could  also 
include  part  of  a  mediation  (if  any)  or  the  next  steps  in  the 
proceedings (disclosure/witness statements)… 
In due  course, Mr Hunter advised Mr Cahill  that an application  for  summary  judgment 
was possible, but it was by no means “a sure thing”.  As Mr Cahill was not willing to take 
the  risk  of  liability  for  the  legal  fees  in  the  event  that  it was  unsuccessful, Mr Hunter 


















which	 transform,	 translate	 and	 modify	 meaning	 when	 it	 comes	 into	 contact	 with	








his	 legal	 advice	 and	 suggested	 next	 steps.	 	 The	 costs	 of	 the	 legal	 processes,	 the	
client’s	objectives	and	the	lawyer’s	advice	are	beginning	to	characterise	the	dispute	
in	 a	 different	 light	 and	 force	 it	 in	 a	 particular	 direction:	 	 these	 mediators	 are	
beginning	 to	make	 the	dispute	 take	 a	particular	 shape.	 	 Indeed,	we	 see	 the	 lawyer	
suggesting	 the	need	 for	 a	new	 “impression”	of	 the	dispute:	 	 to	present	 the	dispute	
differently	and	to	have	the	dispute	be	perceived	differently.	 	To	do	so	he	intends	to	
introduce	 further	 legal	 arguments	which	have	not	been	 raised	previously	between	
the	parties	with	 the	 intention	 that	 the	dispute’s	direction	changes	course	and	ends	
up	 in	mediation,	 rather	 than	continuing	along	 its	current	path	 (this	being	 litigation	
before	a	judge).	
This	 chapter	 considers	 those	 entities	 identified	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 research	
which	behaved	as	mediators,	causing	disputes	either	to	develop,	to	disintegrate	or	to	
act	 in	 a	 particular	 way	 by	 the	 very	 relations	 or	 associations	 they	 create.	 	 The	
mediators	are	both	human	and	non‐human	actors,	but	nevertheless	each	influenced	
the	development	of	 the	disputes,	 shaped	 their	 identity	 and	had	an	 impact	on	 their	
outcome.	 	This	was	evident	by	the	traces	they	left	behind	and	the	way	in	which	the	
disputes	 transformed.	 	 Without	 these	 entities,	 associations	 would	 not	 have	 been	














This	 list	 of	 course	 is	 by	 no	 means	 a	 conclusive	 list	 of	 entities	 which	 influence	
disputes;	 however,	 these	 five	 appeared	 to	 have	 the	 largest	 impact	 on	 the	 cases	

























































































by	 a	 commercial	 document	 storage	 company.	 	 In	 addition,	 electronic	 files	 also	
consumed	 vast	 amounts	 of	 virtual	 space	 in	 the	 Firm	 and	 were	 dealt	 with	 by	 a	
sophisticated	 document	 management	 system.	 	 Of	 the	 various	 types	 of	 files	 and	
documents	which	the	lawyers	and	the	Firm	dealt	with,	created	and	stored,	it	was	the	
client	documents	 (those	documents	which	 the	 client	provided	 to	his	 lawyer)	which	
consumed	a	 considerable	 amount	of	 time,	 energy	 and	 space.	 	 	The	 lawyers	poured	
over	 these	 documents,	 if	 and	 when	 available,	 to	 determine	 their	 advice	 to	 their	
clients	and	strategically	used	them	in,	and	for,	their	course	of	dealings.			
In	 summary,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 below,	 the	 data	 revealed	 that	 the	 documents	
themselves	 and	 how	 lawyers	 dealt	 with	 and	 perceived	 them	 was	 fundamental	 to	
provision	of	their	professional	services	and	the	identity	and	outcome	of	the	dispute.			
They	influenced	how	and	when	the	lawyer	carried	out	his	professional	service	and	in	
turn	 their	 significance	 and	meaning	were	 determined	 by	 this	 professional	 service.		
This	 reciprocal	 relationship	 had	 implications	 for	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	matter	 as	 the	
Photograph D:  Again, client documents in temporary box files, shoehorned into empty space





dispute	 evolved	 based	 on	 these	 professional	 services	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 the	
parties.		
The	 following	 first	 examines	 the	 nature	 documents,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	
client	documents	utilised	 in	construction	disputes.	 	 In	doing	so,	narrative	examples	
from	 the	 research	 as	 to	 how	 lawyers	 dealt	 with	 these	 documents	 are	 considered.		
This	 reveals	how	 lawyers	review,	reassemble	 and	reconstruct	 these	documents,	and	
the	events	to	which	they	relate,	when	dealing	with	their	clients’	case.		Documents	are	
employed	to	reassemble	past	events	–	how	and	when	the	lawyer	receives	them	may	
influence	 how	 their	 professional	 services	 are	 carried	 out.	 	 Secondly,	 using	
illustrations	 from	 the	 research,	 the	 following	 then	 considers	 how	 lawyers	 in	 turn	
influence	 the	 significance	 and	meaning	of	 these	 documents	when	 carrying	out	 this	
professional	 service.	 	 In	 this	 reciprocal	 relationship	 we	 see	 that	 lawyers	 utilise	
documents	 as	 tools	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	manage	 their	 clients’	 position	 in	 negotiations	
and	 in	 formal	 proceedings	 and	 to	 define	 and	 identify	 the	 dispute	 in	 the	 best	 light	





lawyer	 to	 be	 used	 when	 dealing	 with	 the	 case	 and	 in	 evidence.	 	 However,	 when	
examining	the	role	of	lawyers	and	tracing	disputes	involving	construction	projects,	it	
is	clear	that	the	definition	of	a	client	document	is	much	wider	than	one	might	expect.				
A	document	 is,	 ordinarily,	 a	 textual	 record	 (Buckland,	1997:804).	 	 In	 the	 context	of	
litigation,	 CPR	 r.31.4	 supports	 this	 wide	 definition:	 	 ‘document’	means	 anything	 in	
which	 information	of	any	description	 is	 recorded.	 	One	might	 reasonably	 expect	 say	
letters,	 emails,	 reports,	 photographs,	 videos,	 text	messages	 and	 social	media	 to	 be	
included	 in	 this	 definition.	 	 Indeed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 construction	 disputes	 and	
litigation,	 the	 documents	 which	 clients	 put	 forward	 to	 explain	 and	 evidence	 their	
case	include,	but	are	not	limited	to:		project	meeting	minutes	between	the	contractor	
and	the	consultants,	contract	and	tender	documentation,	emails	and	correspondence,	
site	 labour	 records,	 supplier/subcontractor	 invoices	 and	 payment	 records,	 etc.		
Drawings	 and	 photographs	 are	 also	 important	 client	 documents	 as	 they	 may	
evidence	delay,	disruption	and/or	defects.		It	is	not	difficult	to	see	how	drawings	and	









is	 informed	by	 the	observation	of	 them	–	he	 cited	artifacts,	 educational	 games	and	
works	 of	 art	 as	 examples	 (Otlet,	 1934:217).	 	 Suzanne	Dupuy‐Briet,	 a	 librarian	 and	
documentalist	 from	1924	 to	 1954,	 defined	 a	document	 as	 “evidence	 in	 support	of	a	
fact”	and	“any	physical	or	symbolic	sign,	preserved	or	recorded,	intended	to	represent,	
to	 reconstruct,	 or	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 physical	 or	 conceptual	 phenomenon”	 (Briet,	
1951:7).			Briet	discusses	how	an	antelope	running	wild	on	the	plains	of	Africa	should	
not	be	 considered	 a	document.	 	However,	 in	 contrast,	 an	 antelope	which	has	 been	
captured,	placed	in	a	zoo	and	made	to	be	an	object	of	study	is	a	document	(Buckland,	
1997:806).			
Similar	 to	 Briet’s	 antelope,	 where	 disputes	 in	 the	 construction	 industry	 concern	
delay,	defects	or	workmanship	issues,	the	project	itself	(eg,	the	building,	the	bridge,	
the	 roof	 extension,	 etc.)	 becomes	 a	 critical	 document	 which	 lawyers	 and	 experts	
scrutinise	 in	order	 to	shape	their	clients’	argument.	 	 It	 is	an	essential	record	of	 the	
events	which	took	place	and	is	most	crucial	in	terms	of	evidencing	the	claim	and	the	
shaping	of	the	dispute.			
This	 is	 exemplified	 in	 Matter	 No	 7	 [‘Additional	 Works’]	 where	 the	 documents	
involved	played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 evolution	of	 the	dispute	 after	proceedings	
commenced	in	court.		This	case	concerned	a	dispute	between	a	main	contractor	and	
the	 building	 owner	 which	 ultimately	 found	 its	 way	 into	 the	 Technology	 and	
Construction	Court.		The	issues	at	the	outset	of	the	litigation	were	wide‐ranging	and	
included	 delay,	 defects	 and	 contract	 interpretation	 arguments.	 	 After	 the	 parties’	
lawyers	 had	 exhausted	 their	 arguments	 in	 correspondence	 and	 pleadings,	 a	












building	components	 (as	either	defective	or	not)	were	evidence	 in	support	of	 their	
respective	claims,	and	the	identity	of	the	dispute	transformed	as	the	parties	agreed	
and	disagreed	 on	 the	 defects	 and	 the	 state	 of	 the	 building.	 	 Photographs	were	not	
used	 as	 there	were	 hundreds	 of	 components	 in	 dispute	which	 required	 inspection	
(this	 requiring	 more	 scrutiny	 than	 a	 photograph	 could	 capture)	 and,	 in	 certain	
circumstances,	additional	testing.	
Matter	No	 7	 [‘Additional	Works’]	 also	 illustrates	 how	 the	 potentially	 ambiguous	
nature	of	documents	involved	in	construction	projects	fuels	disputes.		Here,	whether	
a	 building	 element	 was	 defective,	 or	 failed	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 specification,	 was	
dependent	 on	 each	 party’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 original	 scope	 of	
works/specification,	 along	 with	 one’s	 definition	 of	 ‘defective’.	 	 If	 the	 technical	
requirements	set	out	in	the	drawings,	specifications	and	statutory	requirements	had	
been	clear	and	unequivocal,	arguably	this	would	have	minimised	the	development	of	
the	 dispute.	 	 However,	 the	 parties	 disagreed	 as	 to	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 documents,	
these	 being	 both	 the	 building	 defects	 and	 the	 hardcopy	 documents	 used	 on	 the	
project	 (eg,	 drawings,	 specifications,	 contract	 obligations,	 instructions,	 change	
orders,	meeting	minutes,	emails,	etc).		The	building	owner	argued	that	the	contractor	
was	 obliged	 to	 construct	 further	 works	 than	 he	 had	 done	 and	 that	 certain	 works	
were	defective,	whereas	the	contractor	argued	that	he	had	already	gone	beyond	the	
contracted	scope	of	works	(as	determined	by	the	contract	documents)	and	that	the	
alleged	defects	 either	were	not	defects	 or	were	minor	 and	 still	 in	 accordance	with	
standard	building	workmanship.			
The	potential	for	multiple	interpretations	in	documentation	(contract	documentation	
or	otherwise)	 is	 ripe	 in	 the	construction	 industry	and	seemingly	 the	basis	of	many	
disputes	 observed	 in	 this	 research.	 	 This	 was	 particularly	 so	 if	 the	 documents	
contained	ambiguous	or	conflicting	terms,	were	taken	out	of	context	or	were	difficult	





of	 documentation,	 both	 electronic	 and	 hardcopy.	 	 In	 some	 of	 the	 disputes	 the	
documentation	amounted	to	several	terabytes	of	data.		Considering	that	a	number	of	
cases	concerned	documentation	which	was	complex,	contradictory	and/or	countless	




documents	 are	 “the	most	despised	of	all	 ethnographic	objects”	 	 (Latour,	 1988b:54).		
Nevertheless,	 regardless	of	 the	quantity	or	nature	of	 the	client	documents,	 lawyers	
interpret	and	translate	(Cain,	1979)	the	information	provided	into	their	own	“legal”	
language	 (see	 further	 Chapter	 4.2	 below).	 	 However,	 before	 doing	 so,	 they	 must	
manage	 and	 scrutinise	 these	 documents.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 document	 itself,	 the	
manner	 in	 which	 lawyers	 deal	 with	 these	 document,	 and	 indeed	 how	 these	
documents	 are	 provided	 to	 them,	 influences	 the	 trajectory	 and	 outcome	 of	 the	
dispute.				
reReview,	reAssemble	&	reConstruct	
How	 lawyers	 deal	 with	 and	 manage	 client	 documents	 depends	 on	 the	 manner	 in	
which	the	documents	are	provided	to	them.		The	research	revealed	two	situations:	
Category	1:	 Circumstances	 in	which	 the	 client	 selected	and	provided	 the	
lawyer	with	 apparently	 all	 relevant	documents	 at	 the	outset	
and	 then,	 for	 various	 reasons,	 further	 relevant	 (and	
necessary)	documents	subsequently	surfaced.	
Category	2:	 Circumstances	 in	which	 the	 client	 provided	 the	 lawyer	with	
all	 documents	 (whether	 relevant	 or	 not)	 and	 the	 lawyer	
subsequently	selects,	in	his	opinion,	the	ones	required.	
Provision	of	client	documents:		Category	1	
Category	 1	 situations	 are	 those	 matters	 in	 which	 the	 client	 did	 not	 provide	 all	
necessary	 documents	 from	 the	 outset	 and	 therefore	 the	 lawyer’s	 professional	
services	 were	 carried	 out	 in	 an	 iterative	manner.	 	 By	 outset,	 I	 mean	 either	 at	 the	
initial	 instruction	 of	 the	 lawyer	 or	 whenever	 it	 was	 agreed	 that	 the	 documents	
should	be	provided.	 	Often	the	 lawyer	would	request	 from	the	client	all	documents	
which	 are	 relevant	 and	 essential	 for	 him	 to	 provide	 initial	 advice.	 	 If	 the	 matter	
continued	 to	 court	 or	 arbitration,	 the	 process	 of	 disclosure,	 the	 mainstay	 of	 the	
corporate	 litigator’s	 work	 (Brazil,	 1980;	 Kirkland,	 2012:153),	 of	 course	 requires	 a	
wider	search	and	clients	are	required	to	identify	all	relevant	documents,	which	both	
help	 and	 hinder	 their	 case.	 	 Category	 1	 also	 includes	 these	 matters	 which	
subsequently	endure	disclosure	as	the	process	of	the	client	carrying	out	this	further	
search	is	itself	iterative	in	nature.		
In	general,	on	receipt	of	 the	documents,	 the	 lawyers	 reviewed	 the	 information	and	




provided.	 	 Having	 done	 so,	 they	 then	 constructed	 their	 client’s	 case/argument	 –	
providing	 advice	 and	 taking	 instructions	 as	 to	 how	 to	 proceed.	 	 As	 Duffy	 Graham	
notes,	 lawyers	 simply	 do	 not	 take	 documents	 on	 face	 value,	 they	 translate	 the	















Owing	 to	 the	 new	 documentation	 received,	 the	 lawyers	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 re‐
review	 the	 further	 documents,	 and	 the	 collection	 of	 documents	 as	 a	 whole,	
reassemble	their	understanding	of	the	past	events	in	light	of	the	new	information	and	
reconstruct	their	arguments	(as	necessary).		In	many	cases,	this	process	of	document	
























In	 any	 event,	 when	 dealing	 with	 client	 documents	 and	 navigating	 through	 the	
process	 of	 disclosure	 ‐	 the	 trench	warfare	of	 litigation	 (Graham,	 2005:4)	 ‐	 lawyers	
regularly	 interpret	documents	and	make	decisions	which	call	 into	question	what	 is	
true	and	who	might	have	 information	that	would	shed	 light	on	the	truth	(Kirkland,	
2012:152‐153).	 	They	spend	their	time	“both	challenging	and	constructing	apparent	
meaning	 by	 assiduously	 examining	 context”	 (Graham,	 2005:6),	 the	 client	 document	
being	the	first	and	foremost	piece	of	evidence	documenting	that	context.			
By	 way	 of	 example,	 in	 Matter	 No	 7	 [‘Additional	 Works’]	 (the	 main	
contractor/building	owner	example	discussed	above)	the	client	provided	documents	
to	his	 lawyer	 in	a	Category	1	manner.	 	Here,	when	the	client	(the	main	contractor)	
initially	approached	the	lawyer,	he	explained	his	version	of	the	dispute:		the	building	
owner	 had	 denied	 him	 access	 to	 the	 site	 to	 complete	 the	works	 and	 his	 claim	 for	
additional	monies	had	been	rejected.		The	client	provided	the	documents	he	deemed	
relevant.	 	 The	 lawyer	 reviewed	 these	 documents	 (the	 building	 contract,	 drawings,	
schedules,	etc.	which	amounted	to	several	boxes	of	hardcopy	files)	and	assembled	the	
past	 events	 based	 on	 the	 information	 available.	 	 He	 then	 constructed	 the	 legal	
argument	and	advised	the	contractor	to	commence	proceedings	in	court	for	a	claim	
worth	 approximately	 £600,000	 as	 building	 owner	 had	 refused	 to	 engage	 in	
settlement	 negotiations.	 	 When	 the	 proceedings	 commenced,	 the	 building	 owner	




building.	 	 Prior	 to	 this,	 the	 client	 had	 informed	 the	 lawyer	 that	 defects	 did	 exist,	
though	he	had	not	been	clear	on	their	extent	and	the	lawyer	as	a	result	was	unaware	
of	 the	possibility	of	 such	a	 significant	counterclaim:	 	either	 the	client	had	not	been	





and	 re‐constructed	 their	 legal	 argument.	 	 Notably,	 deciphering	 how	 the	 client	
perceived	the	defects	against	how	their	experts	perceived	the	defects	was	no	small	
task	 for	 the	 lawyer.	 	 Certain	 documents	were	 not	 available	 or	 simply	 lost	 and	 the	
experts	disagreed	with	the	client’s	employees	on	certain	items.		Assembling	the	past	
events	 (ie	 the	correct	version	of	 the	 story)	was	not	 straight	 forward	as	a	complete	
picture	was	not	always	available.	
Ultimately	the	parties	proceeded	to	mediation.		Immediately	before	and	even	during	
the	mediation	 even	 further	 documents	 surfaced	 (eg	 emails	 and	 letters)	 which	 the	
lawyer	 again	 took	 into	 account	 and	 re‐assembled	 and	 re‐constructed	 the	 argument	
and	negotiation	strategy.		Eventually	the	parties	did	reach	a	settlement	agreement.			
Had	the	documentation	regarding	the	defects	in	the	building	been	available	from	the	
outset,	 the	 lawyer	 may	 have	 advised	 a	 different	 course	 of	 action.	 	 This	 became	
evident	during	the	mediation.		On	Day	2	of	the	mediation,	the	lawyer	and	his	clients	
were	 idly	 chatting	whilst	 the	mediator	was	 in	 the	 other	 room	 consulting	with	 the	
building	 owner.	 	 They	 reminisced	 on	 the	 events	 and	 proceedings	 of	 the	 last	 two	
years:	
The Client:  What a mess this  is.   These works are 
going  to  cost  us  hundreds  of 
thousands of pounds. 
The Lawyer:  Yes  ‐ had  I known of the true state of 
the  works,  we  would  never  have 
commenced proceedings… 
The	client	and	the	lawyer	were	referring	to	the	defects	which	were	under	discussion	
(those	 which	 were	 allegedly	 the	 fault	 of	 the	 contractor).	 	 Prior	 to	 commencing	
proceedings,	clearly	the	lawyer	(and	potentially	even	the	client)	had	not	appreciated	






dispute	 was	 based	 on	 the	 documentation	 available	 and	 the	 interpretation	 of	 that	
documentation.	 	 These	 documents	 therefore	 established	 the	 initial	 shape	 of	 the	






of	 a	 defective	 cladding	 system.	 	 The	 parties	 eventually	 referred	 the	 dispute	 to	
arbitration	 and	 a	 preliminary	 issue	 hearing	 concerned	 the	 validity	 of	 an	 alleged	
settlement	between	the	parties	a	number	of	years.	
The	 lawyer	 assisted	 his	 client,	 the	 claimant	 main	 contractor,	 with	 two	 witness	
statements	during	the	proceedings	which	concerned	this	alleged	settlement.		One	of	
his	 client’s	 witnesses	 claimed	 in	 his	 statement	 that	 he	 had	 attended	 a	 meeting	 in	
September	in	relation	to	the	alleged	settlement.		This	accorded	with	the	respondent	
subcontractor’s	 version	 of	 events.	 	 The	 client’s	 other	witness	was	 certain	 that	 this	
alleged	September	meeting	had	not	occurred	and	that	neither	of	them	had	attended.		
The	 two	witnesses	 could	 not	 agree.	 	 Indeed,	 one	witness	 swore	 blind	 that	 he	 had	
attended	while	the	other	produced	documents	to	demonstrate	he	certainly	could	not	
have	 attended	 on	 that	 day	 as	 he	was	 out	 of	 town.	 	 Accordingly,	 the	 lawyer	 had	 to	
assemble	a	version	of	events	which	reconciled	this	information	and	then	construct	an	
argument.	 	He	had	 to	reconcile	multiple,	competing	accounts	of	 the	dispute	 in	a	way	














Reviewing,	 assembling	 and	 constructing	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 lawyer’s	
professional	 services.	 	 	 The	 exact	 timing	 of	 the	 re‐reviewing,	 re‐assembling	 and	 re‐
constructing	may	 influence	 the	outcome	of	 the	dispute	 and	whether	or	not	 further	
costs	are	incurred.		In	Matter	No	7	[‘Additional	Works’]	the	identity	of	the	dispute	
and	 the	 lawyer’s	 strategy	 for	 the	 proceedings	 was	 significantly	 influenced	 by	 the	
iterative	provision	of	documents.	 	 In	Matter	No	11	[‘Façade	Defects’]	the	 iterative	
provision	 of	 documents/information	 affected	 the	 factual	 argument	 and	 again	




all	 documents	 (whether	 relevant	 or	 not)	 and	 the	 lawyer,	 in	 carrying	 out	 his	
professional	 services,	 subsequently	 assisted	 in	 selecting	 those	 required.	 	 In	 these	
situations,	 the	 lawyers	 reviewed	 all	 documents	 provided	 and	 then	 both	 physically	
reassembled	 the	 documents	 which	 were	 relevant/required	 and	 also	 conceptually	
reassembled	 a	 version	 of	 the	 past	 events	 based	 on	 the	 documents	 available.	 	 They	
then	 constructed	 or	 reconstructed	 the	 legal	 argument	 –	 just	 as	 the	 lawyers	 did	 in	
Category	1	situations.			

































was	 in	 arbitration	 and	 the	 other	 was	 in	 the	 TCC.	 	 In	 both	 instances	 the	 clients	
provided	 the	 lawyers	 with	 access	 to	 all	 of	 their	 documents	 (both	 electronic	 and	
hardcopy).		When	complying	with	the	court’s/tribunal’s	requirements	for	disclosure,	
the	 lawyers	 reviewed	 each	 document,	 identifying	 it	 as	 ‘relevant’,	 ‘not	 relevant’	 or	
‘privileged’.	 	 If	 relevant,	 they	 often	 assigned	 further	 labelling	 to	 the	 document	 to	
associate	it	with	a	particular	legal	or	factual	issue	to	which	it	pertained.	
On	 both	matters	 the	 lawyers	 (and	 paralegal	 team)	 reviewed	 literally	 thousands	 of	
documents.	 	 By	 identifying	 those	 documents	 which	 were	 relevant,	 the	 lawyers	
actively	 selected	 and	 reassembled	 those	 events	 which	 were	 important	 to	 their	
argument.		Of	course	all	documents	whether	they	helped	or	hindered	the	case	had	to	


























client	 sent	 the	 lawyer	 three	 boxes	 of	 documents	 at	 the	 outset.	 	 The	 client	 had	 no	
experience	 or	 understanding	 of	 what	 the	 lawyer	 required	 and	 literally	 sent	 all	
documents	 relating	 to	 his	 flat.	 	 Of	 the	 three	 boxes	 sent,	 the	 lawyer	 utilised	
approximately	30	documents	during	the	course	of	the	proceedings	–	in	the	lawyer’s	
opinion,	 the	 other	 documents	 did	 not	 relate	 to	 the	 issue	 in	 dispute.	 	 The	 lawyer	
reassembled	the	facts	by	selecting	the	relevant	documents	and	then	constructed	the	
argument.			
In	 the	 above	 examples,	 the	 documents	 again	 cause	 the	 dispute	 to	 develop	 in	 a	
particular	way,	 only	 this	 time	 it	 is	 the	 lawyer	 selecting	 the	 document	 after	 having	
reviewed	 it,	 and	 then	 attaching	 meaning	 or	 significance	 to	 the	 document	 for	 the	









receipt	of)	 influence	how	and	when	 lawyers	carry	out	their	professional	service.	 	 In	
addition,	 lawyers	 in	 turn	 influence	 the	 significance	 these	 documents:	 	 they	 can	 be	
transformed	 into	 objects	 of	 value	 which	 enable	 them	 to	 be	 used	 as	 strategic	 or	
negotiating	tools.		At	times,	lawyers	bestow	upon	these	documents	meaning	or	value	
which	 they	 may	 not	 have	 had	 previously.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 documents	 are	 a	 fluid	
commodity	for	lawyers	as	this	value	may	be	applied	and	then	taken	away,	depending	
on	 situation	 or	 the	 stage	 in	 the	 proceedings,	 or	 both.	 	 The	 temporal	 nature	 of	 the	
documents	allows	 lawyers	 to	manipulate	 their	meaning	and	bestow	significance	as	
and	when	required.		What	is	of	value	today	may	not	be	tomorrow.		This	is	similar	to	




In	 using	 these	 documents	 as	 commodities,	 either	 strategically	 or	 for	 negotiation	
purposes,	the	research	also	revealed	that	 lawyers	often	hunt,	or	at	 least	are	on	the	




One	 example	 of	 the	 use	 of	 documents	 as	 strategic	 tools	 is	 seen	 when	 the	 lawyer	
exploits	 them	 to	 deter	 a	 pending	 claim.	 	 For	 example,	 on	 two	 separate	matters152,	
when	the	lawyer	received	a	pre‐action	letter	on	behalf	of	his	client	(either	owing	to	
the	Pre‐Action	Protocol	or	otherwise)	which	set	out	an	alleged	claim	and	requested	




documents	 in	 support	 of	 the	 defence.	 	 By	 providing	 copious	 amounts	 of	
documentation	 it	 appeared	 that	 the	 lawyer	 hoped	 his	 opponent	 would	 be	







The	 two	matters	 referred	 to	 above	 concerned	 claimants	which	were	 companies	 in	
liquidation.	 	 As	 administrators	 had	 been	 appointed	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 companies	
affairs,	they	would	have	to	assess	their	chances	of	success	prior	to	proceeding.		The	
lawyer,	 in	recognition	of	the	administrator’s	position,	strategically	chose	to	provide	





insulation	 was	 ignited	 with	 a	 blow	 torch.	 	 The	 parties	 agreed	 that	 the	 plumber	
caused	the	fire	as	he	failed	to	follow	best	practice.		The	contractor	(the	Firm’s	client)	
denied	 causing	 or	 even	 contributing	 to	 the	 fire	 –	 he	 had	 constructed	 the	 roof	
correctly	and	had	not	employed	the	plumber.		The	lawyer	advised	his	client	that	the	
response	 to	 the	 insurer	 should	 be	 "in	 some	 detail	 to	 stop	 [the	 claim]	 in	 its	 tracks,	
otherwise	in	my	experience	with	insurance	companies	is	that	it	is	likely	to	rumble	on".		











documents	would	be	provided	 in	due	course	during	 the	proceedings	as	part	of	 the	
formal	disclosure	process	 (which	was	 in	 approximately	 two	months	 time).	 	By	not	
providing	 the	 documents	 in	 advance	 the	 lawyer	 elevated	 their	 status	 –	 previously	
they	had	no	meaning	and	now	they	were	of	some	value:	the	opposition	wanted	them	






This	 strategic	 use	 of	 documents,	 either	 refusing	 to	 provide	 documents	 or,	 to	 the	
contrary,	 providing	 a	 healthy	 amount	 of	 documentation,	 contradicts	 previous	
research	which	 highlights	 that	most	 corporate	 litigators	generally	 read	 requests	 for	
documents	 narrowly,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	 universe	 of	 “responsive”	 documents	
(Kirland,	2012:157;	see	also	Suchman,	1998	and	Gallagher,	2011).		In	the	liquidation	
cases	 discussed	 above	 there	 was	 a	 wide	 interpretation	 regarding	 the	 request	 for	
documents	–	resulting	in	a	copious	amount	of	documents	provided.		In	other	cases,	a	
wide	 interpretation	 was	 also	 taken	 when	 the	 lawyers	 were	 of	 the	 view	 that	 to	
withhold	documents	would	simply	delay	the	process153.	 	Of	the	matters	observed	at	
the	Firm,	there	of	course	were	also	situations	which	aligned	with	the	prior	research	–	
the	 specific	documents	 requested	by	 the	opponent	 (using	a	narrow	 interpretation)	
were	provided.	 	However,	this	was	by	no	means	the	general	position.	 	In	any	event,	
the	 data	 collected	 was	 not	 wide	 enough	 to	 support	 or	 oppose	 categorically	 the	
previous	research	–	lawyers	at	the	Firm	simply	responded	to	document	requests	in	
the	manner	which	suited	their	client	and	still	fell	within	the	CPR.		This	entailed	either	
providing	 the	 exact	 documentation	 or	 taking	 a	 wide/narrow	 interpretation	 of	 the	
request.	 	Accordingly,	it	cannot	be	said	that	the	lawyers	“generally	read	requests	for	
documents	 narrowly…”	 	Rather,	 they	made	 a	 conscious,	 strategic	 decision	 prior	 to	
supplying	the	documentation.	
As	negotiating	tools	
Lawyers	 also	 elevate	 certain	 documents	 to	 commodity	 status	 during	 the	 course	 of	
negotiations.	 	 In	 all	most	 all	 of	 the	mediations	witnessed	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	
research,	 documents	 were	 essential	 to	 each	 party	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 the	
strength	 of	 their	 case.	 	 Prior	 to	 the	mediations,	 each	 lawyer	would	 ensure	 that	 all	
necessary	documents	were	part	of	the	mediation	bundle	(agreed	in	advance	with	the	
opposition)	 or	 alternatively	 that	 the	 client	 intended	 to	 locate	 them	and	have	 them	
available	at	the	mediation.		If	one	party	held	a	document	which	appeared	to	prove	a	
particular	 point	 (no	 matter	 how	 trivial),	 they	 somehow	 felt	 empowered	 and	
therefore	 entitled	 to	 further	money	 or	 unwilling	 to	 compromise	 on	 their	 position.		
The	more	convincing	documents	one	party	had,	 the	stronger	 their	stance	and	their	
perception	that	they	had	more	leverage.		
                                                 
153	 By	way	 of	 example,	 in	Matter	No	38	 [‘Designing	Disputes’],	 the	 client	 and	 the	 lawyer	
agreed	to	provide	all	documents	requested	as	to	do	otherwise	would	merely	slow	down	the	
dispute	resolution	procedure	and	ultimately	delay	payment	 to	 the	client.	 	Furthermore,	 the	








the	end	of	Day	2).	 	 	Whether	or	not	the	building	components	were	in	 fact	defective	
was	 hotly	 debated.	 	 The	mechanical	 and	 electrical	 (M&E)	 system	was	 one	 item	 in	
particular	which	caused	 the	most	heartache	–	 if	 certain	elements	were	 found	 to	be	
defective,	 it	 would	 cost	 the	 contractor	 (the	 Firm’s	 client)	 millions	 of	 pounds	 to	
remedy.	 	 The	M&E	 system,	 as	 a	 document	 itself	 recording	 the	 alleged	 defect,	 was	
physically	an	expensive	commodity.		The	documents	which	evidenced	the	state	of	the	
system	 (expert	 reports,	meeting	minutes,	 etc)	 were	 of	 course	 also	 valuable	 in	 the	
sense	that	 they	represented	the	state	of	 the	system	and	gave	weight	 to	one	party’s	
argument.	 	 Some	 of	 the	 documents	 clearly	 evidenced	 defects	which	 the	 contractor	
was	 prepared	 to	 remedy	 whilst	 others	 were	 ambiguous	 thereby	 providing	 the	
contractor	with	leverage	to	argue	that	they	were	not	liable	for	other	M&E	elements.		
In	the	end,	a	compromise	was	reached	whereby	the	contractor	would	rectify	certain	
building	 elements	 and	 others	 would	 be	 discussed	 on	 the	 completion	 of	 further	
investigations.			
The	showstopper	
Whether	 the	 lawyer	 employed	 documents	 strategically	 or	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
negotiations,	 in	both	situations	 there	was	a	hunt	 for	 that	one	document	which	was	
crucial	to	the	outcome	of	the	dispute.		It	was	a	search	for	that	piece	of	evidence	–	the	
showstopper	–	which	 ‘sealed	 the	deal’	or	made	 their	argument	undeniable.	 	 	Rarely	
was	 a	 showstopper	 ever	 located.	 	 In	 fact,	 of	 the	 50	 matters	 under	 study	 in	 the	




showstoppers	 were	 only	 significant	 to	 one	 issue	 in	 the	 dispute.	 	 As	 such,	 these	
documents	 were	 fluid	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 at	 one	 point	 in	 time,	 they	 were	 crucial	 –	
though	 once	 the	 parties	 moved	 on	 to	 next	 legal	 issue,	 their	 significance	 was	
diminished.	 	 Nevertheless,	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 proceedings	 these	 alleged	
showstoppers	would,	at	times,	gain	meaning	once	more	(eg,	in	cross	examination	or	
during	mediations).	 	 	Their	value	was	constantly	 in	 flux	 ‐	dependent	on	timing,	 the	
development	of	the	dispute	and	the	emphasis	the	lawyers	bestowed	on	them.	








witness	 realised	 that	 he	 could	 not	 possibly	 have	 attended	 the	 alleged	 settlement	
meeting	 in	 September	 as	 he	 was	 not	 in	 the	 country	 and	 provided	 documents	 in	
substantiation,	 the	 lawyers	 were	 exuberant	 and	 appeared	 confident	 in	 their	
reconstructed	argument.		The	lawyers	view	the	documents	as	pivotal	to	‘winning’	the	
point	 regarding	 the	 alleged	 meeting.	 	 However,	 these	 documents	 were	 not	 so	
significant	 that	 the	arbitration	would	 turn	on	 this	point	or	 these	documents.	 	Once	
the	documents	were	disclosed	to	the	other	side,	they	admitted	that	a	meeting	could	
not	 have	 taken	 place.	 	 Thereafter,	 the	 other	 side	 (the	 subcontractor)	 then	
downplayed	the	importance	of	the	alleged	meeting	and	attempted	to	turn	the	focus	
of	 the	 proceedings	 to	 other	 legal	 issues;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 subcontractor	




As	 illustrated	 in	 the	 narrative	 examples	 above,	 client	 documents	 influence	 how	
lawyers	carry	out	their	services	and	how	the	dispute	evolves.		They	have	the	ability	
to	force	the	identity	and	development	of	the	dispute	to	transform	as	they	are	located,	
reviewed	 and	 assembled.	 	 Indeed	 how	 parties	 and	 their	 lawyers	 perceive	 and	
approach	the	dispute	depends	on	their	understanding,	interpretation	and	translation	
of	the	documents.	
To	summarise,	 in	Matter	No	7	[‘Additional	Works’],	 the	 lawyer	advised	the	client,	
based	 on	 the	 information	 and	 documents	 available	 at	 that	 time,	 to	 commence	
proceedings	in	court.	 	When	further	documents	came	to	light	(ie,	significant	alleged	
defects	 and	 the	 documents	 which	 represent	 them)	 the	 lawyer	 reassessed	 his	
strategy.		Ultimately,	as	the	dispute	evolved	and	its	emphasis	focused	on	the	building	
defects,	 the	 lawyer	 advised	his	 client	 to	 attend	 a	mediation	 and	 settle	 out	 of	 court	
where	possible.	 	 	 In	Matter	No	11	 [‘Façade	Defects’],	 the	preliminary	 issue	of	 the	
arbitration	 concerned	 an	 alleged	 settlement	 meeting.	 	 The	 lawyer	 devoted	 many	
hours	 (and	 therefore	 fees)	 to	 constructing	 the	 client’s	 argument	 based	 on	 the	
recollections	 of	 witnesses	 and	 the	 documents	 available.	 	 Once	 further	 documents	
surfaced	evidencing	that	the	meeting	could	not	possibly	have	taken	place	on	that	day	









or	 the	basis	 of	 the	 claim,	 escalate	 the	 costs	of	 the	proceedings	 (which	 in	 turn	may	
result	in	further	disputes),	narrow	the	issues	in	dispute	(where	parties	agree	on	the	
































Accordingly,	 client	 documents	 are	 not	 simply	 static	 lever	 arch	 files	 which	 fill	
cupboards,	occasionally	dusted	off	to	support	claims.		They	influence	how	and	when	
the	 lawyer	 carries	 out	 his	 professional	 service	 and	 in	 turn	 their	 significance	 and	
meaning	 are	 determined	 by	 this	 professional	 service.	 	 This	 reciprocal	 relationship	
has	 implications	 for	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 dispute	 as	 it	 evolves	 based	 on	 these	
professional	services	and	the	perception	of	the	parties.	 	The	dispute	takes	shape	as	
the	parties	seemingly	 ‘win’	or	 ‘lose’	particular	 issues	based	on	the	strength	of	 their	
documents.	
How	 and	 when	 lawyers	 carry	 out	 their	 professional	 service,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
construction	 disputes,	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 timing	 and	 nature	 of	 these	 client	
documents.	 	 Either	 the	 client	 provides	 the	 lawyer	 with	 relevant	 documents	 in	 a	
piecemeal	 fashion	 (Category	 1)	 or	 he	 provides	 all	 documents,	whether	 relevant	 or	
not,	and	the	lawyer	undertakes	the	process	of	selection	(Category	2).		This	influences	
how	 lawyers	 review	 these	 documents,	 assemble	 past	 events	 and	 construct	 legal	
arguments.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 lawyers	 transform	 documents	 into	 objects	 of	 value,	 fluid	




dispute.	 	 If	 these	documents	had	a	voice,	 they	perhaps	would	 identify	with	Marilyn	
Monroe’s	statement:154	
“I	don’t	look	at	myself	as	a	commodity,	but	I’m	sure	a	lot	of	people	have.”	
As	 seen	 from	 the	 discussion	 above,	 documents	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 disputes	 –	
mediators	 which	 cause	 the	 dispute	 and	 other	 entities	 such	 as	 lawyers	 to	 act	 or	
change	in	a	particular	way.	
	



















the	 lawyer/client	 discourse	 and	 relationship.	 	 Communication,	 or	 words,	 greatly	
impacts	 the	 identity	 of	 disputes.	 	How	 lawyers	 and	 clients	 communicate	 and	 relay	
information	to	each	other	shapes	their	understanding	and	perception	of	the	dispute,	
as	well	 as	 its	 transformation.	 	Whilst	 lawyers	play	 critical	 roles	 in	 introducing	and	








“…Lawyers	are	 translators	 –	 that	 is	 their	day‐to‐day	 chore.	 	They	
are	also	creators	of	the	language	into	which	they	translate…		It	is	in	
this	sense	that	lawyers	are	conceptive	ideologists.”	
The	 lawyers	 translated	 technical	 building	 and	 engineering	 terminology	 and	 the	
construction	 events	 which	 their	 clients	 relayed	 to	 them	 into	 their	 own	 “legal”	







a	 more	 common	 language,	 easier	 for	 their	 lawyer	 to	 understand.	 	 The	 phrase	 I	
commonly	heard	clients	say	with	regard	to	 technical	 issues	or	events	was	typically	
along	the	lines	of:		“I’ve	made	it	easy	so	the	lawyers	can	understand	it.”	
In	 some	 instances,	 this	 resulted	 in	 numerous	 conversations	 before	 both	 the	 client	
and	lawyer	appeared	confident	that	a	mutual	understanding	had	been	reached.		The	
lawyer	then	translated	his	understanding	of	the	events	into	legal	terms	which	suited	
or	 supported	 his	 client’s	 case.	 	 Having	 constructed	 a	 legal	 argument	 in	 his	 own	
profession’s	 language,	 in	order	 to	advise	 the	client	and	seek	 instructions	 regarding	
the	way	 forward,	 the	 lawyer	 then	 had	 to	 reverse	 translate	 his	 findings	 back	 into	 a	












The	 translation	 between	 the	 clients	 and	 the	 lawyers	was	 an	 iterative	 process,	 one	
which	oscillated	back	and	forth	until	a	mutual	understanding	was	in	place	and	a	legal	
argument	was	constructed	–	an	argument	which	held	weight	 in	 law	and	suited	 the	
client’s	 case.	 	 The	 clients	 knew	 their	 own	 histories	 and	 goals,	 which	 the	 lawyers	
needed	 to	 learn	about,	 and	 the	 lawyers	knew	 the	 law	and	 legal	process,	which	 the	
clients	 needed	 to	 find	 out	 about,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree	 (Sarat	 and	 Felstiner,	
1995:149).	
For	example,	in	Matter	No	11	[‘Façade	Defects’],	during	the	course	of	a	conference	
call	 between	 the	 solicitor,	 the	 barrister	 and	 client’s	 expert	 witness,	 the	 barrister	













repeatedly	attempted	 to	 translate.	 	Eventually,	after	an	hour	of	 failed	attempts,	 the	
barrister	 and	 the	 expert	 finally	 agreed	 on	 a	 description	 for	 “factor	 of	 safety”	 in	 a	
language	 which	 they	 both	 understood.	 	 Valuable	 time,	 and	 therefore	 money,	 was	
spent	 on	 this	 one	 phrase.	 	 It	 was	 a	 phrase	 that	 the	 barrister	 returned	 to	 in	
subsequent	 meetings	 and	 conference	 calls	 throughout	 the	 case	 to	 ensure	 his	
understanding	was	accurate.								
This	 iterative	 translation	 into	 a	 common	 language	 occurred	 in	 most	 matters	
observed	in	the	study.		It	did	not	depend	on	whether	the	client	was	a	repeat	player	or	
a	 one‐shotter.	 	 Repeat	 players	 tended	 to	 have	 less	 questions	 regarding	 procedural	
issues	 the	more	often	 they	engaged	 the	Firm.	 	For	example,	once	a	client	had	been	
through	 one	 adjudication,	 the	 next	 adjudication	 appeared	 to	 be	 more	 straight	
forward	in	that	the	client	knew	what	to	expect	procedurally	with	the	timetable	and	
what	 the	 lawyer	would	be	 looking	 for	 in	 terms	of	documents.	 	However,	 each	new	
case	 involved	 different	 legal	 issues	 which	 inevitably	 required	 translation	 of	 some	
degree	 to	 the	 client.	 	 In	 addition,	 each	 new	 case	 involved	 a	 different	 construction	
project	 –	 if	 defects	 were	 an	 issue,	 clients	 (whether	 repeat	 player	 or	 not)	 had	 to	
translate	the	new	technical	terminology	and	issues	into	a	common	language,	for	the	
lawyers	to	translate	this	into	the	legal	argument	in	turn.	




did	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 any	 prior	 experience	 with	 construction	 law	 or	 legal	

















the	 lawyer	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 “best	 practice	 solution”	 and	 a	 “non‐standard	
solution”	–	the	client	considered	that	the	electricity	company	had	over	charged	him	




his	 point	 into	 a	 common	 language.	 	 The	 lawyer	 in	 turn	 updated	 the	 Defence	
accordingly.			
The	 lawyer	 and	 the	 client	 held	 various	 discussions	 on	 particular	 factual	 points	
concerning	the	technical	aspects	of	 the	project	and	what	 that	meant	 in	 legal	 terms.		
When	 the	 lawyer	had	 a	 better	understanding	of	 the	 technical	 elements	 and	 events	
which	occurred,	elements	of	the	Defence	were	amended	to	accord	with	that	account.	
Once	 the	Defence	was	 served	 the	 lawyer	 advised	 the	 client	 in	 respect	 of	 a	Part	 36	
offer.	 	In	a	telephone	conversation,	the	lawyer	recommended	that	the	client	make	a	
“Part	 36”155	 offer	 at	 some	 point	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 his	 costs	 position	 in	 the	
proceedings.		The	lawyer	began	to	describe	a	Part	36	offer	and	its	implications	when	
the	 client	 interrupted	him.	 	He	was	noticeably	 frustrated	by	 the	 “excessive”	 use	 of	
legal	terminology	and	made	it	clear	to	the	lawyer	that	he	simply	wanted	the	matter	
                                                 
155	 A	 “Part	 36	 offer”	 is	 a	 legal	 phrase	 which	 describes	 an	 offer	 made	 by	 either	 party	 in	
litigation	 proceedings	 in	 accordance	 with	 Part	 36	 of	 the	 CPR.	 	 This	 imposes	 severe	 costs	






settled	and	would	 follow	whatever	 the	 lawyer	advised.	 	The	client	 said	he	was	not	




instructions	 from	 the	 client	 and	 again	 attempted	 to	 describe	 the	 term.	 	 This	 time	
however,	he	merely	stated	that	an	offer	should	be	made	to	the	electricity	supplier	to	
comply	with	court	rules.		He	suggested	a	figure	to	“get	the	ball	rolling”.				
Notably,	 as	 soon	as	 the	 lawyer	mentioned	 costs	 and	 suggested	an	amount	 that	 the	
client	might	offer	to	the	electricity	company	to	settle	the	dispute	(ie	an	amount	which	
the	 client	would	have	 to	pay	out),	 the	 client	 appeared	 to	 understand	 and	 relate	 to	
what	 information	 and	 instructions	 the	 lawyer	 required.	 	 Costs,	 of	 any	 nature,	















































he	was	aware	of	 the	client’s	concern	of	 legal	costs,	 this	constant	 implied	request	to	
translate	made	it	difficult	for	the	lawyer	to	keep	to	the	cost	estimate	he	had	indicated	
originally	 to	 the	 client.	 	There	was	a	 clear	 tension	between	providing	 the	 requisite	
level	of	translation	and	minimising	legal	costs.	
After	the	Defence	was	served,	 the	 lawyers	began	without	prejudice	negotiations	by	
telephone.	 	 It	 was	 clear	 neither	 party	 wanted	 to	 proceed	 to	 court;	 however,	 the	
lawyers	recognised	that	they	would	have	to	motivate	their	respective	clients	to	agree	
a	 settlement	 figure.	 	 The	 lawyer	 for	 the	 electricity	 company	 said	 that	 if	 a	 “half	






  Lawyer (Electricity Co)    Did you get my message the other day? 
  Lawyer (Developer)    Yes, it wasn’t a very serious offer. 







I’ve not yet  taken  instructions, but  I’m  sure we 
could get to half, if that works for your client… 
Your claim  to  recover  the  fees  is hopeless.    I’ve 
even had counsel’s view. 
Lawyer (Electricity Co)  I’ve  had  counsel’s  view  too!    And  he  said  the 
opposite!  
  Lawyer (Developer)    Do we want to carry on dancing around this? 
Lawyer (Electricity Co)  If  you  can  send  me  an  offer,  that  would  be 
helpful…  My client is not cost sensitive, yours is 
likely  to  be.    It  is  a  point  of  principle  for  my 
client… 
Lawyer (Developer)  I will get you an offer very shortly.   However,  if 
this does not settle within a matter of days, my 
advice  to  my  client  will  be  to  make  a  Part  36 
offer and carry on… 
During	 the	 course	 of	 the	 negotiations,	 the	 lawyers	 appeared	 transparent.	 	 They	
advised	 each	 other	 of	 their	way	 forward	 if	 a	 settlement	 could	 not	 be	 reached	 and	
they	agreed	that	if	they	could	each	get	their	respective	client	“half	way”,	then	a	deal	
could	 probably	 be	 done.	 	 On	 some	 level,	 the	 lawyers	 were	 actually	 acting	 as	
mediators.	 	To	do	so,	 the	 lawyers	used	 language	and	 terminology	which	 they	were	
comfortable	with.	 	They	would	name	drop	 legislation	and	case	 law	 to	bolster	 their	
arguments.	 	When	 the	 lawyer	 reported	 back	 to	 his	 client,	 he	 rarely	 described	 the	
legal	 arguments	 he	 had	 used	 to	 the	 full	 extent	 or	 the	 law	 he	 relied	 on.	 	 He	
summarised	 the	points,	 left	 out	 the	 “lawyers’	 speak”	 and	 translated	 the	 legal	 rules	
into	 the	 vernacular	 with	 the	 use	 of	 examples	 (Sarat	 and	 Felstiner,	 Chapter	 4).			
Eventually	the	parties	reached	a	settlement	agreement.			
The	 oscillation	 between	 the	 client’s	 use	 of	 translation	 and	 the	 lawyer’s	 use	 of	













lawyer	 understood	 informed	 his	 perception	 of	 the	 dispute	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 the	
case	and	inherently	influenced	how	he	negotiated	with	the	other	side	and	conducted	
his	professional	service.			
In	 other	 cases,	 it	was	 evident	 that	 the	 translation	 required	was	not	 successful	 and	
resulted	 in	 an	 unfavourable	 outcome	 owing	 to	 either	 miscommunication	 or	
mistranslation.	 	At	times	it	was	unclear	as	to	the	cause	of	the	miscommunication	or	
mistranslation,	though	in	any	event	the	dispute	did	take	shape	or	morph	as	a	result.	
Matter	 No	 7	 ['Additional	 Works'],	 described	 above,	 contained	 an	 element	 of	
miscommunication	 or	 mistranslation.	 	 Here,	 how	 the	 client	 initially	 portrayed	 the	
defects	 to	 the	 lawyer	 resulted	 in,	perhaps,	 an	 inappropriate	 strategy	and	 course	of	
proceedings.	 	The	defective	works	were	more	extensive	and	costly	 than	the	 lawyer	
had	appreciated	at	the	outset	of	the	instruction.		It	was	not	apparent	why	the	client	
did	not	adequately	convey	the	defects	to	his	lawyer:		perhaps	they	were	not	aware	of	








extent	 of	 the	 defects	 and	 the	 remedial	 works	 required.	 	 The	 lawyer	 had	 advised	
litigation	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 perception	 of	 the	 dispute	 and	of	 the	 defects	 –	 he	 had	
envisaged	 a	minimal	 or	 straight	 forward	Defence	&	Counterclaim.	 	 The	 lawyer	 did	








the	 wrong	 end	 of	 the	 stick	 and	 failed	 to	 understand	 the	 client’s	 wishes	 or	
instructions.		This	was	either	owing	to	a	breakdown	in	communication	or	a	failure	to	
appropriately	 translate.	 	 For	 instance,	 lawyers	 drafted	 clauses	 or	 letters	 not	
completely	 in	 line	with	what	 the	client	had	 in	mind,	which	resulted	 in	a	number	of	
exchanges	 to	 settle	 on	 the	 agreed	wording.	 	 A	 certain	 amount	 of	 “back	 and	 forth”	
undoubtedly	is	 inevitable	and	clearly	not	all	disputes	will	develop	adversely	simply	
owing	to	an	initial	miscommunication	or	mistranslation.			
Rather,	 it	 is	 those	 instances	 where	 the	 miscommunication	 or	 mistranslation	 is	
unconscious	or	not	realised	and	the	dispute	advances	in	a	particular	direction	where	
perhaps	 it	 would	 not	 have	 done	 so	 otherwise.	 	 	 In	 this	 situation	 the	 potential	
certainly	 exists	 for	 the	 lawyer/client	 discourse	 to	 shape	 the	 dispute	 adversely,	
prolonging	 and	 complicating	 its	 trajectory	 in	 a	 costly	manner,	 as	 demonstrated	by	
Matter	No	7	 ['Additional	Works']	 above.	 	Notably,	 not	 all	 lawyer/client	 discourse	
will	 result	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 When	 the	 lawyer	 transports	 the	






that	does	not	 transport	 causality	but	 induces	 two	mediators	 into	 coexisting	 (Latour,	
2005:108).	 	 As	 the	 identity	 and	 trajectory	 of	 construction	 disputes	 arise	 out	 of	
collaboration	between	the	lawyer	and	his	client,	translation	tends	to	be	an	iterative	
process	 whereby	 both	 the	 lawyer’s	 and	 the	 client’s	 perception	 of	 the	 events	 and	
issues	 exist	 alongside	 the	 common	 language	 they	 create	 to	 communicate	 and	 to	
develop	 the	 dispute.	 	 It	 is	 a	 process,	 not	 a	 mere,	 singular	 cause	 and	 effect	 event	








objective.	 	The	 lawyer	and	the	client	clearly	only	 translated	an	element	of	 the	 legal	
jargon,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 lawyer	was	 content	 that	 he	 had	 the	 appropriate	 and	
informed	 instructions	 he	 required.	 	 It	 is	 likely	 therefore	 that	 each	 had	 a	 different	
understanding	 of	 certain	 issues	 and	 a	 different	 perception	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 In	 any	
event,	 a	 sufficient	 level	 of	 translation	 had	 been	 carried	 out	 which	 created	 the	
common	 language	 to	 coexist	 alongside	 their	 individual	 perceptions	 of	 the	 dispute.		
The	lawyer	and	his	client	jointly	collaborated	to	bring	the	dispute	to	an	end.	
To	 use	 the	 example	 described	 above	 in	 Matter	 No	 11	 [‘Façade	 Defects’],	 the	
barrister	and	the	expert	collaborated	on	the	meaning	of	a	particular	technical	phrase	
and	their	understanding	of	it:		“factor	of	safety”.		Both	the	expert’s	understanding	and	













Lawyers	 may	 simply	 be	 required	 to	 relay	 information	 or	 transport	 their	 client’s	























costs	 on	 a	 civil	 engineering	 project.	 	 The	 settlement	 was	 for	 £146,953	 but	 the	
combined	 costs	 had	 been	 over	 £1	 million.	 	 In	 settling	 the	 case,	 the	 parties	 were	








the	 scope	 and	 outcome	 of	 disputes	 as	 well	 as	 how	 lawyers	 carry	 out	 their	
professional	services.	
Influencing	the	scope	&	outcome	of	disputes	
A	 number	 of	 the	 narratives	 discussed	 elsewhere	 in	 this	 thesis	 illustrate	 how	 legal	
costs	 shape	 the	 scope	 and	 outcome	 of	 disputes.	 	 In	 particular	 Matter	 No	 7	
['Additional	Works'],	 similar	 to	 the	 case	 of	Bellway	Homes	 Ltd,	 exemplifies	 how	 a	
further	 form	of	dispute	 resolution	was	 required	 in	order	 to	 resolve	 the	dispute	on	
costs,	 which	 evolved	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 proceedings.	 	 Here	 the	 parties	managed	 to	
settle	 all	 other	 issues	 at	 the	 mediation,	 but	 were	 unable	 to	 agree	 a	 settlement	









cost	 conscious	 and	 will	 do	 whatever	 it	 takes	 to	 reach	 a	 settlement	 as	 quickly	 as	
possible	in	order	to	avoid	further	legal	costs.		Having	said	that,	as	we	shall	soon	see,	
there	 is	 a	 notable	 tension	 between	 the	 client’s	 determination	 “to	 get	 what	 he	 is	
rightly	owed”	and	his	financial	need	to	minimise	or	avoid	legal	costs.		Mr	Hunter,	the	
lawyer,	had	already	 recognised	 this	potential	 tension,	which	no	doubt	he	had	seen	
previously	in	his	experience,	at	the	outset	when	he	said:			
The Lawyer:  I  completely  understand.    If  this  runs  the  course,  you 
quickly  could  run  up  huge  costs.    We  need  to  find  a 
balance.   At the end of the day, you might be better off 
walking away frustrated, than continuing with this…  					
Again,	 this	 demonstrates	 the	 potential	 for	 legal	 costs	 to	 shape	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	
dispute.	
Influencing	lawyering	




and	 frequency	 of	 conference	 calls	 and	meetings	 and	 carving	 out	 of	 their	 scope	 or	
delegating	 certain	 tasks	 to	 others	 which	 they	 otherwise	 may	 have	 carried	 out	
themselves	 (eg,	 locating	 documents,	 preparing	 quantum	 figures	 and/or	 drafting	
preliminary	witness	 statements).	 	 They	 also,	 at	 times,	 obtained	 confirmation	 from	
the	 client	 on	 every	 particular	 issue	 prior	 to	 recording	 time	 or	 incurring	 any	 other	
cost	 (though	arguably	 this	 increased	 the	 client’s	 costs	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	number	of	
emails	and	telephone	calls	this	required).	
Furthermore,	 lawyers	 choose	particular	methods	of	 dispute	 resolution	 over	others	
owing	to	the	projected	costs.	 	We	have	already	seen	evidence	of	 this	 in	Columns	&	
Beams	 Ltd	 v	 Structures	 Ltd.	 	 It	 was	 clear	 that	 Mr	 Hunter	 would	 have	 advised	
commencing	adjudication	had	Mr	Cahill	not	been	so	risk	adverse	to	the	costs	of	the	
adjudication.	 	Mr	Cahill’s	position	 in	respect	of	costs	 influenced	the	 lawyer’s	advice	
and	directed	the	dispute	away	from	adjudication	at	this	point.	





Equally,	 in	 litigation	 or	 arbitration	 cases,	 the	 lawyer’s	 actions	 or	 advice	 on	 certain	
procedural	elements	in	the	proceedings	can	be	influenced	by	its	costs.		For	example,	
if	 a	 case	 reached	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 stage,	 the	 costs	 associated	with	 the	
various	 types	of	e‐disclosure	platforms	 influenced	 the	 lawyer’s	 recommendation	 in	
terms	 of	 the	 disclosure	 strategy.	 	 The	 advice	 certainly	was	 also	 dependant	 on	 the	
number	of	documents	involved,	the	state	of	the	client’s	documents	and/or	the	value	
of	 the	 sums	 claimed;	 however,	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 e‐disclosure	 platforms	 and	 the	
resource	 required	 to	 implement	 them	 appeared	 to	 be	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	
decision.	 	The	use	or	non‐use	of	 these	platforms,	 and	 the	 specific	one	chosen	 if	 so,	
impacted	the	dispute	in	turn;	for	instance,	the	non‐use	of	a	platform	had	the	potential	
for	 lawyers	 to	 overlook	 or	 miss	 certain	 documents	 and	 the	 incorrect	 use	 of	 a	
platform	made	it	difficult	for	lawyers	to	locate	evidence.							
A	further	example	is	the	Jackson	Reforms	(discussed	further	below	at	Chapter	4.5).	
Clearly	this	 is	another	procedural	area	concerning	costs	which	is	 likely	to	 influence	
lawyering.	 	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 was	 carried	 out	 just	 prior	 to	 the	
implementation	 of	 these	 reforms.	 	 As	 such,	 conclusive	 data	 of	 their	 impact	 on	
lawyering	could	not	be	collected.		Nevertheless,	I	did	observe	the	sentiment	of	some	
lawyers	 that	 the	 reforms	 are	 not	 appropriate	 for	 certain	 cases	 and	 may	 result	 in	
additional	 costs	 (rather	 than	 achieving	 the	 objective	 of	 minimising	 costs).	 	 One	
example	 did	 arise	where	 the	 costs	which	would	 have	 been	 incurred	 in	 complying	
with	 the	 Jackson	 Reforms	 caused	 the	 lawyer	 to	 avoid	 the	 CPR	 requirements	 by	
implementing	an	alternative	case	strategy.	
The	costs	of	lawyering	and	litigation	and	its	influence	on	disputes	is	of	course	is	wide	
and	 complex	 area	 of	 study	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research.	 	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 note	 that	 legal	 costs	 are	 highly	 influential	 on	 the	 development	 of	







steer	 its	 outcome.	 	 Whilst	 this	 research	 could	 not	 be	 conclusive	 on	 the	 clients’	





The	 clients’	 conduct	 which	 influenced	 disputes	 generally	 fell	 into	 two	 categories:		








clients’	 directions	 were	 often	 one	 of	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 on	 which	 the	 dispute	
trajectory	was	 dependent	 (see	 Chapter	 5).	 	 If	 the	 lawyer	 had	 no	 other	 entities	 or	
factors	which	conflicted	with	the	clients’	express	instructions,	then,	on	the	whole,	the	
lawyer	 simply	would	proceed	as	 requested.	 	 If	 lawyer	was	of	 the	view	 that	 certain	
issues	 should	 be	 brought	 to	 the	 clients’	 attention	 (generally	 substantive	 legal	 or	





influence	 the	 course	 of	 a	 dispute.	 	 These	 clients,	 having	 been	 through	 the	 dispute	
process	 previously	with	 lawyers	 and	 perhaps	 even	 have	 in‐house	 counsel,	 tend	 to	
embody	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 capabilities	 of	 an	 intelligent	 customer	 –	 they	 have	 a	
clear,	or	at	least	some,	understanding	and	knowledge	of	the	product	or	service	being	











and	 developed	 the	 legal	 argument	 and	 identity	 of	 the	 dispute	 ‐	 the	 ‘story’	 as	 they	
termed	 it.	 	 As	 the	 story	 unfolded	 and	 the	 lawyers	 drafted	 the	 pleading,	 the	 client	
would	 confirm,	 amended	 or	 discount	 the	 picture	 of	 the	 dispute	 which	 emerged.		
When	the	client	felt	the	lawyer	was	not	stressing	a	particular	point	or	event	(either	
sufficiently	 or	 at	 all)	 he	 would	 raise	 this	 as	 an	 issue	 and	 the	 lawyers	 responded,	
typically	by	redrafting.		If	the	lawyers	had	good	reason	for	drafting	the	pleading	in	a	
particular	 way,	 discussions	 took	 place	 and	 a	 jointly	 acceptable	 narrative	 was	






which	had	been	prepared	 to	date,	 the	 lawyer	advised	 that	most	 likely	proceedings	
could	 be	 commenced	 against	 the	 contractor,	 the	 subcontractor	 and	 the	 Architect	
(after	 obtaining	 further	 expert	 reports).	 	 The	 client	 replied	 to	 say	 that	 it	 probably	
would	 be	 best	 not	 to	 commence	 an	 action	 against	 the	 Architect	 as	 they	 were	
continuing	to	work	with	them	on	other	projects.				In	a	subsequent	meeting,	the	client	
was	adamant	that	he	did	want	to	claim	against	the	Architect	(if	it	was	likely	that	he	
was	 responsible	 for	 the	 defects).	 	 Then,	 out	 of	 the	 blue,	 several	months	 later,	 the	
client	 emailed	 to	 say	 that	 he	 would	 rather	 not	 sue	 the	 Architect	 if	 that	 did	 not	





will  not  prejudice  your  claims  against  [the  contractor]  or 
[subcontractor].   We  just  need  to  keep  in mind  the  limitation 
period.    As  we  are  still  investigating  the  defects  and  the 
Architect’s  liability  in  this  respect,  it  is  still  too  early  to  say 







As	 the	 lawyer	advised	that	making	a	claim	against	 the	Architect	did	not	 impact	 the	
dispute	against	the	contractor,	it	was	largely	down	to	the	client	as	to	how	to	proceed	
on	this	point.		At	the	time	of	writing,	the	client	had	not	come	to	decision.			




Disputes	which	 are	 non‐monetary	 and	 emotionally	 significant	 to	 the	 client	 further	
illustrate	where	a	client’s	explicit	instructions	could	direct	or	influence	the	course	of	
a	dispute.	 	By	this	 I	mean	those	disputes	 in	which	the	client	has	an	objective	other	
than	merely	to	recover	money	owed:		the	client’s	reputation	is	at	stake,	the	client	has	
a	point	to	prove	to	his	opponent,	the	client	is	seeking	revenge	of	some	sort,	etc.	 	 In	
other	words,	 the	 client	 is	 emotionally	 involved	with	 the	dispute.	 	 I	did	not	witness	
any	 disputes	which	were	motivated	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 improve	 or	 serve	 the	 collective	
good;	however,	equally	this	could	fit	within	this	category	of	disputes.		
By	 way	 of	 example,	 in	Matter	No	10	 [‘High	 end	 residential’]	 the	 Firm’s	 client,	 a	
contractor,	carried	out	and	completed	the	extension	and	refurbishment	of	a	high	end	
residential	property.		The	client	then	ceased	trading	for	various	reasons.		The	home	
owner	 subsequently	 threatened	 arbitration,	 seeking	 payment	 for	 defects	 and	
repayment	 of	 sums	which	 they	 contended	was	 overpaid.	 	 The	 lawyer	 advised	 the	
client	 that	 the	 proceedings	 possibly	 could	 be	 avoided	 if	 the	 company	 was	 closed	
using	a	creditors’	voluntary	liquidation.		The	client	refused.		He	said	he	was	prepared	
to	 personally	 fund	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 proceedings	 and	 “fight	 it	 until	 the	 end	 as	 I	 did	
nothing	 wrong”.	 	 It	 turned	 out	 that	 the	 contractor	 and	 the	 home	 owner	 had	
previously	 been	 close	 friends	 and	 some	 event	 (which	 appeared	 not	 to	 be	 the	
defective	works)	 had	 occurred	which	 caused	 the	 relationship	 to	 end.	 	 The	 dispute	
was	personal	and	though	he	may	have	been	entitled	to	avoid	the	dispute	owing	to	a	
particular	 legal	argument	(the	solvency	of	his	company),	 the	client	did	not	want	 to	
peruse	that	avenue	–	he	wanted	to	carry	on	until	either	an	arbitrator	determined	the	
dispute,	which	 he	was	 confident	 he	would	win,	 or	 the	 home	 owner/former	 friend	
made	 an	 offer	 he	 was	 prepared	 to	 accept.	 	 Accordingly,	 the	 lawyer	 followed	 his	










friends.	 	 Eventually	 the	 client	 became	 concerned	 that	 his	 fellow	 shareholder	 was	
diverting	 monies	 and	 projects	 away	 from	 their	 company,	 to	 one	 of	 his	 other	
companies,	and	commenced	an	arbitration.		Ultimately,	the	client	instructed	the	Firm	
after	the	proceedings	were	already	underway.		The	lawyer	reviewed	the	dispute,	as	
identified	 in	 the	 existing	 pleadings	 and	 the	 documents	 available.	 	 He	 advised	 his	
client	 that	 there	was	 little	 concrete	 evidence	 at	 that	 time	 to	 support	his	 claim	and	
therefore	his	chances	for	success	were	questionable.	 	The	client	disagreed.	 	He	said	
that	 once	 the	 arbitrator	 heard	 his	 side	 of	 the	 story,	 which	 in	 his	 opinion	 was	
compelling,	the	arbitrator	would	be	persuaded.	 	 Indeed,	the	client	believed	that	the	
fact	 that	 certain	 evidence	was	missing,	was	 clear	proof	 that	 his	 fellow	shareholder	
was	redirecting	monies	away	 from	the	company.	 	The	client	said	he	was	extremely	
disappointed	in	the	breakdown	of	the	relationship	and	was	adamant	that	he	wanted	
the	 proceedings	 to	 carry	 on,	 despite	 the	 lawyer’s	 initial	 findings	 and	 despite	 the	
projected	 cost	 estimates	 for	 the	 legal	 and	 expert	 fees.	 	 Again,	 the	 lawyer	 found	no	
compelling	 reason	 as	 to	why	 they	 could	 not	 continue	 and	 began	 to	 craft	 legal	 and	
evidential	arguments	in	conjunction	with	the	client.		The	lawyer	appeared	sceptical,	
but	 in	 the	best	 interest	of	his	client’s	case,	he	proceeded	and	collaborated	with	 the	
client.			
In	 each	of	 these	 two	 cases,	 the	 client	had	a	personal,	 emotionally‐driven	objective,	
not	all	of	which	was	ever	revealed	or	apparent	to	the	lawyers.		These	objectives	and	
their	subsequent	conduct	 influenced	 the	direction	of	 the	dispute.	 	Here,	but	 for	 the	
clients’	conduct,	the	dispute	may	have	ended	earlier	and	with	a	different	outcome.		
Providing	implicit	direction	
In	 other	 cases,	 the	 client’s	 conduct	 or	 state	 of	 affairs	 implicitly	 influenced	 the	
trajectory	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 Here,	 the	 client’s	 instructions	 to	 the	 lawyer	 or	 their	
preference	for	the	direction	of	the	dispute	were	not	expressed.		Rather,	their	conduct,	
mannerisms	 and	 approach	 to	 particular	 issues	 suggested	 how	 they	 wanted	 the	















fee might  include.    It  really depends on how Structures 
Ltd responds to our  initial  letters/moves.   It may be that 
the  dispute  can  be  concluded  within  a  few  letters  in 
which case your costs will be more in the region of £2k or 
£3k.    Equally,  the  £5k  could  also  include  part  of  a 
mediation  (if  any)  or  the  next  steps  in  the  proceedings 
(disclosure/witness statements)… 
It	was	apparent	 that	 the	client	wanted	to	achieve	a	quick	settlement	of	 the	dispute	
without	incurring	significant	legal	costs.		As	discussed	above,	even	though	the	lawyer	
was	 of	 the	 view	 that	 an	 adjudication	 should	 have	 been	 commenced	 he	 did	 not	
recommend	doing	so	at	this	point	owing	to	the	irrecoverable	costs	involved	and	the	
client’s	 risk	 adverse	 position	 on	 costs.	 	 Here,	 whilst	 the	 client	 did	 not	 expressly	
disagree	 to	 adjudication,	 the	 implication	was	 that	 any	 course	 of	 action	which	was	
costly	or	irrecoverable,	was	not	a	viable	option.		
In	Matter	No	41	[‘Redirecting	Monies’]	the	client’s	silence	during	the	course	of	the	
proceedings	 directed	 the	 lawyer’s	 professional	 service	 and	 implicitly	 relayed	 his	
preference	 for	 the	 dispute’s	 trajectory.	 	 	 During	 the	 course	 of	 the	 arbitration,	 the	
client	did	not	agree	to	pay	the	expert	accountant’s	fee	–	he	considered	the	fee	to	be	
too	expensive	and	that	he	could	find	a	different	expert	 for	 less.	 	The	arbitrator	had	
fixed	 the	 timetable	 by	 this	 point.	 	 The	 client	 advised	 the	 lawyer	 that	 once	 he	 had	
secured	 an	 expert,	 he	would	 forward	 the	 contact	 details	 such	 that	 the	 documents	
could	 be	 sent	 to	 him.	 	 The	 lawyer	 never	 heard	 from	 the	 client	 again.	 	 The	 lawyer	
repeatedly	emailed	and	telephoned	the	client	to	no	avail.		Even	when	the	deadline	for	
exchange	of	 the	expert	reports	was	nearing,	 the	 lawyer	was	not	able	to	contact	 the	
client.	 	 As	 the	 lawyer	 had	 no	 instruction	 from	 the	 client	 he	 could	 not	 advance	 the	
dispute.		Ultimately,	the	arbitrator	emailed	to	congratulate	the	parties	on	reaching	a	




client,	 via	 his	 personal	 assistant,	 had	 negotiated	 directly	with	 the	 other	 side.	 	 The	
client’s	silence	provided	an	implicit	direction	to	the	lawyer:		do	nothing.	
In	other	 cases,	 the	 clients’	 failure	 to	pay	 the	 lawyer’s	 fees	or	 the	 expert’s	 fees	 also	
implicitly	directed	the	lawyer	(or	the	expert)	to	do	nothing.		The	lawyers	were	often	








their	 lawyer,	 either	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 instruction	 or	 during	 the	 course	 of	 their	







When	advising	clients	and	developing	case	strategy,	 taking	 into	account	 legislation,	







clearly	 took	 this	 into	 account	 when	 considering	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	
their	clients’	case.	 	Their	advice	to	clients	influenced	the	direction	of	the	dispute:		if	
the	lawyer	advised	that	their	case	was	weak	on	a	particular	point	(or	on	the	whole)	
and	 had	 little	 chance	 for	 success	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 previous	 case	 law	 and	 the	
requirements	 stipulated	 in	 legislation,	 on	 the	 whole,	 clients	 tended	 to	 follow	 that	
advice.158			Where	ambiguity	was	involved	and	the	lawyers	were	required	to	analyse	
and	assess	that	ambiguity,	the	situation	was	less	straight	forward.		 
If	 there	 was	 any	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 case	 law	 or	 legislation,	 the	 lawyers	 tended	 to	
qualify	or	caveat	 their	advice.	 	This	qualification	provoked	different	reactions	 from	
clients	 depending	 on	 the	 lawyer/client	 relationship,	 which	 in	 turn	 influenced	 the	
direction	and	shape	of	the	dispute. 
For	repeat	player	clients,	many	of	them	acknowledged	and	appeared	to	be	aware	of	
the	 existence	 of	 grey	 areas	 in	 the	 law.	 	 When	 the	 lawyers	 caveated	 their	 advice,	
repeat	 player	 clients	were	 not	 necessarily	 overly	 concerned,	 albeit	 at	 times	would	
express	 their	 disappointed,	 and	 appeared	 to	 build	 the	 qualification	 into	 any	 risk	
analysis	 undertaken	 when	 deciding	 on	 and	 agreeing	 the	 way	 forward	 with	 the	
lawyer.	 	 Repeat	 player	 clients	 appeared	 at	 least	 somewhat	 comfortable	 with	 the	
notion	of	ambiguous	or	conflicting	case	law	and	legislation.		They	were	interested	in	
their	 chances	 of	 success,	 either	 on	 a	 particular	 point	 or	 for	 the	 claim	 as	 a	 whole,	
though	 did	 not	 dismiss	 a	 claim	 simply	 because	 the	 lawyer	 could	 not	 provide	 an	
assurance	on	the	outcome.		The	direction	and	shape	of	the	dispute	was	dependent	on	
                                                 
158	Having	said	that,	there	are	of	course	exceptions	to	the	rule.		By	way	of	example,	in	Matter	
No	41	 [‘Redirecting	Monies’]	 the	 lawyer	 and	 the	barrister	 advised	 the	 client	 that	 as	 there	
was	little	or	no	evidence	to	put	before	the	tribunal	other	than	witness	evidence,	his	chances	
for	 success	were	minimal.	 	 The	 client	 disagreed	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 and	 carried	 on.	 	 This	






possible	 outcomes	 and	 associated	 costs.	 	 In	Matter	No	11	 [‘Façade	Defects’]	 and	
Matter	No	38	[‘Designing	Disputes’],	the	lawyers	advised	their	respective	clients	on	
the	case	law	and	legislation	in	respect	of	limitation	and	the	issues	this	presented	for	
the	 case.	 	 Both	 clients	 appeared	 to	 appreciate	 the	 risk	 and,	 following	 other	
discussions	 of	 costs	 and	 outcomes,	 decided	 that	 the	 benefit	 of	 proceeding	
outweighed	the	risks	which	arose	out	of	the	law	on	limitation.			 
One‐shotter	 clients	 generally	 did	 not	 have	 the	 same	 approach	 as	 repeat	 players	 to	
the	grey	areas	of	the	law.		As	the	one‐shotter	clients	did	not	have	prior	experience	of	
contentious	matters,	they	were	extremely	cautious	with	any	decision	and	preferred	
to	make	decisions	 only	where	 the	 lawyer	was	near	 certain	 of	 the	 outcome.	 	When	
ambiguity	in	the	case	law	or	legislation	arose	and	the	lawyer	advised	the	client	that	
the	outcome	was	not	certain,	one‐shotter	clients	had	difficulty	making	decisions	on	








one	 area	 of	 the	 law	which	 appears	 to	 have	 a	 significant	 influence	 and	 is	 a	 regular	
consideration	for	construction	lawyers	is	limitation	periods.	 	The	matters	studied	in	




not	necessarily	have	been	discussed	with	 their	client;	however,	 if	 there	was	even	a	
remote	 possibility	 of	 time	 becoming	 an	 issue	 in	 respect	 of	 bringing	 a	 claim,	 the	
lawyers	 either	 discussed	 it	 directly	with	 the	 client	 or	 included	 it	 within	 a	written	
advice,	or	both. 
A	broad	definition	of	‘limitation	period’,	and	one	which	is	employed	in	this	research,	
is	 “any	 provision	 which	 specifies	 a	 time‐limit	 within	 which	 legal	 proceedings	 of	 a	











which	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 decision‐making	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 strategy	 and	 way	
forward	 regarding	 the	 dispute.	 	 Question	 2	 was	 of	 course	 important,	 though	
generally	 identifying	 an	 answer	 was,	 on	 the	 whole,	 either	 straight	 forward	 or	
relatively	easy	to	at	least	form	an	opinion:		limitation	periods	are	imposed	by	statute	
(primarily	 the	 Limitation	 Act	 1980)	 and	 in	 respect	 of	 construction	 contracts	 and	
construction	 claims,	 the	 answer	 generally	 is	 either	 six	 years	 or	 twelve	 years159	 –	
though	this	may	be	extended	in	the	case	of	latent	defects.160		Similarly,	the	answer	to	
Question	3	is	largely	well‐established.161					
Question	1	 requires	 the	 lawyer	 to	 analyse	 the	 alleged	 facts	 provided	by	 client	 and	
interpret	the	relevant	legislation	and	case	law.		 
                                                 















For	 fraud	 or	 concealment,	 section	 32	 of	 the	 Limitation	 Act	 provides	 that	 the	 limitation	
period	does	not	start	to	run	until	the	claimant	could	have	reasonably	discovered	the	fraud	or	
concealment.	
There	 is	 also	other	 specific	 legislation	 in	 respect	 of	 limitation.	 	By	way	of	 example,	when	
bringing	a	claim	under	the	Defective	Premises	Act	1972,	the	claim	must	be	brought	within	six	
years	 from	 completion	 of	 the	 dwelling.	 	 Alternatively,	 if	 specific	 works	 are	 carried	 out	 to	
rectify	a	defect,	the	limitation	period	in	respect	of	this	further	work	will	run	from	the	time	it	
was	completed.	
161	 The	 law	 in	 respect	 of	 limitation	 bars	 the	 remedy	 of	 bringing	 a	 claim,	 but	 does	 not	
extinguish	the	underlying	right	 to	bring	a	claim.	 	Accordingly,	a	claimant	may	bring	a	claim	
after	time	has	expired	under	the	relevant	period,	provided	the	defendant	does	not	rely	on	a	





Just	 to	 give	 a	 flavour	 of	 the	 legal	 context	 of	 limitation	 within	 which	 construction	
lawyers	operate	and	refer	back	 to,	 in	general,	 time	starts	 to	run	 from	the	date	of	a	
breach	of	 contract	or,	 for	negligence,	 from	when	a	breach	of	 the	duty	of	 care	gives	
rise	to	relevant	damage162.		Accordingly,	this	may	not	be	the	same	point	in	time	when	
the	 loss	or	damage	was	 suffered	 (Bailey,	2011:1750).	 	Where	a	 contractor	 is	 liable	
under	a	contract	to	carry	out	and	complete	all	of	the	works,	and	fails	to	do	so	by	the	
date	for	completion,	the	breach	is	continuing	from	that	date	until	the	time	the	works	






for	 example,	 in	 those	 contracts	where	 the	 contractor	had	design	obligations	which	
were	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 breach.	 	 Clearly	 the	 design	 will	 be	 prepared	 prior	 to	 the	
relevant	 works	 being	 constructed,	 so	 the	 question	 arises	 whether	 the	 breach	 of	
contract	 occurs	 when	 the	 relevant	 deficient	 design	 is	 prepared	 such	 that	 the	
limitation	period	runs	from	that	date.		However,	cases	such	as	Brickfield	Properties	v	





As	demonstrated	by	 the	above,	 the	position	 is	not	 straight	 forward	and	 is	 likely	 to	
turn	 on	 the	 specific	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 in	 question.	 	 This	 was	 seen	 in	 a	 number	 of	
instances	in	the	cases	observed	which	concerned	issues	of	limitation.		Lawyers	spent	
many	 hours	 debating	 the	 legal	 merits	 of	 limitation	 arguments,	 investigating	 the	













A	 notable	 example	 in	 the	 research	 concerned	Matter	No	 39	 [‘Limitation’]	which	
exemplifies	how	a	dispute	which	had	been	in	hibernation	for	a	number	of	years	can	
take	 shape	 and	build	up	momentum	owing	 to	 the	possible	 expiry	of	 the	 limitation	
period.		Here,	a	well‐known	contractor	constructed	a	new	build	housing	scheme	for	a	
developer.	 	Practical	Completion	was	achieved,	and	 then,	 for	 the	next	10	years,	 the	
parties	 debated	 the	 final	 account,	 sporadically,	 with	 no	 prospects	 of	 achieving	
agreement.	 	The	contractor	then	sought	advice	from	the	Firm	–	the	dispute	had	not	
progressed,	nor	had	the	contractor	even	corresponded	with	the	developer	for	some	









Interestingly,	 owing	 to	 the	 recent	 judgment	 in	 Aspect	 Contracts	 (Asbestos)	 Ltd	 v	
Higgins	Construction	Plc	(2013),	the	verdict	still	could	be	out	on	whether	the	dispute	
has	finally	been	“resolved”	in	Matter	No	39	[‘Limitation’].		
In	 the	case	of	Aspect	Contracts	 (Asbestos)	Ltd	v	Higgins	Construction	Plc	 (2013)	 the	
Court	of	Appeal	ultimately	considered	the	question	of	just	how	long	do	you	have	to	
commence	 legal	 proceedings	 to	 determine	 a	 dispute	 which	 was	 the	 subject	 of	
adjudication?	 	 If	 one	 party	 pays	 money	 to	 the	 other	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	
adjudicator’s	decision,	does	the	paying	party’s	cause	or	right	of	action	to	recover	the	
money	paid	out	run	from	the	date	of	payment	(and	therefore	the	six	year	limitation	
period	 runs	 from	 that	 moment)?	 	 Or	 does	 the	 cause	 or	 right	 of	 action	 run	 from	
whenever	it	otherwise	did	before	the	adjudicator’s	decision	was	issued?	 	The	Court	
of	Appeal,	who	overturned	Mr	 Justice	Akenhead’s	decision	at	 first	 instance167,	 held	
                                                 
167	Mr	Justice	Akenhead,	referring	to	and	distinguishing	Jim	Ennis	Construction	Ltd	v	Premier	
Asphalt	Ltd	(2009),	held	that	there	was	nothing	in	the	Parliamentary	debates	to	suggest	that	
Parliament	 intended	 to	 create	 in	 every	 construction	 contract	 incorporating	 the	 Scheme	 an	
implied	term	along	the	lines	suggested.	The	fact	that	there	had	been	an	adjudication	did	not	
mean	that	the	limitation	clock	started	to	run	afresh.		He	held	that	there	was	no	implied	term	
in	 the	contract	 that	 the	paying	party	 (Aspect)	 remained	entitled	 to	have	 the	dispute	 finally	






that	 if	 a	 payment	 is	 made	 in	 compliance	 with	 an	 adjudicator’s	 decision	 but	






six	 years	 from	 the	 alleged	 breach.	 	 As	 more	 than	 six	 years	 had	 passed	 since	 the	
breach,	the	court	held	that	the	counterclaim	was	time‐barred.	
In	other	words,	this	judgment	provides	a	lifeline	for	those	disputes	which	have	been	
the	subject	of	adjudication.	 	The	unsuccessful	party	 in	 the	adjudication	 (the	paying	
party)	has	the	benefit	of	limitation	running	from	the	date	they	made	payment,	with	





Three	 months	 after	 the	 adjudicator’s	 decision,	 the	 developer	 sent	 a	 letter	 to	 the	
contractor	stating	that	they	disagreed	with	the	adjudicator’s	decision	on	a	number	of	
points	 and	 considered	 that	 they	 had	 overpaid	 the	 contractor.	 	 The	 contractor	
contacted	his	lawyer	for	advice.		The	lawyer	advised:	
The Lawyer:  …As discussed yesterday, in my view we should respond 
robustly  to  this  letter.   In  reality,  if  [the  developer]  is 
going  to  take  this  further,  they will have  to  commence 
Court proceedings for a determination of the entire final 
account.   This  is  a  huge  exercise  which  will  costs 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  pounds.   I  really  doubt  they 



















you  say,  when  the  total  is  divy’d  up  it  means  you 
couldn’t get more than originally paid.  So, for  instance, 
if  the Court decided you got  too much  for  interest, but 
you  persuaded  the  Court  this  was  offset  by  an 
entitlement  to  additional  loss  and  expense,  [the 
developer]  wouldn’t  get  paid  anything.   It’s  a  pretty 
tricky and emerging area.   
The  only  way  round  it  would  be  to  start  proceedings 
prior to expiry of limitation period and then not progress 
them,  so  we  would  protect  the  position  as  regards 
limitation but not incur significant costs in doing so.   
If you wanted  to go down  this  route we  should diarise 
the  12  year  expiry  and  then  issue  the  claim  form 
immediately prior  to  it.  Remind me, but  the key dates 
are… 
So	again,	here	we	see	the	lawyer	raising	the	possibility	of	commencing	proceedings	








because	 one	 party	 is	 attempting	 to	 protect	 their	 position	 in	 light	 of	 the	 unknown.		
The	law	in	respect	of	limitation	periods	in	construction	contracts/disputes	contains	a	
level	 of	 uncertainty	 –	 which	 in	 turn	 creates	 an	 element	 of	 ambiguity	 for	 some	
disputes	as	to	when	the	parties	have	actually	achieved	an	end	to	the	dispute.				
Procedural	Rules:		CPR/Pre‐Action	Protocols 
Procedural	 rules,	 such	 as	 the	 CPR	 and	 Pre‐Action	 Protocols,	 are	 a	 further	 area	 of	
influence	on	disputes	 and	 their	 trajectories.	 	 The	objective	of	 the	CPR	 is	 to	 ensure	
that	 costs	 are	 minimised,	 cases	 are	 dealt	 with	 expeditiously,	 fairly	 and	










the	 applicability	 or	 interpretation	 of	 the	 rules	 or	 become	more	 complex	 than	 they	






action	 meeting	 prior	 to	 the	 claimant	 issuing	 proceedings.	 	 This	 does	 amount	 to	 a	
certain	level	of	cost	expenditure	prior	to	the	issuing	of	a	claim,	which	some	clients	do	
express	their	dissatisfaction	thereof;	however,	the	Protocol	aims	to	minimise	costs	in	
the	 long	 run	 by	 settling	 the	 dispute	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 	 Lawyers	 interpret	 the	
requirements	of	 the	Protocol	 in	 the	best	 light	 for	 their	 client	and	 in	 line	with	 their	
case	 strategy,	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 disputes	 can	 expand	 in	 complexity	 or	 take	 on	 new	
meaning.		
By	way	of	example,	in	Matter	No	31	[‘Gentleman’s	Agreement’],	in	a	last	attempt	to	
deter	 proceedings,	 the	 lawyer	 strategically	 referenced	 the	 Protocol.	 	 Here,	 an	
Architect	sought	his	fees	in	respect	of	a	planning	application	(approximately	£5,000)	
which	 he	 had	 prepared	 for	 a	 home	 owner	 (the	 Firm’s	 client)	 and	which	 the	 local	
council	had	rejected.		There	was	no	contract	between	the	parties	and	the	client	was	
of	 the	 view	 that	 they	 had	 gentleman’s	 agreement	 in	 place	 regarding	 the	 fees	 and	
therefore	the	Architect	was	not	entitled	to	any	further	monies	(he	had	already	paid	
the	Architect	£1,500).		The	Architect	threatened	proceedings.		After	a	series	of	short	













We  note  that  you  have  not  complied with  the  Construction & 
Engineering Pre‐Action Protocol – a copy of which is enclosed for 
your use.  Should you proceed with your claim without doing so, 
we  reserve our  clients’  entitlement  to draw  this matter  to  the 
attention of the Court on any question as to costs. 
Yours faithfully      
The	 Architect	 replied	 to	 say	 that	 he	 was	 taking	 professional	 advice	 regarding	 the	
Protocol,	 but	 in	 any	 event	 had	 applied	 to	 the	 County	 Court.	 	 Until	 this	 point,	 the	




however,	 the	 lawyer’s	 reference	 to	 the	Protocol	 certainly	provoked	 the	reaction	he	
was	looking	for:		to	dissipate	the	dispute,	at	least	to	the	extent	that	his	client	did	not	





if	 it	was	necessary	 for	 their	 client’s	 case	and	 if	 the	dispute	had	been	 the	subject	of	
correspondence	and	negotiations	for	a	number	of	years.			
In	a	different	case,	the	lawyer	served	the	Pre‐Action	Protocol	letter,	attaching	a	draft	
Particulars	 of	 Claim.	 	 When	 the	 other	 side	 requested	 a	 five‐month	 timetable	 to	
respond	 and	 attend	 the	 Protocol	Meeting,	 the	 lawyer	 advised	 and	 agreed	with	 his	
client	to	take	the	aggressive	approach:		implement	a	strict	approach	of	the	Protocol,	
not	agree	to	the	extension	requested	and	serve	the	Claim	Form	after	the	requisite	28‐
day	 period	 for	 their	 response	 had	 expired.	 	 In	 due	 course	 the	 lawyer	 served	 the	
claim.	 	 The	 parties	 continued	 to	 debate	 the	 timetable	 but	 still	 could	 not	 reach	
agreement.	 	 In	 the	end,	 the	parties	 found	 themselves	before	an	unimpressed	 Judge	
who	 compromised	 and	 struck	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 parties	 in	 respect	 of	 the	






over	 the	 timing	 for	 the	 service	 of	 the	 Defence	 &	 Counterclaim.	 	 The	 lawyer’s	
interpretation	 of	 the	 Protocol	 as	 to	 when	 his	 client	 was	 entitled	 to	 commence	
proceedings	suited	his	client’s	position	and	case	strategy.	
Matter	 No	 6	 [‘Timetable’]	 was	 similar	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 lawyer’s	 strict	
interpretation	of	the	Protocol.		In	this	case,	the	lawyer	issued	proceedings	in	the	TCC	
for	 approximately	 £200,000.	 	 The	 defendant	 failed	 to	 file	 an	 Acknowledgement	 of	
Service	 or	 a	 Defence	 within	 14	 days	 (CPR	 r.10.3)	 and	 the	 lawyer	 applied	 for	
judgment	 in	 default	 pursuant	 to	 CPR	 r.12.3(1).	 	 The	defendant’s	 lawyer	 eventually	
contacted	the	claimant’s	lawyer	and	correspondence	was	exchanged	in	respect	of	the	
claimant’s	alleged	failure	to	comply	with	the	Protocol	and	the	defendant’s	request	for	
a	 three‐month	extension	of	 time	 for	service	of	 the	Defence	&	Counterclaim.	 	 In	one	
letter	the	defendant’s	lawyer	stated:	
  …Your  clients  have  failed  to  comply  with  the  Construction 
Protocol  despite  your  protestations  to  the  contrary.    It  is  of 
course  entirely  up  to  your  client  if  they  wish  to  abandon  the 
Protocol  but  we  will  bring  this  to  the  attention  of  the  Court 
regarding costs…  
Ultimately	 the	 defendant	 applied	 to	 the	 court	 for	 the	 extension	when	 the	 claimant	
only	agreed	to	a	14‐day	extension.		The	defendant’s	application	was	on	the	basis	of,	
amongst	 other	 issues,	 the	 claimant’s	 failure	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 Protocol.	 	 The	
lawyer’s	witness	statement	claimed:	
…It is my and my clients’ opinion that the Claimant, who has not 
adhered  to  the  Pre‐Action  Protocol  for  Construction  and 
Engineering  (“the Protocol”) or  the Overriding Objective of  the 
Civil  Procedure  Rules,  served  these  papers  in  order  to 
inconvenience  and  upset  the Defendants  as much  as  possible.  
This  is  largely because at  the end of  [year], and  just before  the 
Christmas  break,  the  Claimant’s  solicitors  sent  a  substantive 
letter (with 110 pages of enclosures), which they (wrongly) claim 
complies with  the  Protocol.    Even  though  the  aforementioned 
letter  does  not  comply  with  the  Protocol,  the  Claimant’s 
solicitors make reference to it being a Letter of Claim and so the 
intent  was  that  the  Defendants  would  have  to  put  in  their 















judge	 awarded	 the	defendant	 the	 three‐month	 extension,	 after	 reprimanding	 them	
for	being	disorganised	on	several	accounts.	
Again,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 lawyer	 interpreted	 the	 Protocol	 in	 favour	 of	 his	 client’s	




In	 the	 two	 cases	 described	 above	 disputes	 concerning	 the	 Pre‐Action	 Protocol	
expanded	 to	 include	disputes	over	 the	procedural	 timetable.	 	The	parties	were	not	
able	 to	 agree	 the	 timing	 for	 service	 of	 the	 Defence	 &	 Counterclaim	 and	 required	
assistance	from	the	court.		These	two	matters	were	by	no	means	unique	–	a	number	
of	 the	matters	 observed	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 concerned	 procedural	
issues	which	resulted	in	expanding	or	complicating	the	existing	substantive	dispute.		
These	 included,	 but	 are	 not	 limited	 to:	 	 the	 length	 of	 time	 required	 for	 services	 of	
pleadings,	 witness	 statements,	 expert	 reports,	 etc	 (arbitration	 and	 litigation);	
whether	 the	 defendant	was	 entitled	 to	 security	 for	 costs;	whether	 further,	 specific	
documents	should	be	disclosed	(as	one	party	had	failed	to	include	certain	document	
during	 the	 disclosure	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings);	 and	 whether	 the	 proposed	
defendant	should	disclose	documents	prior	to	the	commencement	of	proceedings.	
In	 each	 situation,	 the	 lawyer	 interpreted	 the	 relevant	 rules	 and	 advanced	 an	




The	 introduction	 of	 the	 new	 “Jackson	Reforms”	 is	 a	 further	 and	 recent	 area	 out	 of	
which	disputes	escalate	and	take	shape.		As	briefly	introduced	in	Chapter	1.3	above,	






the	 key	 objective	 of	 Jackson’s	 Review	 was	 to	 ‘promote	 access	 to	 justice	 at	 a	
proportionate	 cost’	 (Jackson,	 2010:2)	 and	 the	 Reforms	 include	 new	 CPR	 rules	 in	
respect	 of	 conditional	 fee	 agreements,	 disclosure,	 cost	 management,	 witness	
statements	and	Part	36	offers.	 	As	one	might	expect,	disputes	have	materialised	out	






on	 time	 but	 Mitchell’s	 budget	 was	 filed	 six	 days	 late,	 after	 his	 solicitors	 were	
prompted	 by	 the	 court.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 late	 filing	 of	 Mitchell’s	 budget,	 it	 was	
necessary	for	the	original	hearing	to	be	adjourned.		The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	in	
light	of	the	new	overriding	objective	(CPR	r.1.1)	governing	the	conduct	of	litigation	at	




truly	 trivial;	 the	party	 seeking	 relief	has	otherwise	 fully	 complied	with	 court	 rules,		
practice	directions	and	court	orders;	and	the	application	for	relief	is	made	promptly.		









28	 days	 by	 prior	 written	 agreement,	 without	 formal	 application	 to	 the	 court,	
provided	that	any	hearing	date	is	not	put	at	risk	as	a	result.172		This	enables	the	court	
                                                 
170	CPR	r3.12‐3.18	and	Practice	Direction	3E.	
171	 By	 way	 of	 example,	 see	 Summit	 Navigation	 v	 Generali	 Romania	 (2014),	 Wain	 v	






to	 retain	 overall	 control	while	 still	 allowing	 the	 parties	 some	 latitude	 to	 deal	with	
unforeseen	events.	
Most	recently,	on	4	July	2014,	the	Court	of	Appeal	handed	down	its	judgment	on	the	
conjoined	 appeals	 in	 Denton|Decandent|Utilise	 (2014)173.	 	 While	 amplifying	 the	
guidance	it	had	set	down	in	Mitchell	eight	months	earlier,	it	set	out	a	new	three‐stage	
test	for	the	granting	of	relief	from	sanctions,	which	requires	a	consideration	of	all	the	
circumstances	 of	 the	 case.	 	 The	 following	 new	 three‐stage	 test174	 replaced	 the	
decision	in	Mitchell:	
Stage	1	 assess	 the	 significance	 and	 seriousness	 of	 the	 default	which	
led	to	the	application	for	relief;	
Stage	2	 if	 the	 breach	 is	 significant	 and	 serious,	 consider	 why	 the	
default	occurred	and	whether	there	was	a	good	reason	for	it;	
and	
Stage	3	 irrespective	of	 any	conclusion	 that	might	have	been	reached	
at	Stages	1	and	2,	evaluate	all	the	circumstances	of	the	case	to	
enable	 the	 application	 to	 be	 dealt	with	 justly:	 	 in	 particular,	




minimise	 further	disputes	 in	respect	of	court	orders	and	the	CPR.	 	However,	as	the	
judgment	 requires	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 court	 rules/orders	 and	 procedural	
discipline,	interpretation	as	ever	will	still	be	necessary.	
The	disputes	regarding	procedure	in	Mitchell	and	Denton|Decandent|Utilise	stemmed	




clients	 fell	 foul	of	 a	 court	order	or	 rule/practice	direction	and	 required	 relief	 from	
sanctions.		Mitchell	and	Denton|Decandent|Utilise	do	appear	to	be	at	the	forefront	of	
                                                 
173	 In	Denton,	 the	 claimant	 served	 six	 new	witness	 statements	 two	months	 before	 trial,	 in	
Decadent,	the	claimant	sent	a	cheque	to	the	court	by	DX	on	the	date	on	which	the	unless	order	






their	minds	 and	 regularly	 feature	 in	 conversations	 between	 the	 lawyers	 and	 have	
been	 the	 subject	 of	 Continuing	 Professional	 Development	 (CPD)	 seminars.	 	 The	
lawyers	appear	conscience	of	the	severe	implications	of	this	case	law175	and	are	most	
concerned	with	the	new	costs	management	and	e‐disclosure	regimes176.	 	There	 is	a	




the	 professional	 practice	 of	 lawyers	 is	 a	 possible	 area	 for	 further	 research	 in	 due	
course.	







This	 chapter	 considered	 how	 the	 associations	 of	 documents,	 evidence,	 lawyering,	
costs,	 the	 client’s	 conduct	 and	 objectives	 and	 the	 substantive	 law	 influenced	 the	







a	 constantly	 evolving	 form	 depending	 on	 its	 associations.	 	 It	 seems	 this	 notion	 is	
highly	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 concepts	within	 relational	 contract	 theories,	 particularly	
Hugh	 Collin’s	 competing	 frames	 of	 reference	 or	 competing	 norms	 of	 contractual	
behaviour	(Collins,	1999:132).	 	In	Chapter	2,	we	saw	how	Collins	considers	that	the	
three	 normative	 frameworks	 of	 the	 business	 relation,	 the	 economic	 deal	 and	 the	
contract	 are	 competing	 and	 constantly	 at	 play	 in	 the	 context	 of	 economic	
transactions.	 	When	 one	 framework	 takes	 priority	 over	 another	 for	 good	 business	
sense,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 others	 fall	 away,	 but	 rather,	 are	 temporarily	
occluded	and	perhaps	may	be	resuscitated	and	brought	to	the	forefront	at	some	later	
point.		In	a	sense,	this	is	an	excellent	description	of	exactly	how	a	dispute	transforms:		






token,	 understanding	 any	 dispute	 requires	 understanding	 all	 elements	 of	 its	
enveloping	relations	that	might	affect	the	dispute	significantly.	
This	 research	 revealed	 at	 least	 five	 categories	 of	 relations	 that	 significantly	 affect	
construction	disputes:	 	documents,	 lawyering,	costs,	 the	client’s	conduct/objectives	
and	 the	 substantive	 law	 –	 and	 no	 doubt	 these	 are	 just	 the	 tip	 of	 the	 iceberg.	 	 The	
descriptions	and	narratives	included	in	this	chapter	are	the	traces	of	these	relations,	
that	are	in	themselves	an	explanation	of	the	assemblages.		They	have	been	included	






This	 illustrates	 the	 temporal	 and	 constantly	 changing	nature	of	disputes	 and	 these	
associations.		A	particular	association	may	exist	and	be	significant	for	periods	of	time	
during	the	case,	informing	how	decisions	are	made	and	how	the	dispute	is	perceived	
by	 both	 parties	 and	 their	 respective	 lawyers.	 	 At	 other	 times	 they	 may	 become	
benign:	 	 though	still	 in	existence	 they	are	not	connected	 to	 the	heart	of	 the	matter	
which	gives	momentum	to	the	dispute.		To	put	this	in	context,	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	
4.5,	 this	 was	 most	 noticeable	 in	 disputes	 concerning,	 or	 influenced	 by,	 limitation	
periods.		The	impending	expiry	of	a	limitation	period	breathed	life	back	into	disputes	
which	perhaps	had	been	dormant	for	some	time.		The	disputes	had	lost	momentum	
owing	 to	 the	disassembly	of	 certain	 relations,	 for	whatever	 reason,	 yet	 took	 shape	
and	force	once	again.		Put	another	way,	the	parties	collectively,	though	not	expressly,	
for	whatever	reason	deemed	the	dispute,	at	a	point	in	time,	not	worth	pursuing.		This	
is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 dispute	 no	 longer	 existed,	 quite	 the	 contrary.	 	 Rather	 it	
dissipated	 or	 hibernated	 until	 other	 entities	 or	 factors	 brought	 it	 back	 to	 the	
forefront	–	one	of	which	being	the	expiry	of	the	limitation	period.						
As	we	have	seen,	any	of	the	competing	associations	may	fuel	the	scope	and	identity	















claim,	 which	 had	 been	 made	 previously	 and	 was	 set	 out	 in	 their	 on‐going,	 albeit	
protracted,	proceedings.		
Mr	Hunter	 then	went	 further	 introducing	 new	 legal	 arguments	which	 had	 not	 been	
made	previously	 in	the	pleadings.	 	He	asserted	that	Structures	Ltd	had	 failed	to	serve	
Pay	Less	Notices	during	 the	course	of	 the	project	and	had	 failed	 to	allow	Columns	&	
Beams	Ltd	to	return	to	site	and	rectify	the	alleged	defects.		He	quoted	Pearce	and	High	
Limited	v	Baxter	&	Anr	(1999)	as	strong	evidence	of	what	the	consequences	would	be.	
In	 due	 course,	 after	 several	 exchanges	 of	 correspondence,	 Mr	 Hunter	 then	 sent	 a	
without	prejudice	letter	suggesting	mediation:	
The Lawyer:  Your Client’s offer does not fairly reflect our Client’s entitlement 
and  is  rejected.   As  you  can  see  from  our  letter  to  the  Court, 
having considered our advice, our Client proposes  to pursue  its 
claim vigorously. 





only be prudent  to explore whether there  is an opportunity  for 
settlement. 















(Structures Ltd)  we  appreciate  that  the  parties  are  currently  due  to 
attend mediation.   Unfortunately, for the reasons which 




against	 Columns	 &	 Beams	 Ltd.	 	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 they	 were	 not	 willing	 to	 attend	 a	
mediation	without	understanding	the	extent	of	these	new	claims	which	they	suggested	
had	 just	 come	 to	 light.	 	 The	 email	 concluded	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	mediation	 be	
adjourned	for	a	period	of	four	weeks	to	enable	them	to	continue	their	investigations.		
Mr	 Cahill	was	 furious.	 	He	 considered	 this	 to	 be	 a	 further	 delay	 tactic	 and	 found	 it	
astonishing	that	Structures	Ltd	could	possibly	have	any	new	claims.			
Mr	Hunter	advised	Mr	Cahill	to	go	on	the	attack.			










In the above extract from the Columns & Beams v Structures Ltd narrative, we now see the parties’ dispute taking momentum and evolving into different issues, different forms of dispute resolution and different levels of complexity.  Clearly the lawyers’ advice and actions have had a significant impact on the trajectory of the dispute.  We see that Mr Hunter has changed course, owing to the actions of Structures Ltd, and now has advised adjudication.  Mr Cahill has followed suit.  The dispute which has now been referred to adjudication is different to dispute which is in litigation – it now includes issues of Pay Less Notices.  Indeed seemingly from Structures Ltd’s alleged viewpoint, there are further new claims or arguments which have yet to be included in the formal proceedings and are preventing settlement until their extent is fully realised.  Either way, the parties now have a very different dispute to what they had previously. To arrive at this newly defined dispute, both sets of lawyers have put forward new and competing arguments – some being legal arguments, others being procedural or commercial arguments – all of which concern the identity and scope of the dispute.  This focus on the identity and scope of the dispute is not new – the following two, seemingly simple, questions have gainfully employed construction lawyers and the judiciary for nearly a century, if not more177:   (1) Is there a dispute? (2) What is the extent of the dispute? The answer to the first question must be “yes” if a party wishes to commence adjudication or arbitral proceedings.  The answer to the second question must fall within the applicable rules which govern the proceedings.178  Accordingly, the definition of a dispute and what comprises the dispute is crucial to lawyers and their clients from a formal legal standpoint if proceedings are to be successful and without any valid jurisdiction issues.  Lawyers therefore seek to ensure not only that a 
                                                 177 S1(1) of the Arbitration Clauses Protocol Act 1924 considered the relationship between arbitration and court proceedings in English law and the court’s jurisdiction to stay proceedings.  The MacKinnon Committee Report of 1927 at paragraph 43 (MacKinnon, 1927) recognised a need for the court to have jurisdiction to stay the proceedings if it is “satisfied 
that there is a real dispute to be determined by arbitration”.  The Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act 1930 then amended the Arbitration Clauses Protocol Act 1924 and this wording was carried through into the Arbitration Acts 1950 and 1975, from which a long line of case law arose (eg Eagle Star v Yuval (1978), Nova (Jersey) v Kammgarn (1977), Ellerine v Klinger (1982), Hayter v Nelson (1990), etc.)  See the judgment of Swinton Thomas LJ in Halki 




dispute exists, as defined by case law and any contractual provisions, but also to identify the dispute in the language of the law, in the best possible light which suits their clients’ case.   As we will see in this chapter, the process lawyers invoke to define the dispute often is an iterative process of assembling various components – a process which is dependent on constraints and associations.  These constraints and associations stem from a number of sources including, no less, case law, legislation and the client’s objectives.  Put another way, lawyers seek to name their clients’ disputes in a way which attempts to ensure a successful outcome.  I suggest this is a process of design:  a creative pursuit which must take into account dependencies and alliances when developing the end result. This chapter considers:  the definition of a dispute and the lawyer’s search for its identification; how the search for this identification equates to the “naming” stage identified by Felstiner, Abel and Sarat (Felstiner, et al., 1980-1981) and what follows is an iterative, and sometimes messy, Reverse Trajectory of “Claiming, Blaming, 











5.1  Defining the dispute:  the search for identification 
Is there a dispute? As introduced above, lawyers spend an extensive amount of time debating whether or not a dispute exists, the reason being largely dependent on the complexity of the law.  As far as lawyers are concerned, disputes may be defined by and dependent on both case law and the terms of the parties’ contract.  In the context of adjudication and arbitration, lawyers and their clients are particularly concerned as if there is “no 
dispute”, the adjudicator or arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to determine the matter.  Considering its significance in the context of lawyer’s conduct and advice, the following briefly develops the doctrinal issues previously set out in Chapter 2.2, so as to contextualise the lawyer’s actions and the discussion which follows in this chapter.     
Case law In order to decide whether there is a dispute, the courts have spilt much ink on defining the term “dispute”, particularly in the context of arbitration before statutory adjudication was introduced in 1996.  The Court of Appeal in Halki Shipping 
Corporation v Sopex Oils Ltd (1997) summarised previous case law in order to determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to bring Order 14 proceedings179 to enforce a claim to which the defendants allegedly had no arguable defence, where the claim arose under a contract containing an arbitration clause.   The plaintiffs/appellants (Halki) submitted that a “dispute” meant a genuine or real dispute, and that a claim which is indisputable because there is no arguable defence does not create a dispute at all.  They submitted that it follows that claims to which there is no arguable defence are outwith the scope of s9 of the Arbitration Act (“matter which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration”).  The defendants/respondents (Sopex) argued that a “dispute” meant any disputed claim, and therefore covered any claim which is not admitted as due and payable, thus leaving no scope for court proceedings save where it had made a positive admission.  In doing so, they relied on the decision in Hayter v Nelson (1990) where Saville J (as he then was) held that the word “dispute” in an arbitration clause should be given its ordinary meaning and that just because a person has no arguable grounds for disputing something, does not mean in ordinary language that he is not disputing it.  




The court dismissed the appeal, in favour of Sopex.  They found that an unadmitted claim gives rise to a dispute, however unanswerable or flimsy such a claim might be.180  Once the HGCRA 1996 introduced statutory adjudication, a number of reported cases followed concerning the “crystallisation of a dispute” for the purpose of adjudication (ie when did the dispute materialise).  It has been argued frequently by the responding party that the referring party’s alleged dispute was not a matter which had previously arisen between the parties.  The responding party’s argument generally is that such a claim, since it had not been considered, let along rejected, could not be said to be in dispute at the time of the adjudication notice and therefore the adjudicator does not have jurisdiction to determine the dispute (Coulson, 2015:44).  In short, the argument goes that no dispute existed prior to the referring party serving the Notice of Adjudication.   As set out in Chapter 2.2, in the leading case of AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd v Secretary 
of State for Transport (2004) Jackson J (as he then was) set out seven propositions for the meaning of a dispute and the identification as to when a dispute has arisen in the context of construction adjudication and arbitration cases.  In short, he held that a dispute arises when it emerges that a claim is not admitted.  To arrive at his seven propositions, Jackson J considered a long line of previous case law regarding both arbitration and adjudication, including Halki,181 adopting and summarising various points and not endorsing others.  Notably, he did not endorse the suggestions in some of the earlier cases that a dispute may not arise until negotiation or discussion had been concluded or that a dispute should not be lightly inferred182.   In approving Jackson J’s seven propositions, the Court of Appeal added further guidance and a narrowed the definition in the context of adjudication as costs will be incurred against tight timescales.  Rix LJ stated that “the respondent should have a 
reasonable time in which to respond to any claim."183  Accordingly, the existence of a dispute will depend on the particular circumstance:  the responding party should have a reasonable opportunity to respond to the claim and a reasonable time will need to have expired.  Silence, ie not responding to a claim within a reasonable time, 
                                                 180 See paragraph 58 in Jackson J’s judgments in AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd v Secretary of 




may amount to a dispute as the claim has not been admitted.184  In any event, the court has been clear that the word “dispute” should be given its ordinary English meaning and not some form of specialised meaning for the purposes of adjudication.185    Notably, Felstiner, Abel and Sarat’s definition accords with the court’s definition:  a 
dispute only materialises if this claim is rejected, in whole or in part.  Furthermore, Felstiner, et al. also assert that rejection need not be expressed by words:  “delay that 
the claimant construes as resistance is just as much a rejection as is a compromise offer 
(partial rejection) or an outright refusal” (Felstiner, et al., 1980-1981:636).  Cases since AMEC further summarise the court’s position as to whether a dispute has crystallised prior to the Notice of Adjudication.  By way of example, in Cantillon Ltd v 
Urvasco Ltd (2008) the Judge held at paragraph 55186: 
“(a)  Courts (and indeed adjudicators and arbitrators) should not adopt 
an over legalistic analysis of what the dispute between the parties is. 
(b) One does need to determine in broad terms what the disputed claim 
or assertion (being referred to adjudication or arbitration as the 
case may be) is. 
(c)  One cannot say that the disputed claim or assertion is necessarily 
defined or limited by the evidence or arguments submitted by either 
party to each other before the referral to adjudication or 
arbitration. 
(d)  The ambit of the reference to arbitration or adjudication may 
unavoidably be widened by the nature of the defence or defences put 
forward by the defending party in adjudication or arbitration.” Here, the court interpreted “dispute” broadly and held that the referring party was not limited to the precise arguments, contentions and evidence put forward before the dispute crystallised.  Cantillon was followed in Bovis Lend Lease Ltd v The 
                                                 184 Tradax International v Cerrahogullari TAS (1981) and AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd v 
Secretary of State for Transport (2004). 185 Beck Peppiatt Ltd v Norwest Holst Construction Ltd (2003) and Cowlin Construction Limited 




Trustees of the London Clinic (2009)187 and Working Environments v Greencoat 
Construction (2012).188   The above by no means documents all of the case law on this point, but rather, is intended to demonstrate the intricacy of the issues lawyers face and why they consider the existence of a dispute, prior to commencing proceedings, to be so critical.   
Contract In addition to case law, the parties’ contract may define whether a dispute (or a claim) exists.  The IChemE, ICE, FIDIC and NEC3 standard forms of contract are such examples.  To provide a flavour of what these contracts stipulate and the behaviour and events which follow as a result, the following briefly discusses the ICE and NEC3 forms.189 
ICE Clause 66190 of the ICE Conditions of Contract, 7th edition, includes a process whereby “a dissatisfaction” is referred to the engineer prior to a dispute coming into existence:  
                                                 187 In Bovis Lend Lease, the referring party’s quantum and breakdown of the loss and expense claim included in the referral notice was different to the quantum and breakdown of the claim made shortly after the project was completed.  The responding party claimed that a dispute over loss and expense had not crystallised at the time of the referral.  The Judge held that a dispute had crystallised as it was not a materially different claim, noting that the quantum had merely been updated. 
188 Working Environments is a recent example where the court found that not all of the dispute had crystallised prior to the Notice of Adjudication.  Here the Judge confirmed the dicta in Cantillon that adjudication decisions were severable, enforced a large bulk of the adjudicator’s decision and severed two items which had not arisen until some 22 days into the adjudication process.  189 With regard to the IChemE, see Clause 46 of the IChemE Form of Contract (5th ed, 2013, The Red Book) states that a dispute does not exist until the “dissatisfaction” has been referred to and determined by the Project Manager.  With regard to FIDIC, see Clause 20 (Claim, Disputes and Arbitration) of the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction (the Red Book, 1st ed, 1999) which provides a further example of a condition precedent.  Here, the contractor must give notice to the engineer pursuant to Clause 20.1 if he considers himself entitled to additional time and/or money.  See also the recent case of Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her 





“66(3) The Employer and the Contactor agree that no matter shall 
constitute nor be said to give rise to a dispute unless and until in 
respect of that matter  
(a)  the time for the giving of a decision by the Engineer on a 
matter of dissatisfaction under Clause 66(2) has expired or 
the decision given is unacceptable or has not been 
implemented and in consequence the Employer or the 
Contractor has served on the other and on the Engineer a 
notice in writing (hereinafter called the Notice of Dispute)  
(b)  an adjudicator has given a decision on a dispute under 
Clause 66(6) and the Employer or the Contactor is not 
giving effect to the decision, and in consequence the other 
has served on him and the Engineer a Notice of Dispute 
and the dispute shall be that stated in the Notice of Dispute.  For 
the purposes of all matters arising under or in connection with 
the Contract or the carrying out of the Works the word "dispute" 
shall be construed accordingly and shall include any difference.” Whilst this contract does attempt to avoid disputes by prolonging or avoiding the specific use of the word “dispute”, the question does arise as to whether there is fundamentally or in practice any real difference between “dissatisfaction” and “dispute”.  The case of AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (2004), discussed above, concerned Clause 66 of the ICE Conditions (5th edition).  Here, six months prior to the expiration of the limitation period, defects became apparent.  Twelve days before the expiration date, the Highway Agency referred the matter regarding the defects to the engineer pursuant to Clause 66 – in essence, they requested the engineer to decide whether AMEC was liable for the defects.  When they referred the matter to the engineer, they did not term the matter a “dissatisfaction”, but rather a “dispute”: 
“1. We copied you our letter to AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd dated 6th 
December 2002. 
2.   AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd has not acknowledged that it is 
responsible for the situation with Thelwall Viaduct by close of 




3. We refer the dispute to you as engineer pursuant to clause 66 for 
your decision."  [Emphasis added] Seven days later the engineer gave his decision in that AMEC were responsible for the defects and the day after that the Secretary of State served its Notice of Arbitration.  AMEC argued that there was no dispute or difference in existence which could be referred to arbitration owing to the timescales.  The Judge disagreed as meetings had taken place many months before and it was clear that AMEC did not admit to the defects.  Therefore the engineer’s decision was not unfair procedurally and the Notice of Arbitration was valid.  In this case, the Secretary of State (Highway Agency) did follow the condition precedent of referring their dissatisfaction to the engineer, albeit in an extremely short timescale.  Clearly it did so in light of the limitation period and as a matter of procedure in order to commence arbitration.  As such, the name “dissatisfaction” at the time it was referred to the engineer was arguably immaterial and superficial as eight days later the same was now termed a “dispute” for the purposes of the contract. 
NEC3 As can be seen from the case law on condition precedents191, in addition to defining what a dispute is and identifying whether a dispute exists prior to the commencement of proceedings, lawyers may also spend considerable time crafting an explanation as to why their client is entitled to make a claim in the event that they fail to comply with the contractual notice provisions.  The NEC3 standard form of contract certainly keeps lawyers busy in this respect. Core Clause 6 across all the NEC3 suite of contracts is concerned with compensation events.  Compensation events are those events which change the cost of the work or the time needed to complete the work for which compensation has to be given.  The contract provides a list of compensation events, the basis of their assessment and the procedure by which they are to be notified, assessed and implemented.  The aim is 
                                                 191 See Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (2007) where the court confirmed their approval for condition precedents, though they will be construed strictly and narrowly:  they must state the precise time within which the notice is to be served and must make it clear that unless the notice is served within that time the party making the claim will lose its rights (Bremer HandelsGesellschaft MBH v Vanden (1978)).  The analysis in Multiplex was followed subsequently in Steria Ltd v Sigma Wireless 




that the events are assessed as early as possible, and if possible, prior to the event occurring (Thomas, 2012:231).   Within Core Clause 6, Clause 61.3 establishes an eight-week time bar for making a claim, which is a condition precedent for entitlement to time and/or money: 
“If the Contractor does not notify a compensation event within eight 
weeks of becoming aware of the event, he is not entitled to a change 
in the Prices, the Completion Date or a Key Date unless the Project 
Manager should have notified the event to the Contractor but did 
not.” During the course of the research, I observed a number of matters or discussions which involved lawyers’ considering their clients’ right to claim for more time or money in light of Clause 61.3.  The lawyers had a number of conversations with their clients regarding the factual events and how to construe them in light of the phrase 
“…of becoming aware of the event…”  By way of example, in Matter No 9 




both case law and the parties’ contract inform how lawyers develop their argument and present their clients’ case. 
What is the extent of the dispute? This is the second question which regularly engages construction lawyers during the course of their professional service – largely as a result of the case law which has built up around statutory adjudication and the jurisdiction of the adjudicator.  The authorities are clear that any jurisdictional issues will be considered by reference to the nature, scope and extent of the dispute identified in the Notice of Adjudication (Coulson, 2015: 221).  Accordingly, it is the dispute identified and defined in the Notice of Adjudication which the adjudicator has the jurisdiction to decide – only by express agreement between the parties can this amended.192 This raises a number of issues which lawyers now need to consider, in light of the case law over the last 18 years, when drafting Notices of Adjudication:  is the notice wide enough to embrace the claim made193; is the notice wide enough to allow cross-claims by the responding party194; is the dispute referred a single dispute195; and does the single dispute arise out of multiple contracts, and if so, is it still one dispute?196 
Witney Town Council v Beam Construction (Cheltenham) Limited (2011) illustrates the difficulties lawyers face when identifying the scope and extent of the dispute in the Notice of Adjudication and the court’s recognition of the fluidity of disputes.  Here, Beam served a Notice of Adjudication and Referral Notice which identified that a dispute had arisen and set eight questions to be decided by the Adjudicator.  The 
                                                 192 In KNS Industrial Services Ltd v Sindall Ltd (2001) HHJ Lloyd QC held that further documents which come into existence after the Notice of Adjudication “do not cut down, or, 
indeed, enlarge the dispute (unless they contain an agreement to do so)”. 193 William Verry (Glazing Systems) Ltd v Furlong Homes Ltd (2005) and Pilon Ltd v Breyer 
Group PLC (2010). 194 VHE Construction Plc v RBSTB Trust Co Ltd (2000) and Letchworth Roofing Company v 
Sterling Building Company (2009). 195 The HGCRA only allows a single dispute to be referred, unless the parties agree otherwise:  Clause 8(1) of the Scheme.  See Fastrack Contractors Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd (2000) at paragraph 20.  Cases on this point include, though not limited to:  David McLean Housing Ltd v 
Swansea housing Association Ltd (2002), Michael John Construction v Golledge (2006), 
Grovedeck Ltd v Capital Demolition Ltd (2000), CIB Properties Ltd v Birse Construction Ltd (2005), David and Teresa Bothma (In Partnership) T/A DAB Builders v Mayhaven Healthcare 
Ltd (2007) and Witney Town Council v Beam Construction (Cheltenham) Ltd (2011). 196 See Air Design (Kent) Ltd v Deerglen (Jersey) Ltd (2008), Enterprise Managed Services Ltd v 
Tony McFadden Utilities Ltd (2009), Supablast (Nationwide) Ltd v Story Rail Ltd (2010) and 




Council made it clear that it considered that four disputes, rather than one, had been referred to the Adjudicator. Ultimately, the Adjudicator awarded some £70,500 to Beam. When the Council failed to pay, Beam commenced proceedings for enforcement of the Adjudicator’s decision.  Mr Justice Akenhead, having reviewed the relevant case law, drew the following conclusions at paragraph 38: 
“(i)  A dispute arises generally when and in circumstances in which a 
claim or assertion is made by one party and expressly or implicitly 
challenged or not accepted. 
(ii)  A dispute in existence at one time can in time metamorphose in 
to something different to that which it was originally. 
(iii)  A dispute can comprise a single issue or any number of issues 
within it. However, a dispute between parties does not necessarily 
comprise everything which is in issue between them at the time that 
one party initiates adjudication; put another way, everything in 
issue at that time does not necessarily comprise one dispute, 
although it may do so. 
(iv)  What a dispute in any given case is will be a question of fact 
albeit that the facts may require to be interpreted… 
(v)  The Notice of Adjudication and the Referral Notice are not 
necessarily determinative of what the true dispute is or as to 
whether there is more than one dispute. One looks at them but also 
at the background facts. 
(vi)  Where on a proper analysis, there are two separate and distinct 
disputes, only one can be referred to one adjudicator unless the 
parties agree otherwise… 
(vii)  Whether there are one or more disputes again involves a 
consideration of the facts…  A useful if not invariable rule of thumb 
is that, if disputed claim No 1 can not be decided without deciding 
all or part of disputed claim No 2, that establishes a clear link and 




After considering the facts in light of the above, the Judge held that there was only one dispute between the parties by the time of the Notice of Adjudication and only one dispute which was referred to adjudication. That dispute was what was due and owed to Beam. Judgment was in favour of Beam and the Adjudicator’s decision was enforced. In arriving at his decision, the Judge recognised that a dispute has the potential to change or transform its nature, “metamorphose”, into something different, ie it is not a static entity.  He also appreciated that a dispute can comprise a single issue or multiple issues and is a question of fact which may require investigation or interpretation.  As such, it is not difficult to understand why lawyers spend so much time describing the dispute and precisely wording the Notice of Adjudication.    
Identifying & redefining the dispute In AWG Construction Ltd v Rockingham Motor Speedway Ltd (2004) Judge Toulmin CMG QC stated at paragraph 145: 
“In some cases the basis on which the claim is made will be clear and 
obvious.  In others it will have been the subject of sophisticated legal 
argument on the precise legal basis which the claim is made…” Here the Judge recognised that at times the basis of a claim will be a sophisticated legal argument constructed by lawyers.  Acknowledging that lawyers construct these arguments and develop facts in support of that argument is not novel (Graham, 2005:3).  Nor is the recognition that lawyers are “adversarial architects” who construct and deconstruct law’s meaning (Yngvession, 1988-1989; Sarat and Felstiner, 1995; Kirkland, 2012:160).  As Yngvession summarises (1988-1989:1691):  
“…law creates the social world by ‘naming’ it; legal professionals are 
empowered by their capacity to reveal rights and define wrongs, to 
construct the meanings of everyday events (as just or unjust, as 
crime or normal trouble, as private nuisance or public grievance) 
and thus to shape cultural understandings of fairness, of justice, and 




As introduced above, lawyers place great emphasis on appropriately drafting the Notice of Adjudication and defining the dispute therein such that their clients’ claim does not fall foul of prior case law.  The same holds true in arbitration and litigation.  Lawyers develop the identity of the dispute in a legal context and draft Notices of Arbitration, Claim Forms, Particulars of Claim, lists of issues, skeleton arguments, etc.  In addition, witness statements and expert reports are all prepared in support of the dispute which the lawyer has identified. Litigation in the TCC does not necessarily require the full identity of the dispute prior to commencing proceedings.  However, the process itself encourages the parties to narrow the issues in dispute and agree, where possible, certain elements of the dispute or at a minimum the nature of the dispute.197  It is recognised that disputes exist prior to the precise naming of them and it is the process itself which searches for the identity.  As Judge Kirkham sated in Cowlin Construction Limited v CFW 
Architects (a firm) (2003): 
“…Many court and arbitral proceedings are begun before the nature of the 
dispute or difference between the parties has been explicitly set out…”  During the course of this research nearly every matter, if not all, involved the lawyer identifying the dispute and defining it (or redefining it) in a legal context.  Whether it was for the purposes of negotiation, adjudication, arbitration or litigation – or simply advising clients on the merits or possible outcome of their case – each matter involved the lawyer investigating the clients’ version or description of the dispute, satisfying himself as to its existence and identity (or lack thereof) and redefining it thereafter, as needed in a legal context.  In doing so, lawyers are in a sense producing (or reproducing) a reality of the dispute, similar to how the practice of science 
produces its realities as well as describing them (Law, 2004:13). 
Matter No 24 [‘Termination’] illustrates one way lawyers identify disputes and confirm that they have crystallised for the purposes of adjudication under the HGCRA.  In this case, a home owner had engaged a contractor to refurbish a residential property and design and build a new extension to it.  The parties’ relationship deteriorated and eventually they “agreed to terminate the building 
contract”.198  Their respective quantity surveyors (QS) then spent the next 18 months arguing about how much the contractor was entitled to (payment) without reaching an agreement.  The contractor's QS finally contacted a lawyer at the Firm as his 




colleague had used him before with good results.  The lawyer ultimately wrote three letters in total prior to the parties reaching a settlement agreement.  The parties' QSs did most of the negotiating and even drafted the proposed settlement agreement in order to minimise legal costs.   In the lawyer’s second letter to the home owner’s QS, he confirmed crystallisation of the dispute.  If a settlement was not forthcoming, his advice to the contractor was to commence adjudication and to do so, this required clear evidence that a dispute existed.  His letter to the home owner’s QS stated:  
Lawyer: Further to our letter of [x], we note that our clients provided 
your client with extensive documentation over the last 22 
months to substantiate their claim.  Our clients and/or their 
representatives also met with your client or her representatives 
on a number of occasions.  In these circumstances, it is clear 
that your client is unwilling to pay our clients the monies they 
are entitled to - £49,767.27 plus VAT, as set out in… 
 Doubtless, you are familiar with the line of authorities which 
state that a dispute crystallises once a claim has been 
challenged or rejected.  By way of example we refer you to the 
case of Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC).   
 Notwithstanding our clients’ entitlement, they are still prepared 
to accept a reasonable offer as they acknowledge the time and 




building owner’s failure to serve the notice – and following on from that, their failure to pay the amount rightly due to their client.199   In the context of litigation, Matter No 7 [‘Additional Works’] is one such example of lawyers redefining the dispute.  Here, the client (a contractor) approached the lawyer with their dispute in respect of the additional works under the contract.  The client essentially said that the building owner had rejected their claim for payment of these additional works.  There was some mention of defects, though the client described them as minimal and in any event an agreement had been reached.  When drafting the Particulars of Claim, the lawyer couched the dispute as a breach of 50 separate contracts for non-payment – one contract for each additional element of work.  The dispute, as described in the Particulars of Claim, was defined as a non-payment dispute, using a legal analysis which skirted around the difficult set of facts that one contract for the additional works could not have come into existence.200  The Particulars of Claim made no mention of defects or that their contract(s) had been wrongfully terminated as the building owner refused to let them back into the site to complete the works.  The dispute, irrespective of how the contractor or the developer perceived it, was redefined by the lawyer to suit his client’s case.  It is important to note that in each of the cases described above, and indeed all of the 50 matters within the Matter Database, the client approached the Firm with an understanding or perception that a dispute already existed – this being a claim that had been put to the other side and rejected (or not responded to).  The lawyer then investigated the dispute and redefined as necessary.  This process, which Chapter 5.2 will now consider, is perhaps inevitable in the construction industry owing to the contractual requirements of construction contracts.   




5.2  The Reverse Trajectory:  Claiming, Blaming, Naming… As introduced above, the empirical data illustrated that when clients approached the Firm, they generally did so with the knowledge that a dispute existed:  they were on the receiving end of a formal claim or they wanted to escalate the dispute to the next level, if so advised by the lawyer.  Either way, disputes generally exist prior to construction clients approaching their lawyers – and the research therefore concerns the trajectory of the dispute after the lawyer’s first gaze upon the dispute. A dispute’s existence prior to the engagement of a lawyer is of course not unique to the construction industry.  In Hazel Genn’s two ‘Paths to Justice’ studies which concerned a wide range of ‘justiciable problems’201, 68% of the respondents in England and 77% of the respondents in Scotland made contact with the other side to try to resolve the dispute directly, prior to obtaining advice (Genn, 1999; Genn and Paterson, 2001).    Nevertheless, whether grievances are referred to the lawyer, as was discussed in 
“Naming, Blaming, Claiming…”, or disputes are referred, lawyers generally, though certainly not always, produce a transformation (Felstiner, et al., 1980-1981:645): “…lawyers (and others) help people understand their grievances 
and what they can do about them.  In rendering this service, they 
almost always produce a transformation…”  The suggestion here is that lawyers advise their clients as to what options they have for their grievance.  In addition, lawyers may play a part in shaping disputes “to fit 
their own interests rather than those of their clients.  Sometimes they systematically 
“cool out” clients with legitimate grievances…”  Accordingly, both passages imply that lawyers assist in the transformation grievances, through the various stages, which may or may not result in a dispute.  Felstiner, et al., perhaps could not have been more specific as to the influence of lawyers on this transformation as they recognised that data about lawyers and dispute transformations was incomplete and atheoretical owing to the paucity of observational studies of lawyer-client relationships (Felstiner, et al., 1980-1981:646). In any event, the results of this research supports the perception that claiming and disputes in the construction industry are part and parcel of construction contracts 




(Latham, 1994).  The traditional transformation of “Naming, Blaming, Claiming…”, and any other ordering of these stages (Lloyd-Bostock, 1984) generally occurs before the construction clients engaging their lawyers.  Dispute(s) tend to exist already before the lawyer’s first gaze and notably a number of disputes and dispute trajectories may have materialised.  Once clients instruct their lawyers in respect of the dispute(s) which already exists, the process thereafter is reversed at that point to:  “Claiming, Blaming, Naming…”  This is not say, as we shall see, that “Claiming, 
Blaming, Naming…” necessarily happens in this specific order or indeed the transformation only occurs ones.  Quite the contrary – the dispute transformations witnessed were muddled, messy, iterative and complex, difficult.  What was constant however, was the end goal of “naming”.   The process was reversed in the sense that the aim of the lawyer is to name, or rename, the dispute in an appropriate legal context to suit his clients’ objectives.  We investigate this reverse trajectory first with an understanding “claiming” in construction contracts.  
“Claiming” in construction contracts Construction contracts by their very nature provoke the existence of disputes.  The procedures and requirements set out within these contracts require that claims are made if, for example, additional payment or extensions of time are to be effected.  As such, the moment one party does not agree with and rejects a valuation of the works or any other decision of the contract administrator, in essence, a dispute comes into existence.  The term “claims” (eg, a contractor’s claims) is regularly used on projects to mean “application” or “request” for additional time and/or money.  It is not necessarily an adversarial term and employers/building owners and their contract administrators expect to receive contractor’s claims during the course of a project if the works do not run as-planned.  As defined by Chappell, et al., (2009, 82), a “claim” is: 
“…[a]  word…commonly used to refer to a contractor’s application 
for loss and expense and/or an award of an extension of time (qv).  
Strictly speaking, the contractor does not submit or make a claim 
[under the JCT contracts], but gives notice to the architect/contract 
administrator to address the content of the notice in accordance 




In addition, when settling the final account202, some parties may refer to the contractor’s submission as the contractor’s “claim”.  Today’s standard form contracts tend to avoid the use of the word “claims” in spirit of collaboration and cooperation, unless it is in the context of the dispute resolution procedure.  Nevertheless, it is still a commonly used word in their course of dealings, negotiations and otherwise.  In addition, some standard form contracts still expressly refer to “claims”.  For example, Clause 41.1 of the IMechE/IET Model Form of General Conditions of Contract (2010 edition)203 provides that in every time a contractor considers that he is entitled to additional monies, he must make “a claim”.  If he fails to make a claim in accordance with this clause, the purchaser will not be liable to make payment in respect of that claim.  This clause is not the dispute resolution clause of the contract – it is merely the clause under which the contractor must notify his request for additional monies. 
Notification of Claims 41.1 ln every case in which circumstances arise 
which the Contractor considers entitle him, by virtue 
of the Conditions, to claim additional payment the 
following provisions shall take effect: 
(a) within 30 days of the said circumstances 
arising the Contractor shall, if he intends to 
make any claim for additional payment, give to 
the Engineer notice of his intention to make a 
claim and shall state the reasons by virtue of 
which he considers that he is entitled thereto; 
(b) as soon as is reasonably practicable after the 
date of the notice given by the Contractor of 
his intention to make a claim for additional 
payment, and not later than the expiry of the 
last Defects Liability Period, the Contractor 
shall submit to the Engineer (with copies for 
transmission to the Purchaser) full particulars 
of and the actual amount of his claim. The 
                                                 202 “A phrase used to describe the calculation of the overall amount due to a contractor for 
works carried out under and in accordance with the contract…  Not all the standard forms of 




Contractor shall thereafter promptly submit 
such further particulars as the Engineer may 
reasonably require to assess the value of the 
claim… [Emphasis added] The express terminology used is “claim” – a claim is required if the contractor believes he is entitled to additional monies for whatever reason.  This quickly establishes the potential for a dispute.  If the engineer disagrees with the value of the contractor’s claim, a dispute exists – not necessarily a dispute which one of the parties wants to escalate to arbitration or adjudication, but one which requires attention and agreement in order to settle the final account at the end of the project.  Here “claim” is akin to “request” or “application”.     The current version of JCT suite of contracts (2011) does not expressly use the term “claim” in this way.  Rather, the contractor must “notify” the Architect/contract administer if it becomes reasonably apparent that the progress of the works is being or is likely to be delayed (Clause 2.27 of the SBC/XQ 2011) or must make an “application” to the Architect/contract administrator if in the execution of the contract he incurs or is likely to incur direct loss and/or expense that he considers requires additional payment (Clause 4.23 of the SBC/XQ 2011).  Whilst this terminology is employed, it is nevertheless akin to the use of “claim” in the IMechE contract above.  Notably, the JCT has not always avoided the use of the word “claim”.   In the 1980 edition of the Domestic Sub-contract (DOM/1) the following clauses indicate the use of the word “claim” to mean “application” or “request” for loss and expense: 
Clause 13.1:  Disturbance of regular progress of Sub-Contract Works 
– Sub-Contractor’s claims;  
Clause 13.2:  Disturbance of regular progress of Works – 
Contractor’s claims; and 
Clause 24:  Contractor’s claims not agreed by the Sub-Contractor – 




Clause 19:  Matters affecting regular progress - direct loss and 
expense - Sub-Contractor's rights However, Clause 6.14.2 (Breach of Joint Fire Code – Remedial Measures) of the 2011 edition still refers to Clause 19 as “Disturbance of regular progress of Sub-Contract 
Works – Sub-Contractor’s claims”.  Possibly a typographical error, though nevertheless, this evidences the continued use of the term “claim” to mean “application” or “request”.  Furthermore, Clause 1.8.1.4 and 1.8.1.5 uses the term “claim” to mean “application” or “request" in respect of the effect of the final payment: 
“1.8.1.4 conclusive evidence of final settlement of all and any claims 
which the Sub-Contractor has or may have arising out of 
the occurrence of any of the matters referred to in clause 4.20 
whether such claim be for breach of contract, duty of care, 
statutory duty or otherwise; 
1.8.1.5 conclusive evidence of final settlement of all and any claims 
which the Contractor has or may have arising out of the 
occurrence of any of the matters referred to in clause 4.21, 
whether such claim be for breach of contract, duty of care, 




Employer's risks 80 
80.1 The following are Employer's risks. 
• Claims, proceedings, compensation and costs 
payable which are due to 
o use or occupation of the Site by the works 
or for the purpose of the works which is the 
unavoidable result of the works, 
o negligence, breach of statutory duty or 
interference with any legal right by the 
Employer or by any person employed by or 
contracted to him except the Contractor or  
o a fault of the Employer or a fault in his 
design.  [Emphasis added] The intention here could well be third-party claims, as the contractor recovers his costs through Clause 60.1, though nevertheless, the contract is unclear (Thomas, 2012:312) and the authors perhaps used “claims” because they considered it to be a well-known or often used concept. Not only do some contracts expressly use the term “claim” within their conditions, but parties (contractors, consultants, etc) often refer to “claims” on regular basis in conversation and correspondence.  Again, by “claim”, they do not mean a “claim” in the contentious, formal dispute context, but rather merely a “claim” for an extension of time or a “claim” for more money – ie, a request for something.  This also tends to be transcribed in bespoke contract terms.  In Columns & Beams Ltd v Structures Ltd one of the parties’ contracts at Clause 10 stated: 
 “This contract is offered at an agreed fixed sum of £X + VAT and 
shall not be subject to fluctuation in any event.  Under no 
circumstances will any claim for additional costs be considered 




The following table contains three examples of other clauses extracted from bespoke contract terms and conditions: 
“The Hirer may not set-off against any monies due to The Owner 
under The Contract any amount claimed by or due to The Hirer 
from The Owner whether under this contract or on any other 
account whatsoever.” 
“The Main Contractor shall be entitled to issue any direction to the 
Sub-Contractor omitting any part of the Sub-Contract Works and 
employ others to complete the omitted part of the Sub-Contract 
Works. The Sub-Contractor shall not make or be entitled to make 
any claim against the Main Contractor for any loss of profit or 
opportunity or contribution to overheads which but for such 
direction(s) the Sub-Contractor would have received in respect of 
the omitted work.”        
“…all interim applications for payment shall set out in sufficient 
detail the gross cumulative value of the Sub-Contract Works 
properly carried out up to and including the Valuation Date 
together with appropriate deductions for any Main Contractor’s 
Discount and Retention and state the net sum that the Sub-
Contractor considers to be due to him and any applicable VAT and 
be prepared as follows: 
…any claim for the reimbursement of direct loss and/or 
expense together with sufficient details in support of each amount. 
The Sub-Contractor agrees that the inclusion of any direct loss 
and/or expense in an interim application of itself shall not be 
deemed to be compliance with the requirements of Clauses 11.12, 























the	 other	 party	 in	 respect	 of	 their	 initial	 dispute,	 for	 at	 least	 some	period	 of	 time,	
prior	to	approaching	the	 lawyer.	 	This	 included	both	one‐shotter	and	repeat	player	
clients.	 	 They	 either	 negotiated	 directly	with	 their	 opposition	 to	 try	 and	 achieve	 a	
solution	 or	 they	 instigated	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures	 required	 by	 the	
contract.		Either	way,	all	of	the	clients	took	matters	into	their	own	hands,	at	least	in	
the	 first	 instance.	 	 Generally,	 the	 client	 approached	 their	 lawyer	 at	 the	 point	 they	
believed	they	had	taken	it	as	far	as	they	could,	or	felt	that	the	only	way	to	achieve	an	
outcome	 (either	 a	 successful	 outcome	 or	 at	 all)	 was	 to	 have	 “a	 legal	 letter”	 sent	
directly	 from	 the	 lawyer.	 	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 shows	 that	 many	 construction	
clients	 approach	 their	 lawyers	 simply	 to	 advance	a	 formal	or	 “legal”	 claim,	 as	 they	
have	been	unable	 to	 achieve	 a	 desired	 result	 through	 their	 own	 efforts.	 	 This	may	
involve	the	lawyer	formally	representing	the	client	and	advancing	a	claim	against	the	
perceived	responsible	party.		Alternatively,	the	lawyer	may	draft	letters	for	the	client,	





Of the 50 matters in the Matter Database, the clients in all but two of the cases approached their lawyer with a clear vision that, unless there was some legal or strategic reason not to, the lawyer would take the next step and the next communication would come via the lawyer.  This included sending letters which demanded payment and threatened proceedings, serving proceedings or offering and conducting negotiations.  Whatever the next course of action was, it was to be carried out by the lawyer on behalf of the client. In the two matters where the lawyers did not deal with the clients’ opposition, the clients merely approached the lawyer for advice only as they intended to continue directly with the negotiations or dispute resolution procedure without the lawyer’s involvement.  For example in Matter No 36 [‘1-Meeting Advice’], the client met the lawyer for advice in advance of a without prejudice meeting the parties had scheduled.  The parties were negotiating and operating the dispute resolution clause of their contract which required a meeting of the Directors.  The client had been offered payment of approximately £300,000 in full and final settlement of the matter.  It appeared that the client requested this meeting with the lawyer to get an answer to the following question:  
The Client: Will we recover more in adjudication than the £300k WP offer on 
the table currently?   Following the meeting with his new client, the lawyer sent a long email confirming his views and answering the client’s question:  he advised that the contract machinery had not been operated and therefore it was not necessarily a straight-forward dispute.  In addition, the contract was not a straight-forward lump sum contract or reimbursable contract.  He advised that on balance it probably was a lump sum contract, but if an adjudicator found otherwise, the £300,000 probably would be more advantageous.  The lawyer ended by encouraging a settlement if possible:   
The Lawyer: …if you can tease out something with a number starting with 5 




addition, lawyers drafted letters demanding payment and otherwise which were then sent from the client on the client’s headed paper so as not to appear too aggressive.  When clients were unsure of what approach to take the lawyer and the client typically collaborated and discussed the best way forward.  Even repeat player clients with extensive legal experience (in-house counsel, etc) often wanted to discuss the options as to the way forward.  At times this would result in the lawyers drafting and sending the opposition initial “claiming” letters, following which their clients would carry out the negotiations directly without their assistance.  If the negotiations were not proceeding in a timely manner, further “lawyer’s letters” were sent. In addition, there were several matters where the client commenced proceedings, or was on the receiving end of such a claim, and felt capable of dealing with the dispute and the proceedings without the use of a lawyer.  When the proceedings reached a point where the client was either well out of his depth or for whatever reason no longer felt able to continue unadvised, he reached out to the lawyer.204     In any of the above scenarios, the dispute existed in some shape or form prior to the client engaging the lawyer.  What happened thereafter was the Reverse Trajectory:  
Claiming, Blaming, Naming…     
Claiming, Blaming, Naming… As set out above, the empirical data gathered shows that, in general, the existence and knowledge of a dispute often occurs even before a party approaches his lawyer.  The aggrieved party approaches the lawyer already conscience that a dispute exists as a claim has already been made and rejected either in part or in whole.  Owing to the procedural requirements of standard form contracts and indeed standard practice in the construction industry, this perhaps comes as no surprise.   Once the lawyer is instructed, his goal is to identify the dispute in the language of the law, in the best possible light which suits their clients’ case.  This identification of the dispute is analogous to the “naming” stage of Felstiner’s, et al., traditional dispute transformation.  In doing so, the subsequent lawyer/client relationship and process which follows mirrors the “claiming” and “blaming” stages.   
 
 




“Claiming” & “Blaming” With regard to the initial stages of “claiming” and “blaming”, this was dependent on the type of dispute in existence and the clients’ objectives.  In those cases where clients considered an agreement had been reached or they were due an agreed, fixed amount of money pursuant to an invoice or certificate, once instructed, the lawyers immediately (where appropriate) wrote to the other party, informing them that they now were on the record and reasserted their clients’ claim.  Their action in the first instance was to reassert the claim to instigate a reaction and possible payment – it often was a strategic move to demonstrate that their client meant business if payment was not forthcoming.   For example, in Matter No 24 [‘Termination’] (see above) the lawyer’s first letter was to the home owner and stated: 
The Lawyer: We act on behalf of… 
On [x] you entered into an agreement with our client to 
refurbish the above property and to design and build an 
extension to it (“the Contract”).  The Contract incorporates the 
JCT Minor Works Building Contract with Contractor’s Design, 
Revision 2 2009.   
On [x] it was agreed between the parties that the Contract would 
come to an end, subject to certain conditions and provided that 
our client would be paid for the works carried out to date.   
Over the course of the past 22 months our client has attempted 
to reach an agreement with you regarding the amount owing.  
You appear unwilling to reach an amicable agreement (as most 
recently evidenced in the last meeting on [x] with your 
representative).  Our client is not prepared to wait any longer for 
the sums it is entitled to, namely… 
Whilst our client would rather not resort to formal legal 
proceedings, it will be left with no other choice unless an 
agreement is reached promptly.  Accordingly, if you are unable 
to resolve this matter with our client by [x], our instructions will 
be to commence proceedings.  You may then become liable for 
our client’s legal costs.  




(likely because of the contract in place and the relations during the course of the project), the “blaming” stage may not exist in the Reverser Trajectory.  Alternatively, if the lawyer consider that further parties are liable, he may allocate blame elsewhere, and then proceed to claim. As such, in some matters, the process of “claiming” and “blaming” was iterative and circular, and perhaps even involved the “naming” stage.  Should the claim (or reassertion of the claim) again be rejected, the lawyer may then continue to advance further “legal” arguments, renaming or redefining the dispute, before commencing formal proceedings.  Alternatively, the lawyer may look to blame and/or claim against other parties depending on how the evidence and situation unfolds.   This was particularly the case on those matters where the client had a dispute with one party and the lawyer subsequently advised that others may also be liable from a legal perspective.  Here, the lawyer and the client collaboratively investigated the alleged facts of the dispute, possibly engaging experts if defects were involved, and allocated blame to other parties as and when (“blaming”), at times, sending initial letters putting them on notice though not necessarily detailing the exact basis of the dispute (“claiming”).  The identity of the dispute developed as the lawyer compiled the relevant facts and formed the basis of the claim and the legal argument which he believed would result in the best possible outcome for the client (“naming”). 

















The	 client	 has	 already	made	 either	 a	 formal	 or	 informal	 “claim”	 (eg,	 a	
request	 or	 an	 application	 under	 the	 contract	 provisions),	 against	 the	




2. Once	 engaged	 and	 if	 appropriate	 in	 the	 circumstances,	 after	 a	 brief	
consideration	of	the	merits	of	the	claim,	the	lawyer	reasserts	the	claim	to	
the	 other	 side,	 previously	made	 by	 his	 client	 (“Claiming”)	 and	Reverse	
Trajectory	begins.		Claiming	at	this	stage	is	not	transforming	the	dispute,	
it	is	merely	transporting	it	again	to	the	other	side.		Although	arguably	by	
the	 sheer	 presence	 of	 the	 lawyer,	 in	 some	 cases	 this	 may	 begin	 the	
transformation.	
3. The	 lawyer	 then	considers	 the	dispute	 in	more	detail.	 	 In	doing	 so,	 the	
lawyer	 may	 widen	 the	 original	 claim	 made	 by	 the	 client	 and	 make	
allegations	 against	 other	 parties	 (“Blaming”).	 	 Or	 alternatively	 he	 may	






4. All	 three	 stages	 of	Claiming,	Blaming	 &	Naming	may	 be	 iterative	 in	 an	
attempt	to	settle	the	dispute	and	avoid	formal	action;	
5. Ultimately,	 if	settlement	does	not	appear	possible,	 formal	action	is	then	
taken	(“Claiming”).	








To	 best	 illustrate	 the	 Reverse	 Trajectory,	 we	 return	 to	 Columns	&	 Beams	 Ltd	 v	
Structures	 Ltd.	 	 When	 Mr	 Hunter	 was	 engaged,	 the	 dispute	 between	 Columns	 &	
Beams	Ltd		and	Structures	Ltd	clearly	already	existed.		By	writing	his	initial	letter	to	
Structures	 Ltd	 notifying	 them	 that	 he	 acted	 for	 Columns	 &	 Beams	 Ltd	 and	 re‐
asserting	the	existing	claim,	he	commenced	the	dispute	down	the	Reverse	Trajectory	
(“Claiming”).	 	 	Here,	 there	was	no	need	 for	 the	Blaming	 stage	owing	 to	 the	parties’	
contract	 and	 it	 being	 clear	Columns	&	Beams	Ltd	was	 recovering	 the	money	 from.		




In	 Columns	&	Beams	 Ltd	 v	 Structures	 Ltd	 the	 various	 factors	 which	 shaped	 the	
dispute	at	particular	points	of	its	trajectory	included:		the	substantive	law	in	respect	
of	 payment	 under	 the	 HGCRA,	 as	 amended;	 the	 client’s	 budget	 for	 legal	 costs;	 the	
client’s	 objectives	 of	 minimising	 legal	 costs	 and	 ending	 the	 dispute	 as	 soon	 as	
possible	 –	 which	 included	 payment	 to	 him;	 the	 former	 lawyer’s	 knowledge	 of	
construction	 law,	 statutory	 adjudication	 and	 summary	 judgment	 in	 respect	 of	



















“Mme.	L.	Amic:		 What	 is	your	definition	of	 “Design”,	Monsieur	
Eames?		
Charles	Eames:	 One	 could	 describe	 design	 as	 a	 plan	 for	
arranging	 elements	 to	 accomplish	 a	
particular	purpose.”	
His	 definition	 suggests	 that	 design	 is	 somehow	 a	map	 or	 a	 strategy,	 comprised	 of	
discrete	entities,	to	meet	an	objective.		He	also	recognised	the	impact	of	“constraints”	
on	design.	 	When	asked	if	there	is	a	design	ethic,	Eames	replied:	 	“There	are	always	
design	 constraints	 and	 these	 usually	 include	 an	 ethic.”	 	 In	 addition,	 in	 respect	 of	
constraints	he	stated:	
“Design	 depends	 largely	 on	 constraints…	 	 Here	 is	 one	 of	 the	 few	
effective	keys	to	the	design	problem	–	the	ability	of	the	designer	to	
recognize	as	many	 of	 the	 constraints	 as	possible	 –	his	willingness	







Charles	 Eames	 created	 the	 following	 diagram	 to	 explain	 the	 design	 process	 as	
achieving	a	point	where	 the	needs	and	 interests	of	 the	client,	 the	design	office	and	




















interests	and	objectives	and	society	as	a	whole	have	an	overlapping	 interest	 in	 the	
design	(and	therefore	dissolution)	of	 the	disputes.	 	As	Eames	notes	 in	 the	diagram,	
the	 areas	 are	 not	 static	 entities,	 they	 develop	 and	 influence	 each	 other	 in	 turn.		
Eames	also	notes	 the	relational	aspects	of	 these	components	and	 the	act	of	design:		





More recently, academics Ralph and Wand carried out an analysis of the literature on the existing definitions of design and settled on the following as their proposal for a formal definition of design (Ralph and Wand, 2009): 
“(noun) a specification of an object, manifested by an agent, 
intended to accomplish goals, in a particular environment, using a 
set of primitive components, satisfying a set of requirements, subject 
to constraints; 
(verb, transitive) to create a design, in an environment (where the 
designer operates)” Again, this definition recognises that constraints are inherent in the design process.  It also relies on the concept of “requirements” (ie, objectives, brief, specification, etc).  There are endless definitions of “design” and “designing”: 
 “the controlling of the evolution of an idea”205  
“…what links creativity and innovation.  It shapes ideas to become 
practical and attractive propositions for users or customers.  Design 
may be described as creativity deployed to a specific end”206 
“the fundamental soul of a man-made creation that ends up 
expressing itself in successive outer layers”207   Others include notions of problem solving, communicating a message, and collaboration.  These definitions are used in various contexts and derived from professionals across multiple industries.  For example, Eames was an Architect and product designer and Ralph and Wand are academics in software engineering and information systems. In the context of law, “design” is now often associated with “Dispute System Design 
(DSD)”.  DSD is “the process of identifying, designing, employing and evaluating an 
effective means of resolving conflicts within an organisation” (PON, 2008).  It is “the 
study of how one assembles a comprehensive program of dispute resolution, one that 
encompasses a range of dispute resolution procedures specifically designed for a 
                                                 205 Professor Janice Kirkpatrick OBE, Graven Images (informal interview). 206 Sir George Cox (Cox, 2005). 207 Steve Jobs, Apple, interview in 2000 that appeared in Fortune, 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2000/01/24/272277/index.ht




particular institution, organization or stream of conflict situations” (Bordone, 2008-2009).  DSD concerns designing a process or procedure for resolving a dispute(s).  By way of example, see Chris Gill’s ‘Dispute System Design Model for Consumer Dispute 
Resolution’ presented at a workshop recently convened to investigate the implications of the new EU Directive on consumer ADR (2013/11/EU) (Brennan, Creutzfeldt, Gill and Hirst, 2015:3).   Lawyers are frequently called upon to assist with the creation and management of these systems.  Lawyers may create systems or procedures for individuals, institutions, organisations and nations and in doing so, have been referred to “dispute 
process architects” in this respect (HNMCP, 2014).   Accordingly, the notion that a lawyer has some sort of ability to design is not new.  Collins (1999:149) discusses “lawyers as engineers” in the context of translating “the 










“The	 designer	 does	 not,	 as	 a	 rule,	 begin	with	 some	 preconceived	
idea.	 	Rather,	 the	 idea	 is	 (or	 should	be)	 the	 result	of	careful	 study	
and	observation,	and	 the	design	a	product	of	 that	 idea.	 	 In	order,	




fields.	 	 He	 improvises,	 invents	 or	 discovers	 new	 techniques	 and	
combinations.	 	He	co‐ordinates	and	 integrates	his	material	so	 that	
he	may	restate	his	problem	in	terms	of	ideas,	sign,	symbols,	pictures.		
He	unifies,	simplifies,	and	eliminates	superfluities.	 	He	symbolizes	–	
abstracts	 from	 his	 material	 by	 association	 and	 analogy.	 	 He	
intensifies	and	reinforces	his	symbol	with	appropriate	accessories	to	
achieve	clarity	and	 interest.	 	He	draws	upon	 instinct	and	 intuition.		
He	considers	the	spectator,	his	feelings	and	predilections.	
The	designer	is	primarily	confronted	with	three	classes	of	material:		
a)	 the	 given	 material:	 	 product,	 copy,	 slogan,	 logotype,	 format,	
media,	production	process;	b)	the	formal	material:		space,	contrast,	
proportion,	 harmony,	 rhythm,	 repetition,	 line,	mass,	 shape,	 color,	
weight,	volume,	value,	texture;	c)	the	psychological	material:		visual	
perception	 and	 optical	 illusion	 problems,	 the	 spectators’	 instincts,	
intuitions,	and	emotions	as	well	as	the	designer’s	own	needs.	
As	 the	 material	 furnished	 him	 is	 often	 inadequate,	 vague,	
uninteresting,	or	otherwise	unsuitable	for	visual	interpretation,	the	
designer’s	 task	 is	 to	 re‐create	 or	 restate	 the	 problem.	 	 This	may	
involve	 discarding	 or	 revising	 much	 of	 the	 given	 material.	 	 By	






This passage this succinctly and robustly sets out the task of a designer – tasks which certainly are reminiscent of the lawyer’s tasks:  re-creating or restating the problem, discarding or revising much of the given material.    Designers (architects, engineers, product designers, etc) all work within constraints.  The architect, for example, designs buildings bounded by the restraints of:  the client’s objectives/brief/specification, the budget, building regulations, planning regulations, material availabilities and capabilities, his own personal agenda and aesthetic preferences, etc.  The list is endless.  Similarly, so do lawyers:  the client’s objectives/instructions, the budget, the substantive law, his own view of various disputing processes, etc. 
Designing disputes:  lawyers as designers The previous chapters discussed why lawyers routinely identify disputes, the importance of doing so in the context of formal dispute resolution procedures and how identifying the dispute is equivalent to “Naming” in the Reverse Trajectory of 












When the Firm was instructed to advance the dispute after the project had been completed, to recover all project costs incurred, the team of lawyers again set out on redefining the dispute.  To develop and draft the claim document, they took into account:  the decisions of the previous tribunals; the documents and other evidence available and able to be collected in the time allowed; the terms of the parties’ contract; the legislation and previous case law in respect of payment, limitation, interpretation of contracts, etc; the client’s objectives in respect of recovery and procedure; the client’s budget for legal costs and what could be achieved therein; the constraints of time and available resources; the employer’s previous position in respect of the dispute and the client’s perception as to how they would respond on particular issues; and the lawyer’s and client’s previous experience regarding the issues involved, their knowledge of the tribunal and their perception of the dispute.  When considering how the payment provisions of the contract were to be construed and how they envisaged that the costs should be calculated, the lawyers made the following remarks: 
 Lawyer No 1: We essentially have two options in terms of the 
calculation, each of which reveals issues.  We therefore 
just need to decide which way is best. 
 Lawyer No 2: This how the argument works intellectually for both 
options… 
 Lawyer No 1: We need to get the party line on this right… It doesn’t 
matter if we have pages and pages of narrative – that 
will be undermined if this is not right… 
 Lawyer No 2: It can be argued either way…  They actually produce the 
same result, though intellectually they are two different 
ways of looking at it.  As they produce the same result, 
we could just provide the other as an alternative 
argument. 
 [45 minutes later after a lengthy discussion on the strengths and weaknesses 
of each option…] 
 Lawyer No 3: Ok fine.  That will be the intellectual basis of our claim… In the above exchange, the lawyers recognised that the financial outcome of either calculation was identical – it was the “intellectual” argument which would be different depending on approach taken.  In other words, they were most concerned with how to describe the dispute and why calculation should be carried out in a particular way.  They were of the view that they needed “to get the party line on this 




In Matter No 6 [‘Timetable’] the drafting of the particulars of claim and basis of the dispute was criticised as being “creative” by the other side.  Here, the contractor considered that he was owed additional monies in respect of variations, retention and delay damages.  When he was unable to obtain payment from the home owners, he engaged the Firm.  Eventually the lawyer commenced litigation in the TCC.  The parties exchanged correspondence regarding the contractor’s alleged failure to comply with the Pre-Action Protocol and the home owner’s request for an extension of time for service of the Defence & Counterclaim.  One basis for the request was that the matters raised in the Particulars of Claim were new.  In one letter, the home owner’s solicitor stated: 
The Lawyer:  …The amount of some £173,000 now claimed by way of 
variations is over six times the amount originally 
demanded by your client.  The purported entitlement to 
these additional sums appears to stem from what can 
only be described as a “creative” interpretation of the 
Contract terms.  This has replaced the approach taken 
by your clients in their purported satisfaction of the 
Construction Protocol … by suggesting that such 
entitlement was due to various “non-contractual 
variations”, whatever that might mean… 
[Emphasis added] The implication here was that the scope of the dispute had expanded owing to the lawyer’s interpretation of the contract terms.  In Matter No 8 [‘Settlement 
Agreement’] the extent of the dispute also morphed as a result of the lawyer’s creative interpretation.  Here, a dispute arose between a developer and a contractor regarding payment, defects and the final account.  The parties began negotiations but did not reach an agreement.  The developer engaged the Firm at this point.  After an initial meeting with his new client, the lawyer drafted a letter to the contractor, which was sent on the developer’s letterhead.  The developer did not want to be seen as “going legal” just yet.  The email from the lawyer to the client enclosing the draft letter stated: 
The Lawyer:  Dear [Client] 
Further to our meeting yesterday, attached is a draft 
letter to [the contractor] for your consideration. I have 
highlighted any queries in bold. 
You will see that in relation to payment, I have added a 
new argument - that as there has been no application 
then there is no entitlement to payment. I think that it is 




[the contractor] had only failed to issue applications 
once or maybe twice before. 
However, this argument does contradict the issue of a 
further Certificate and withholding notice. My view on 
this is that you still issue the new Certificate but that we 
put some wording into the cover letter that says 
something along the lines of "in the absence of an 
application, I have undertaken a valuation of the works 
and enclose my Certificate". The withholding notice can 
be served and include some wording to reserve the 
position as to the applicability of clause 4.10 in any 
event… 
[Emphasis added] The lawyer considered the parties’ dispute, as described by the developer and the documents he provided.  He then redesigned the dispute and the contents of the letter reasserted the claim, including an argument that an application was a condition to payment.  This had not been in dispute between parties previously.  The letter was sent and ultimately the parties met and negotiated directly, reaching an initial agreement.   In addition to drafting new claims and reasserting old ones, witness statements are a further area where a lawyer’s confection is witnessed. 
Witness Statements A witness statement is a written statement signed by a person which contains the evidence which that person would be allowed to give orally (CPR r32.4) and stands as evidence in chief (CRP r32.5).  They first came into existence with the 1986 Rules of the Supreme Court.  Before this, witnesses gave direct oral testimony at trial.  The introduction of the witness statement was intended to save costs, eliminate surprises in respect of the witnesses and their evidence and identify the true matters in issue (Snelling and Sofroniou, 2014).  However, by 1996 they no longer served their original purpose.  As Lord Wolf stated in his 1996 Access to Justice report:  “witness 
statements have ceased to be the authentic account of the lay witness; instead they 




witness statements are still considered lengthy, elaborate and cunningly crafted by lawyers, as the quotes from the Court below indicate. In Berezovsky v Abramovich (2012) Mrs Justice Gloster (as she then was) noted that the approach to evidence in that case “led to some scepticism on the court's part as to 
whether the lengthy witness statements reflected more the industrious work product of 
the lawyers, than the actual evidence of the witnesses”. In Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit 
Suisse (2013), Leggatt J noted that a statement will inevitably go through several iterations before it is filed with the court and will often be drafted by lawyers conscious of the significance for the issues in the case of what the witness does or does not say. With regard to the witness statements in matters observed at the Firm, they were drafted by both the lawyers and their clients, depending on the particular case and the particular witness.  If the case was in litigation or arbitration, the lawyers generally drafted the statements.  Some clients provided initial narratives which the lawyers used as a starting point, though on the whole the lawyers took oral statements and developed the written statements in collaboration with the witness.  If the case was in adjudication, the drafting of the witness statement appeared dependant on the size (value) of the claim.  In order to minimise costs on smaller adjudications, lawyers often recommended that the witnesses draft their own statements.  The lawyers would provide a template, advise on what the statement should include and review the statement once drafted.  In both situations, the lawyers, working collaboratively with their clients, designed the statements to support and evidence the dispute.   














The	 adjudicator	 awarded	 Columns	 &	 Beams	 Ltd	 the	 full	 amount	 claimed	 in	 the	
adjudication,	 some	£150,000.	 	The	 full	amount	 claimed	 in	 the	 litigation	 could	not	be	
recovered	 in	 adjudication;	 however,	 Mr	 Hunter	 had	 suggested	 that	 prior	 to	 the	
adjudication	that	a	strong	win	would	enable	further	negotiations	after	the	adjudication	
for	the	remainder	of	the	monies	Mr	Cahill	sought.	
Unfortunately,	 the	story	does	not	end	here.	 	Structures	Ltd	 failed	 to	pay	 the	awarded	
sum.	
Mr	 Hunter	 recommended	 enforcement	 proceedings	 in	 the	 TCC.	 	 Again,	 Mr	 Cahill	
immediately	questioned	the	costs	of	this	procedure.	Mr	Hunter,	again,	capped	the	fees	
for	this	stage	of	the	proceedings	as	Mr	Cahill	was	very	concerned	with	costs	–	having	




On	 receipt	of	 the	enforcement	proceedings,	Structures	Ltd	 immediately	contacted	Mr	
Cahill.	 	They	wanted	 to	reach	an	agreement	out	of	court.	 	Mr	Cahill	was	prepared	 to	
settle	only	 if:	 	he	received	all	of	 the	monies	he	considered	 to	be	owed	 to	him	on	past	
projects,	 including	 outstanding	 retention	 monies,	 his	 legal	 fees	 to	 date	 and	 an	
agreement	that	there	were	no	further	issues	or	claims	to	come,	as	suggested	on	the	eve	
of	the	mediation.	



























‘Exploded Lounge Chair’ 





 Charles and Ray Eames’s ‘Exploded Lounge Chair’ diagram above208 succinctly illustrates the concepts of assembling, disassembling, equilibrium and associations.  Each object of the lounge chair is a component in its own right.  Provided the components of the chair are not assembled, arguably there is no chair in a form suitable for sitting.  However, once the components are assembled once again, the chair takes shape and meaning:  an object of a different value.  By the same token, if the components of the dispute, like the components of the chair, remain detached and their momentum is slowed to a halt, the dispute goes no further.  The components of the dispute have no relation to the others and therefore there is no dispute suitable for argument.  However, this state is only temporal.  If associations begin to reform and reassemble, the dispute takes shape and builds energy once more.  If assembled again, either in its original form or otherwise, the dispute is again in existence, capable of action and argument.   As this research revealed, disputes are rarely “resolved” in the true sense of the word.  It may take many years before disputes finally reach a true state of equilibrium and the parties no longer engage with the dispute – not necessarily resolved, just not pursued – the components are left to live other lives, fulfil other actions.  Accordingly, the pursuit of the parties and their lawyers must be “dispute dissolution” as quickly and as cost efficiently as possible.       




6.1  An overview of the outcomes An analysis of the disputes in the Matter Database revealed that the transformations of these disputes were not linear and did not proceed at a consistent pace.  Indeed, even when on the fact of it there appeared to be a conclusion to the dispute, this outcome was not necessarily clear. Firstly, by way of a background and an overview of the 50 cases in the Matter Database (Appendix 1), the following are brief statistics of the outcomes on the disputes included therein: 
How did the parties reach a conclusion? 
NO OF CASES MEANS OF CONCLUDING 15 A judge or other third party (adjudicator, arbitrator, tribunal, etc)  handed down a decision.209 23 Settled by way of negotiation (either with or without the assistance of a mediator).210 12 Unknown (either because the case is ongoing or the data simply was not available). 
 
How many forms of dispute resolution procedures were implemented? 
NO OF CASES NO OF PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTED 1 No procedures (the lawyer demanded payment in a letter and the full sum was paid) 13 1 procedure (negotiation)211 18 2 procedures 11 3 procedures 2 4 procedures 5 Unknown  
 





What procedure ultimately dissipated the dispute? 


























The diagram above shows how many cases were ended by each of the various forms of dispute resolution.  I use the word “ended”, though this refers to the dispute only at that point in time.  On a number of the disputes, it was clear that what had ended was either (1) only part of the dispute, and further negotiations were to take place between the parties on the remainder; (2) the identity of the dispute at that point in time and further issues existed to shape the dispute in such a way that meant it was likely to continue; or (3) the dispute as determined by a third party and it was unclear whether one of the parties intended to challenge the decision.  Some of the factors which contributed to the state of the outcome, ie the temporal nature of the outcome of proceedings and indeed the dispute itself (many of which are discussed elsewhere in this paper) include:  the interim nature of adjudication decisions; the obligation on the referring party to choose the identify of the dispute referred to the adjudicator; the issue of limitation; settlement agreements; the payment and dispute resolution provisions of the parties’ contract; and the objectives and perception of the parties. 






The	other	aspect	of	adjudication	which	 influences	 the	nature	of	 the	outcome	 is	 the	
fact	that	only	one	party	identifies	the	dispute	referred	to	adjudication.		The	referring	
party	 has	 the	 obligation	 to	 define	 the	 dispute	 in	 the	Notice	 of	 Adjudication	 –	 they	
choose	whether	the	entire	dispute	is	referred	or	only	one	element	of	it	is	referred.		As	




of	 a	 particular	 sum212.	 	 Any	 other	 issues	 of	 defects,	 extensions	 of	 time,	 etc	 were	
outside	the	scope	of	the	adjudicator’s	jurisdiction	(unless	relevant	to	a	claim	of	set‐
off	 in	 the	 responding	 party’s	 Response).	 	 As	 seen	 in	 Columns	 &	 Beams	 Ltd	 v	
Structures	Ltd	the	adjudication	only	concerned	payment	in	respect	of	two	invoices	





As	 seen	 in	 Chapter	 4.5	 above,	 issues	 of	 limitation	 tend	 to	 breathe	 life	 back	 into	
disputes	 which	 have	 been	 left	 to	 hibernate	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years	 for	 whatever	
reason.	 	 In	 some	 cases,	 perhaps	 claimants	 see	 it	 as	 their	 last	 opportunity	 to	 take	
action	 and	 if	 they	have	 the	 financial	 capability	 to	 take	 the	 risk,	 they	might	 as	well	
take	 the	 chance	 (as	 in	Matter	No	39	 [‘Limitation’]).	 	 In	 other	 cases,	where	 latent	
defects	appeared	on,	around	or	after	expiry	of	 the	 limitation	period,	 this	prompted	
creative	 legal	 arguments	 in	order	 to	 continue	a	dispute	which	 seemingly	had	been	
settled	many	years	before	(as	in	Matter	No	11	[‘Façade	Defects’]).			
Settlement	agreements	
The	 drafting	 of	 settlement	 agreements	 and	 the	 language	 used	 therein	 is	 a	 further	
area	which	contributed	to	 the	continuation	of	disputes	 in	a	situation	where	parties	
                                                 









seemingly concluded their dispute, only to have it take shape and momentum later on.  This was particularly the case when the parties’ agreement was vague, ill-worded or poorly documented.  For example, the settlement in Matter No 11 
[‘Façade Defects’] was reached allegedly in a meeting (during the course of the project and without the involvement of lawyers), following which the client (the contractor) sent an email to the other side (the subcontractor) which stated: 
“1. Upon obtaining a snagging list from [the building owner], a site inspection 
will be arranged whereby the scope of these works can be agreed and 
executed. 
2.   All documents required from [the subcontractor] by the client [building 
owner] to obtain practical completion will be forwarded to [the 
contractor]. 
3.   Upon receipt of a practical completion certificate from [the building 
owner] in respect of the works, [contractor] will pay to [the subcontractor] 
£4,840.00. 
4.   [The subcontractor] cancels all amounts due from [the contractor].” The subcontractor did not specifically respond to this email.  The above events were generally carried out and the contractor issued an invoice (on receipt of payment).  The invoice included the following: 
“In full and final settlement of all claims on this project between the parties 
for whatever reason whatsoever. 
Consideration is given by way of the promise of [the contractor] not to 
pursue any claims for whatsoever against [the subcontractor] and [the 
subcontractor] promise not to pursue and claim whatsoever against [the 




This issue was not unique to Matter No 11 [‘Façade Defects’] and I observed a number of disputes arising out of the terms of settlement agreements.  






The Spatial Morphosis The above are examples of entities which inform the trajectory and momentum of the dispute and whether its outcome is fixed or still in flux.  Considering the constant fluidity of these disputes and the human and non-human associations and dependencies which assemble (and are assembled) to give them their identity, these disputes can best be described as spatial214, amorphous systems which are constantly changing in shape and in name:  a spatial morphosis.215  Accordingly, for those disputes that are still in flux and no definitive end has been reached, it is difficult to see how a party might know when their dispute is truly “resolved”.  It may be the case that they do not intend to take any further action, but will the other side?  Alternatively, whilst a dispute has been “resolved” by a third party (ie, a judgment has been awarded), are the parties sufficiently happy to walk away?   Lawyers and their clients therefore need to establish, where possible, what associations and issues continue to drive the momentum of the dispute.  If this can be decelerated to a point at which parties are no longer willing to invest in its morphosis, then perhaps this is what the parties should be striving for, as the next section considers. 
                                                 214 The term and meaning spatial in this context is as Lefebvre’s defined it:  social space is a 
“shared enterprise” and “is dynamic space; its production continues over time and is not fixed to 
a single moment of completion”.  (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]) and as discussed in (Awan, Schneider and Till, 2011).  215 The term morphosis having a number of derivations, but most recently referred to in 








lawyer simply was never advised of the outcome of the matter as the client never mentioned it again and did not required any further services, or the lawyer literally never heard from that client again.  In some instances, when the lawyer contacted the client inquiring as to the outcome, it turned out that the client simply chose not to take the dispute any further, irrespective of whether the lawyer’s advice had been positive or negative.  The research could not be conclusive on why the client chose this particular course of action; however, based on the brief discussions they had with the lawyers, factors such as maintaining business relationships, the effort and resources it would have required (time) and money certainly appeared to influence their decision.  Of course in other instances, clients continued the dispute, though without the use of their lawyer.  They merely sought advice on the strength of their case, which perhaps informed their next steps.216   What enables disputes to lose momentum?  Just as the associations discussed in Chapter 4 above assemble the dispute, these are the same associations which disassemble the dispute, causing them to decelerate.  If an association is no longer bonded to or feeding into the identity of the dispute, the dispute begins to lose energy.  The aim therefore must be to disassemble these associations to the point at which the dispute becomes static, or in other words, to the point at which it reaches a perpetual state of equilibrium. The associations from which disputes are designed and assembled are three-dimensional objects which do not simply disappear.  These objects may change in shape or significance to the dispute, though are not entities which can be eliminated.  By way of example:  the client’s objectives might change from rectifying all of the defects at any cost, to rectifying only those defects which can be completed in a particular time period and the costs of which can be recovered somehow; the law may change providing more clarity on a particular issue; the client may no longer want to commence proceedings against a particular party for whatever reason, even though they still consider that a dispute exists; evidence is located which, though its meaning and content are controversial and disputed, suggests one party’s position on a particular issue is stronger than the other’s position; and the lawyer amends or caps his fees, making a particular dispute “resolution” procedure viable for his client.             No matter what the association, even if an entity is disassembled from the dispute, thereby inherently morphing the shape of the dispute, that entity still exists in some form or outline of its former self.  The key is to keep that association disassembled 








6.3  Dispute  resolution v dispute dissolution In light of the data collected and discussed above, I suggest that construction disputes are rarely ever “resolved” completely.  Whilst an independent third party (ie, a judge or arbitrator) may hand down a judgment, or the parties reach a settlement agreement, this state is often only temporal:  disputes do not necessarily end at that point.  Resolution of something suggests that a problem has been completely solved or determined.217  This research reveals that this, owing to the level of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding and contained within the associations discussed in Chapter 3 above, can only occur in certain circumstances and therefore is not the norm when dealing with construction disputes. By way of example, the table below lists those situations observed during the course of the fieldwork where complete resolution was not achieved: 
1.  An adjudicator’s decision was awarded, was interim binding and it was uncertain whether one of the parties would continue with the dispute at some point in the future. 2.  The dispute referred to the adjudicator was only part of a larger dispute, which carried on following receipt of the adjudicator’s decision. 3.  The parties reached a settlement agreement, but only in respect of a discrete issue. 4.  The parties reached a settlement agreement on vague or poorly worded terms. 5.  Limitation had not expired and it was unclear whether latent defects existed or would arise. 6.  One of the parties was not satisfied with the settlement agreement reached. 7.  The end of one dispute sparked the beginning of another.  
                                                 217 The Oxford English Dictionary online definition of “resolution” is “the action of solving a 




As discussed above, some construction disputes even dissipate, or reach a state of hibernation, for a period of time and then pick up momentum and energy some years later.  Therefore, as set out in Chapter 6.2, the ultimate goal in “dispute resolution” (to use the commonly accepted term) must be for all participants to reach this state 
of equilibrium as quickly and as cost effectively as possible:  the slowing down of the spatial morphosis and reaching the ultimate and perpetual state of equilibrium.  Again, this suggests that the concept of “dispute resolution” cannot exist in the construction industry.  Even when parties mediate and reach an agreement, it is difficult to see whether the problems have actually been “resolved”.  In a number of mediations and negotiations, the Firm’s clients agreed to settlement terms, though they clearly were disappointed.  Nevertheless, they did not want to engage with the dispute any further, and terms were achieved that both parties could walk away (at least at that point in time).  This is perhaps best exemplified by one’s lawyer’s advice to his client on the morning of a mediation: 
“At the end of today, if we reach an agreement with them and 
neither of you are happy, but both can live with it – today will have 
been a success.”    This notion that resolution is not possible has been touched on briefly in the past.  When Gulliver discusses dispute avoidance and other transformations of disputes, he states:  “the dispute is not so much resolved as deflected” (Gulliver, 1979, 1-3).  In addition, Felstiner, et al. (1980-81) states:  
“People never fully relegate disputes to the past, never completely 
let bygones be bygones (Abel, 1973:226-229):  there is always a 
residuum of attitudes, learned techniques, and sensitivities that will, 
consciously or unconsciously, color later conflict.  Furthermore, 
there is a continuity to disputing that may not be terminated even 
by formal decision.  The end of one dispute may create a new 














has  been  a  complete  drain  on  both  finances  and  my 
mental  well‐being  for  the  past  2  years  and  had  I  not 
contacted you I am sure that this would have dragged on 
for a  lot  longer.   From the moment  I came and saw you 
at your offices I felt in safe hands and your guidance and 




















what	 extent	 do	 construction	 lawyers	 control	 or	 direct	 this	 outcome?	 	 	 The	 starting	
point	of	 the	research	 is	 from	the	 lawyer’s	 first	gaze	on	 the	dispute	–	how	does	 the	
agency	of	construction	lawyers	impact	the	dispute	trajectory	and	to	what	extent	do	
they	 shape	 and	 transform	 these	 disputes?	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 one	 of	 its	 aims	 and	
contribution	to	knowledge	and	previous	studies	was	to	break	down	the	office	door	of	
the	 law	 firm,	 which	 traditionally	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 barrier	 to	 exploring	 and	
researching	 what	 happens	 “behind	 the	 scenes”.	 	 The	 research	 aimed	 to	 provide	 a	
textual,	 narrative	 account	 of	 construction	 disputes	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	
their	 nature.	 	 With	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 ‘vanishing	 trial’	 and	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 ADR,	
society	has	less	of	an	opportunity	to	see	and	learn	from	these	disputes.		This	research	




was	 participant	 observation	 in	 all	 of	 the	 firm’s	 activities,	 centring	 principally	 on	
those	 lawyers	 involved	 in	 disputing.	 	 The	 lawyers	were	 involved	 in	wide‐range	 of	
dispute	 “resolution”	 procedures	 (to	 use	 the	 commonly	 accepted	 term)	 including	
litigation,	 arbitration,	 dispute	 boards,	 adjudication,	 mediation	 and	 of	 course	
negotiation.	 	 The	 basis	 of	 the	 research	method,	 and	 indeed	 part	 of	 the	 theoretical	
framework,	was	 the	Actor‐Network	Theory	 (ANT).	 	This	was	most	productive	as	 it	
enabled	 the	 study	 to	 include	not	 only	 those	 human	elements	which	 influenced	 the	






human	 elements	 (eg	 evidence,	 documents	 and	 the	 substantive	 law).	 	 Notably	 ANT	
method	of	tracing	of	these	associations,	results	in	the	ethnographic	data	itself	being	
the	 explanations	 of	 these	 associations.	 	 Accordingly	 narratives	 were	 provided	
through	 out	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 and	 provide	 a	 contextual	
account	of	these	disputes.					
As	 such,	 this	 research	 viewed	 a	 dispute	 as	 a	 set	 of	 associations	 –	 an	 entity	which	
takes	form	and	acquires	its	attributes	as	a	result	of	 its	relations	with	other	entities.		





files	 and	 archives,	 thus	providing	 information	 for	quantitative	 analysis	 (the	Matter	
Database,	 see	 Appendix	 1).	 	 This	method	 proved	most	 successful	 as	 I	 was	 able	 to	
observe	 and	 participate	 in	 numerous	 disputes	 and	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures,	
thus	providing	access	 to	construction	 lawyers	and	 the	dealings	 they	had	with	 their	
clients	 during	 the	 trajectory	 of	 construction	 disputes.	 	 Being	 both	 participant	 and	
observer,	stranger	and	friend,	enabled	me	to	obtain	an	in	depth	understanding	of	the	
lawyer/client	 relationship,	 the	 activities	 the	 lawyers	 carried	 out	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	
achieve	their	clients’	objectives,	the	issues	the	lawyers	considered	significant	on	each	
case	 and	 the	 factors	 which	 influenced	 decision‐making	 and	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	
dispute.	
The	 Matter	 Database	 was	 particularly	 helpful	 in	 that	 as	 it	 documented	 key	
characteristics	 of	 the	 clients	 and	 their	 disputes,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 analyse	 the	 themes	
which	emerged	against	the	typology	of	the	client	and	the	dispute.	 	For	example,	the	




lawyer	 through	 to	 the	outcome	of	 the	dispute.	 	During	 the	course	of	 the	 fieldwork,	
clearly	 not	 all	 of	 the	 disputes	 I	witnessed	were	 concluded	with	 a	 distinct	 outcome	






momentum	 and	 dissipate,	 only	 to	 take	 shape	 again	 in	 the	 future,	 results	 in	 the	
perhaps	frustrating	situation	for	the	parties	that	they	cannot	be	certain	the	dispute	
has	 ended.	 	 Furthermore,	 as	 people	 rarely	 let	 bygones	 be	 bygones	 and	 residual	
attitudes,	perceptions	and	sensitivities	still	exist	after	the	dispute	seemly	has	ended,	
certain	 associations	 and	 entities	 which	 created	 the	 dispute	 may	 be	 eternal.	 	 This	
certainly	was	 the	 sentiment	 in	Columns	&	Beams	Ltd	v	Structures	Ltd	 as	we	saw	
above	in	Mr	Cahill’s	final	email	to	Mr	Hunter.		 
Having	 followed	 the	 lawyers,	 their	 clients	 and	 the	 disputes,	 the	 research	 revealed	
that	 construction	 disputes	 typically	 materialised	 prior	 to	 any	 one	 of	 the	 parties	
approaching	 a	 lawyer.	 	 Once	 the	 lawyer	 is	 engaged,	 the	 Reverse	 Trajectory	 of		
“Claiming,	Blaming,	Naming…”	is	invoked.		The	lawyer’s	role	and	aim	is	to	identify	or	
name	 (or	 rename)	 the	dispute	 in	 the	best	possible	 light	 for	 their	 client	 in	order	 to	
achieve	 the	 desired	 outcome	 –	 the	 development	 of	 which	 is	 akin	 to	 the	 design	
process.	 	 The	 transformation	 of	 a	 dispute	 is	 not	 linear,	 but	 rather,	 iterative	 and	
spatial	as	it	requires	alliances,	dependencies	and	contingencies	to	assemble	and	take	
the	shape	it	does.	
Lawyers	 play	 a	 part	 in	 controlling	 or	 directing	 the	 outcomes	 of	 disputes	 by	
influencing	the	design	and	the	identity	of	the	dispute	–	the	naming	of	the	dispute	–	in	
collaboration	with	their	clients.		In	designing	the	dispute,	they	assemble	associations,	
contingencies	 and	 dependencies,	 these	 being	 the	 factors	 which	 influence	 the	
outcome	 of	 construction	 disputes.	 	 Their	 role	 is	 constantly	 in	 flux,	 reacting	 to	 the	
momentum	of	the	dispute	and	the	objectives	of	the	client.		They	do	not	merely	dictate	
control	 over	 the	 client	 at	 all	 times,	 they	 jointly	 identify	 with	 the	 client	 the	 best	
strategy	and	best	way	 forward	 taking	 into	account	and	designing	 the	dispute	 from	
the	associations	categorised	in	Chapter	4	above	(eg,	evidence,	client’s	objectives,	the	
substantive	 law,	 etc).	 	 The	 lawyers	 studied	often	 led	 the	process	 and	 the	decision‐
making	in	terms	of	the	creative	legal	and	intellectual	arguments	and	any	procedural	
issues.	 	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 Goffman’s	 (1959:152)	 notion	 of	 lawyers	 as	 “service	
specialists”	in	that	they	“formulate	the	factual	element	of	a	client’s	verbal	display,	that	
is,	his	team’s	argument‐line	or	intellectual	position”.		Having	said	that,	there	were	also	







Furthermore,	 the	 client	 too	 was	 not	 a	 stable	 entity	 and	 transformed	 during	 the	
trajectory	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 As	 their	 requirements,	 objectives	 and	 perceptions	
morphed,	so	did	the	dispute.		This	research	did	not	purport	to	(nor	could	it	possibly)	
identify	specifically	what	these	elements	were;	nevertheless,	their	transient	presence	
clearly	 influenced	 lawyering	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	
communication	and	translation	process	between	the	lawyer	and	his	client	added	to	
the	 shape	 and	 complexity	 of	 the	 dispute.	 	 Each	 had	 their	 own	 language	 which	
required	 interpretation	 into	 a	 common	 language,	 or	 a	 common	 environment,	 that	
both	 could	 operate	 such	 that	 decisions	 could	 be	made	 and	 next	 steps	 taken.	 	 The	
oscillation	 between	 these	 environments	 provided	 challenges	 for	 efficiently	 dealing	
with	the	dispute	and	indeed	miscommunication	and	mistranslation	has	the	potential	
to	manipulate	 the	 dispute	 in	 a	manner	 contrary	 to	 the	 client’s	 objectives,	 possibly	
renewing	the	dispute	or	expanding	and	redefining	it.						
The	 temporal	 nature	 of	 the	 lawyer’s	 role,	 the	 client	 and	 the	 lawyer/client	
relationship	are	inherent	within	the	fluid	composition	of	the	dispute,	which	in	itself	
is	 temporal	 and	dependent.	 	When	 referring	 to	 individuals	and	 the	presentation	of	
self,	Goffman	(1959:13)	stated:	
“Information	 about	 the	 individual	 helps	 to	 define	 the	 situation,	
enabling	others	to	know	in	advance	what	he	will	expect	of	them	and	
what	 they	may	 expect	of	him.	 	 Informed	 in	 these	ways,	 the	others	
will	know	how	best	to	act	 in	order	to	call	 forth	a	desired	response	
from	him.”		
I	 suggest	 this	 is	 equally	 applicable	 to	 disputes:	 	 given	 the	 complexity	 of	 these	
disputes,	lawyers	and	their	clients	need	information	about	the	dispute	to	define	the	
situation	and	know	how	best	to	act	and	call	forth	a	desired	response.		This	research	
assists	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 that	 general	 understanding	 of	 the	 composition	 of	












certainly	 a	 basis	 for	 further	 research,	 drawing	 from	 the	 data	 collected	 herein.	 	 As	
their	current	practice	is	a	constant	search	for	the	name	and	the	design	of	the	dispute,	
the	 focus	 now	 needs	 to	 shift	 from	 assembling	 the	 dispute	 to	 disassembling	 the	
dispute.	 	To	what	extent	this	disassembly	can	be	achieved	without	first	naming	and	









issues	 and	 sentiments	were	 unlikely	 to	 be	 forgotten,	 describing	 and	 informing	 the	
parties	that	their	dispute	is	“resolved”	was	simply	masking	and	denying	that	matters	
and	concerns	were	still	in	existence,	but	the	parties	had	opted	to	walk	away.			
Accordingly,	 I	 posit	 that	 “dispute	dissolution”	 is	 a	more	 appropriate	 term	 and	 does	
not	provide	a	false	hope	to	parties	in	advance	of	engaging	a	lawyer.		Managing	client	
expectations	 is	 perhaps	 one	 element	 in	 the	 quest	 to	 disassemble	 the	 dispute.	 	 The	
goal	of	dispute	dissolution	is	to	disassemble	the	components/associations	of	a	dispute	
to	 the	 extent	 they	 are	 kept	 in	 equilibrium	eternally.	 	 	 The	 industry	would	be	well‐
advised	 to	 investigate	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 is	 possible	 without	 first	 renaming	 and	
designing	the	dispute.			
In	this	respect,	 the	relational	and	complex	contract	 theories	discussed	 in	Chapter	2	
are	 informative.	 	 Let	 us	 consider	 again	 the	 following	 which	 replaces	 the	 word	
“transaction”	 with	 “dispute”	 in	 Macneil’s	 summary	 of	 the	 four	 core	 propositions	
which	 inform	 any	 relational	 approach	 to	 contracts	 are	 (Macneil,	 2003;	 Macneil,	
2000):	
1.			 every	dispute	is	embedded	in	complex	relations…	
2.			 understanding	 any	 dispute	 requires	 understanding	 all	
elements	 of	 its	 enveloping	 relations	 that	 might	 affect	 the	
dispute	significantly…	





4.			 combined	 contextual	 analysis	 of	 relations	 and	 disputes	 is	
more	efficient	and	produces	a	more	complete	and	sure	final	
analytical	 product	 than	 does	 commencing	 with	 non‐
contextual	analysis	of	disputes…	
As	 with	 relational	 contracts,	 if	 we	 approach	 relational	 disputes	 in	 the	 same	 light,	
those	 dealing	 with	 disputes	 need	 to	 recognise	 all	 significant	 relational	 elements	
which	 form	 or	 influence	 the	 disputes	 prior	 to	 carrying	 out	 a	 combined	 contextual	
analysis	 the	 dispute	 and	 its	 relations.	 	 In	 the	 fourth	 core	 proposition	 above,	 the	
“product”	which	 the	parties	 and	 their	 lawyers	must	be	 striving	 for	 is	 the	 complete	
equilibrium	of	the	dissipated	disputes.	
How	this	analysis	of	the	relational	dispute	is	carried	out	is	food	for	thought,	though	
borrowing	 the	 concept	 of	 “reverse	design”	 from	Karl	Aspelund,	 a	 designer	 across	 a		
number	 of	 disciplines,	 may	 offer	 a	 way	 forward	 (Aspelund,	 2015:14).	 	 Firstly,	
Aspelund	 considers	 there	 to	 be	 seven	 stages	 of	 design:	 	 (1)	 Inspiration;	 (2)	
Identification;	 (3)	 Conceptualization;	 (4)	 Exploration/Refinement;	 (5)	





of	 many	 possible	 problems”	 and	 that	 once	 ideas	 go	 through	 the	 seven	 stages,	 a	
tangible	design	results	(Aspelund,	2015:1).				
Firstly,	drawing	from	Aspelund’s	seven	stages	of	design,	if	we	recall	the	lawyer’s	role	
within	 the	 disputing	 process	 (naming	 the	 dispute	 in	 the	 best	 possible	 light	 for	 his	
client)	 and	 appreciate	 how	 this	 is	 akin	 to	 the	 design	 process,	 it	 seems	 Aspelund’s	
trajectory	 may	 have	 some	 relevance	 to	 the	 lawyer’s	 design	 process	 in	 respect	 of	
assembling	 disputes.	 	 Secondly,	 in	 terms	 of	 practically	 disassembling	 the	 dispute,	














Aspelund	 considers	 that	 having	 traced	 the	design	process	backward,	 “you	can	now	
see	the	way	forward	for	any	project”	(Aspelund,	2015:16).	
It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 perhaps	 the	 next	 step	 in	 understanding	 and	 disassembling	
construction	 disputes	 is	 to	 undertake	 one	 such	 “reverse‐designing”	 exercise	 on	 a	
dispute,	 as	described	 above.	 	 To	do	 so,	 as	Aspelund	goes	on	 to	 explain,	 this	would	
require	 “considering	 [the	dispute’s]	elements,	components,	 structures	and	production	




the	 light	within	which	 this	research	has	done,	perhaps	going	 forward,	by	using	 the	
design	 process	 itself,	 we	 can	 redirect	 the	 lawyer’s	 efforts	 from	 “naming”	 and	












1A Litigation - adjudication enforcement
1B Litigation - arbitration issue




5A Mediation - settlement - after proceedings commenced
5B Mediation - settlement - prior to any proceedings commenced
6 Other recognised form of ADR
7A Settled - negotiation - prior to any process/proceedings
7B





Typology of the parties
I OS v OS
II RP v OS
III OS v RP
IV RP v RP
Work Types
Code Client Matter
1 Individual Construction Litigation
2 Individual Other Litigation




7 Construction Company Construction Litigation
8 Construction Company Other Litigation
9 Construction Company Non Litigious
10 Construction Company Adjudicaiton
11 Construction Company Arbitration
12 Construction Company Mediation
13 Other Company Construction Litigation
14 Other Company Other Litigation
15 Other Company Non Litigious
16 Other Company Adjudication
17 Other Company Arbitration
18 Other Company Mediation
Settled - negotiation - after process/proceedings commenced (but 































































































































































































































D 7 Payment of outstanding invoice Payment 1 month 7A 0 demand 
payment

















ongoing 9 2 litigation (stat 
demand), 
negotiation






Employer E 13 Advice regarding consultant's 
services & conflict of interest










Payment 24 months 5A 3 negotiation, 
litigation, 
mediation





















RP IV Claimant Standard Form ‐ 
JCT SBC 2007 
(~£12,000,000)








3 months 7B 2 negotiation, 
adjudication





























unknown 2 2 negotiation, 
arbitration












Defects unknown 2 3 negotiation, 
litigation, 
arbitration
RP IV Claimant Bespoke 
(~£1,000,000)










ongoing 2 2 negotiation, 
arbitration










Payment 9 months 7B 3 adjudication, 
litigation, 
negotiation











Payment 9 months 7B 3 adjudication, 
litigation, 
negotiation





Consultant A 13 Review of competence from 
professional regulation body
Other 12 months 1C 1 litigation (2 
tribunal 
hearings)






Other unknown 9 1 negotiation RP III Defendant employment 
contract







Payment 5 months 5A 3 negotiation, 
litigation, 
mediation























































































































































































































Payment 24 months 2 3 negotiation, 
Dispute Board, 
Arbitration
RP IV Claimant Standard Form:  
FIDIC Pink Book 
(with amends) 
USD 2.5m n/a Yes Yes








2 months 9 unknown unknown OS I Defendant £10k (appt.)  
~£550,000 (JCT 
Rev 4 2002)





















20 months 4 2 negotiation, 
adjudication








22 Subbie v Contractor Subbie E 7 Contractor/Subbie Final Account 
Dispute  (Subbie seeking 
payment from Main Contractor)









Payment 3 months 4 2 adjudication, 
negotiation
















Payment 4 months 7A 1 negotiation OS I Claimant Standard Form:  
JCT Minor 
Works (D&B)










Payment 5 months 7A 1 negotiation 
(and use of Pre‐
Action Protocol)
RP IV Claimant Bespoke £229,320  £388,000 No No
26 Contractor v Subbie 
('Defective Glue')
Subbie A 15 Contractor/Subbie Defects 
Dispute























Subbie D 7 Payment of outstanding invoices Payment 12 months 7B 2 litigation, 
negotiation







Contractor K 7 Payment of outstanding monies Payment 2 months 7B 2 negotiation, 
litigation





D 4 Dispute regarding Final Account Payment 9 months 4 2 negotiation, 
adjudication
OS II Defendant No contract 
("cost plus" 
price for works)




Developer E 7 Payment for architectural 
services
Payment 2 months 9 1 negotiation OS I Defendant No contract:  
"gentleman's 
agreement"
approx £5k £0  No No









n unknown Defendant Standard Form ‐ 
JCT SFB 1998
£250,000  £0 No Yes




Payment 5 months 5A 3 negotiation, 
litigation, 
mediation
RP IV Claimant Bespoke ‐ 
Letterof Intent 
(~£150,000)




Subbie D 7 Payment for several outstanding 
invoices on two projects








Subbie A 7 Dispute concerning payment Payment 
& Defects
12 months 4 2 negotiation, 
adjudication



























































































































































































































Contractor A 7 Dispute concerning payment Payment 1 day 7A 1 negotiation OS III Claimant Bespoke 
(~£5,000,000)
£1m unknown No No
37 Main Contractor v 
Subcontractor




Defects 18 months 7B 2 negotiation, 
arbitration
RP IV Defendant Bespoke 
(~$25,000,000)




















D 10 Final Account Dispute Payment 5 months 4 2 negotiation, 
adjudication






~£1m n/a Yes No
40 Subbie v Contractor 
('Withholding monies')
Subbie A 7 Main Contractor withholding 
monies from Subcontractor




















Supplier D 5 Dispute concerning payment 
pursuant to a shareholder 
agreement
Payment 10 months 7B 2 negotiation, 
arbitration












B & G  7 Dispute concerning defects Payment 
& Defects
ongoing 1 2 negotiation, 
litigation










Payment 2 months 7B 2 negotiation, 
adjudication
RP unknown Claimant Standard Form:  
NEC3 (~ 
£1,500,000) 





Subbie H 7 Dispute concerning payment ‐ 
Main Contractor failed to make 
any payment
Payment 4 months 4 2 negotiation, 
adjudication




approx £50k £0 No No
45 Employer v Contractor Employer A 7 Dispute concerning flooring and 
roof defects




unknown unknown Yes No
46 Employer v Contractor 
('Roof Defects')
Employer A 13 Dispute concerning roof defects Defects ongoing 9 unknown unknown RP IV Claimant Standard Form:  
JCT Standard 
Form ‐ amended









Payment 9 months 7B 3 negotiation, 
adjudication, 
litigation























OS unknown Claimant Bespoke (approx 
£200k)








15 months 7B 3 negotiation, 
litigation, 
mediation
RP IV Defendant Standard Form:  
NEC3 
Subcontract 
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